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ABSTRACT 
Plato, Souls, and Motions 
by 
Brian D. Prince 
Plato's late works contain an unexpectedly consistent treatment of the physics 
and metaphysics of souls. In the course of showing this, I argue that: (1) the mid-
dle period dialogues Phaedo and Republic assume, but do not mention, a Form of 
Soul; (2) the Timaeus contains a physical theory according to which all changes of 
every kind are forms of spatial motion; (3) Plato's view of souls as self-movers is 
identifiable in more of his late dialogues than is usually recognized (namely, in 
the Statesman as well as in the Phaedrus, Timaeus, and Laws); (4) in the definition 
of souls as self-movers, "motion" should be read as "spatial motion" rather than 
"change" in general, and (5) neither the Phaedrus nor the Timaeus contains the 
claim that human souls are immortal, while both dialogues contain a concept of 
"soul-stuff;' a material from which individual souls are manufactured. 
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0.1 Introduction 
This dissertation describes and analyzes two kinds of relations in Plato's philos-
ophy: those between individual souls and visible items, and those between indi-
vidual souls and Forms. It is a commonplace that Plato's metaphysics posits two 
distinct worlds, a realm of abstract, unchanging, eternal Forms lying outside space 
and time, and the world of sensible, changing, perishable, spatiotemporally lo-
cated things among which we live. Now individual souls do not exactly fit into 
either of these worlds. Scholars often react to this fact by saying that souls have 
one foot in each metaphysical realm, or somehow stand between them. Individ-
ual souls can become aware of items in both worlds, for example, so on the ancient 
epistemological principle that "like is known by like," souls must somehow be like 
both worlds. But how this is possible, since the two worlds are defined by qual-
ities that are opposed to one another?1 Further, the opposed qualities here are 
not first-order properties applying to individual items, such as "hot" or "cold;' 
but second-order properties describing the ways an item possesses its first-order 
properties. Examples of these second-order properties include "stable" and "un-
stable;· "eternal" and "destructible;' "mutable" and "immutable." That is, while 
Plato gives common-sense accounts of how visible items partake of opposing pairs 
of qualities of the first type, the same account rules out any entity's partaking of 
opposing pairs from the second list. These properties are not susceptible to Plato's 
treatment of first-order properties, since the two worlds are defined through the 
opposition of the second-order pairs. This problem is one aspect of the more gen-
1Phaedrus 246c-d, for example, asserts that souls move back and forth between the two worlds, 
and describes souls doing so, but says nothing about how this is possible in the first place. 
1 
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eral problem addressed in this dissertation: reaching greater clarity and detail in 
understanding how individual souls relate to each of Plato's worlds. 
My central finding is that Plato has two distinct theories describing these re-
lations. The first, which I shall call the Imitation Theory, often goes unrecognized 
in Plato's dialogues, so the first task will be to show that it is there. The second, 
which I shall call the Self-Mover Theory, is announced explicitly in a few dialogues 
(the Phaedrus, Timaeus and Laws), but is sometimes thought to have little impor-
tance outside these few brief passages. Each of these theories is found in certain 
central Platonic texts, and each appears to be coherent.2 On certain central issues 
the two theories at least imply distinct conceptions of souls and their relations, 
and at most are incompatible. 
Before introducing the two theories in more detail, two points about what I will 
not do in this dissertation: First, this dissertation is part of a larger project, ask-
ing how Plato treats relations among souls and Forms, and among souls and the 
visible world, and also what these relations tell us about the nature of the entities 
involved. I mostly do not address the second stage of the project here, namely ask-
ing what the relations tell us about the natures of the relata, although occasionally 
I will comment on this issue. Second, my interests lie in the relations between in-
dividual souls and Forms, and between individual souls and visible items; I do not 
intend to discuss relations between Forms and visible items, except in passing. 
There is already an extensive literature on that topic, whereas the one I address 
has only been studied sporadically. 
Several claims I shall defend are not new qua assertions; previously, these claims 
21 make no claim that these two theories exhaust the list; there may be yet other ways of treat-
ing these relations in other Platonic texts. 
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have been put forward in passing, without detailed consideration, argument, or 
often even evidence. In these cases, the contribution of this dissertation is to of-
fer, for the first time, a detailed defense, including textual evidence and explicit 
reasoning from the texts to the claim in question. 
Here, to introduce the two theories, are their most salient claims. The Imita-
tion Theory claims that there is a Fonn of Soul along with the other Forms mentioned 
explicitly. However, Plato never mentions this Form. This theory is found in the 
Phaedo and Republic. The Self-Mover Theory claims that individual souls are sources 
of their own spatial motions. It is found in the Phaedrus, Timaeus, Laws, and Statesman. 
These theories are distinct and, in my view, incompatible. In the Phaedo, souls are 
souls in virtue of partaking of the Form of Soul; in the Phaedrus, however, some-
thing is a soul if and only if it is a self-mover. Prima facie, these are different ways of 
conceiving of individual souls. To describe these two theories in their own right, 
and then to compare them, would fill a much larger project than this dissertation. 
Therefore, in discussing each theory, I shall focus on certain problems, those need-
ing to be addressed immediately to substantiate my claims that these theories are 
part of Plato's works. 
The Imitation Theory 
I shall call the first conception of how individual souls are related to Forms and 
the visible world the Imitation Theory. The Phaedo and Republic ascribe an epony-
mous relation to each visible thing and the various Forms it partakes of: snow is 
snow because it partakes of the Form of Snow, is cold because it partakes of the 
Form Cold, is white because it partakes of the Form White, and so on for all visible 
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objects and for all their properties.3 I will assume that this pattern, relating Forms 
and visible individual items, holds over the texts housing both theories, positing 
the Forms as originals and visible items as their images. The passage on the di-
vided line, for example, sets out this hierarchical structure of reality, according to 
which items at each level are images or imitations of items at higher levels (Rep. 
509d-511e). The most important claim for which I shall argue, in discussing the 
Imitation Theory, is that this theory assumes the existence of a Form of Soul along 
with the many other Forms it posits openly. The Form of Soul is never mentioned, 
making the path to showing its existence somewhat long. For this reason, Chapter 
1 is mostly taken up with showing this Form's existence, and having done this, has 
less space to investigate what follows about the nature of souls and their relations 
with Forms and visible items. 
If there is a Form of Soul, individual souls will participate in Forms just as do 
visible items, and in particular they will qualify as souls by participating in the 
Form of Soul. Establishing that there is a Form of Soul will contribute much to our 
picture of individual souls, for souls differ from visible items in perhaps the most 
important category for Plato, namely, souls are invisible, while visible items are, of 
course, visible. So if there is no Form of Soul, we cannot look to the model of visible 
items for any help in understanding how the metaphysics of souls work. On the 
other hand, if there is a Form of Soul, we can infer that individual souls derive their 
most basic property - being souls - from participation in that Form, in parallel 
with the way visible items work. This fact, in turn, will help explain many other 
claims about souls found in the Phaedo and Republic: that souls do best when most 
3Some parts of this description of the theory of Forms are controversial, but in broad outline 
this is a standard account. I argue for the details of this view in Chapter 1. 
5 
removed from the visible world, for example. At least when a soul is doing as well 
as it can, then, it will be quite similar to the Forms. The theory thus suggests that 
souls become more like the kind of things they imitate. An individual soul, when 
in a good condition, is similar to the Forms and dissimilar to visible items, and vice 
versa when the condition of a soul is bad. I infer from this that there is something 
about individual souls in virtue of which it is good for them to resemble Forms, 
and bad to imitate visible items. I explore these issues more in Chapter 1. 
The Self-Mover Theory 
Call the second theory the Self-Mover Theory, after its most salient claim, that in-
dividual souls are self-movers. It is both more nuanced than the Imitation Theory 
and incompatible with it. Here are two reasons for thinking the two theories in-
compatible. First, the Imitation Theory holds that souls in the best possible con-
dition (such as the gods) are exempt from change, or very nearly so, but the Self-
Mover Theory implies that all souls, even the best, change at all times. Second, 
the Imitation Theory implies that souls become more like what they imitate. So 
on the Imitation Theory, when souls do change, the source of the change seems 
to lie outside themselves, originating in the entity being imitated. The Self-Mover 
Theory, however, locates the source of changes in each soul within that soul it-
self. It does not, in my view, deny that souls can also receive changes from outside 
themselves, but merely adds the claim that each soul is also a source of its own 
changes. The Self-Mover Theory takes pains to deny, however, that there is any 
source of change anywhere in the universe that is not a soul. By contrast, as we 
have just seen, the Imitation Theory allows souls to change as a result of imitat-
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ing objects in the visible world, with those objects serving somehow as sources of 
the changes in those souls. The two theories give different answers, then, to the 
question whether there can be changes within individual souls that have, as their 
ultimate origin, something that is not a soul. 
The interest of the Self-Mover Theory is not exhausted by the claim that souls 
are self-movers, but also involves some other innovative and little-recognized views. 
The most important of these is found in the Timaeus, which contains the elements 
of a comprehensive theory of change, which I shall call the Kinetic Theory. I dis-
cuss the Kinetic Theory in Chapter 2. The main claim of the Kinetic Theory is that 
all change, of every type whatsoever, is nothing but spatial motion. When con-
joined with the Self-Mover Theory, the Kinetic Theory is of crucial importance 
for its role in explaining relations among souls and the visible world. For, as I 
shall argue in Chapter 3, the Self-Mover Theory does not advance the relatively 
vague claim that souls are sources of their own changes, but the much more spe-
cific claim that souls are sources of their own spatial motions. The Kinetic Theory 
shows how being a source of spatial motions is sufficient for being a source of any 
kind of change. So when the Self-Mover Theory is combined with the Kinetic The-
ory, they yield a powerful and sweeping claim about the relations among souls 
and the visible world, the claim that there are no sources of spatial motion, and 
therefore no sources of any type of change whatsoever, other than souls. I shall 
call this combination of the Self-Mover and Kinetic Theories the Unified Theory. 
In scope and consequence, the Unified Theory should thus be ranked among the 
most important theories in Plato's works. 
The Unified Theory covers every change one might propose, from changes in 
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temperature to changes in color, and even proposes an account on which changes 
in age or time are also nothing but spatial motions. It follows that the changes in 
the visible world depend for their existence on souls and the motions (or changes) 
they initiate. The texts do not tell us how to apply these theories to answer most 
of the questions they raise, but an obvious way of filling in their broad claims is to 
think that the Demiurge (best known from the Timaeus) is the soul responsible for 
all the changes in the inanimate parts of the visible world that would otherwise 
be difficult to trace to a soul or souls. 
This relation introduces another contrast with the Imitation Theory: on that 
theory, the clearest relation was between souls and the Forms, while on the Self-
Mover Theory souls are most clearly related to visible items, with their relation 
to the Forms much less explicit. These theories express not just different, but 
opposed tendencies, the first emphasizing relations between souls and Forms, the 
second emphasizing relations between souls and visible items, the first making the 
visible world a source of change, the second denying this. (I am speaking in terms 
of "emphases" because that is the most directly observable feature of the texts.) I 
take it that according to both theories, individual souls participate in Forms, but 
to substantiate this claim for the Self-Mover Theory is far from straightforward; in 
this dissertation I have the more limited aims of (a) showing that the two theories 
are in the texts, and (b) showing how the Kinetic and Self-Mover Theories comple-
ment one another. There are many questions I will not discuss in this investiga-
tion, perhaps most prominently, questions about how the two theories differ, and 
about how much they may have in common. These are, at least for myself, among 
the most intriguing questions raised by my arguments. Except for scattered spec-
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ulations, I will confine myself to the more basic work of establishing the contents 
of the two theories. 
Two Interpretive Issues 
Chapter 3 compares claims across four of Plato's dialogues, the Phaedrus, Laws, 
Timaeus and Statesman. This raises questions about how my arguments relate to 
two fundamental issues in Platonic scholarship, which I address here at the outset. 
First, what assumptions lie behind the comparisons I will make there among 
the four dialogues, and what, precisely, do I hope to establish with these com-
parisons? The major approaches to this problem are developmentalism and uni-
tarianism, the first explaining differences among dialogues by imagining a narra-
tive of how Plato's thought changed over time, the second denying that the texts 
are committed to (importantly) incompatible claims, and explaining apparent in-
compatibilities by finding different purposes in the texts in question, rather than 
attributing them to different periods of Plato's life.4 
The second problem is how to think about the relation between the characters 
in the texts and the author of those texts. On this question there are again two 
characteristic positions, which I shall call "internalist" and "externalist." The in-
ternalist approach prefers to explain why a claim is made by a character in one of 
the dialogues by referring to features internal to the same dialogue. This approach 
is inspired by recent work in literary criticism, and highlights concerns such as the 
personalities, capacities, and motivations of the interlocutors, the type of discus-
sion the participants are engaged in, and any conventions governing that kind of 
4For a balanced discussion of this issue, see Annas (2002) with the reply by Frede (2002). 
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conversation. All these factors must be taken into account in thinking about why 
a character makes a certain claim, and thus no claim found in the text can be at-
tributed to Plato, or directly compared to claims found in other dialogues, before 
appreciating how its immediate context may have moved that character to make 
that particular assertion. By contrast, the externalist view is more confident that 
at least some claims can be attributed to Plato, perhaps on the basis of their persis-
tence through a number of texts, or because we see characters in the text arguing 
more carefully for these claims, or even just because the claim is made by Socrates. 
This last consideration gives the name "mouthpiece view" to some variants of this 
approach, since one of its working assumptions is that Socrates often functions as 
Plato's mouthpiece in the dialogues. 
I next explain how my arguments here remain independent of these two issues, 
and follow this with brief remarks about how I see this dissertation in the light of 
these debates. 
Developmentalism vs. Unitarianism 
I will argue in Chapter 3 that the four dialogues I discuss there contain, or make, 
the same claims on certain points. This result can, in principle, serve either de-
velopmentalist or unitarian accounts. A developmentalist (if also an externalist), 
for example, could take it as evidence that Plato was philosophically committed 
to these claims at a certain period of his life, or (if an internalist), as evidence that 
Plato wrote arguments of this type at a certain period of his life. But these are 
further claims, detachable from the less ambitious existence claim that these four 
dialogues contain the same positions; how to fit these claims into a developmen-
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talist or unitarian account is not part of my argument, and neither alternative 
follows from it. 
In the first instance, the mere fact that these claims are found in the text is 
significant, as is their correct interpretation. After establishing that the claims 
are there, and what they mean, one can then proceed to the stage of using this 
data to build a position on the higher-level question of what the presence of these 
claims contributes to the developmentalist-unitarian debate. This, of course, is an 
idealized picture, since arguments establishing what a passage means usually draw 
to some extent on higher-level claims as premises. Nevertheless, it remains the 
case that trying to establish the best reading for a certain piece of text is logically 
at a lower level, and should be, as much as possible, a temporally prior enterprise 
to settling on a developmental or unitarian perspective. 
In sum, comparisons among dialogues anywhere in this dissertation should 
not be taken as support for either side of the unitarian-developmentalist debate. 
Internalism vs. Externalism 
In the same way, I take my arguments to remain independent of the internalist-
externalist debate, although navigating this controversy is a more subtle business. 
To begin, the claims I argue for should be of interest to members of both camps. 
First, for externalists, to find that a certain group of dialogues contains the 
same claims on a central topic will obviously form an important data point. It 
would be far too quick, of course, even for a committed externalist, to argue im-
mediately that Plato was committed to these views just because they are found 
in four of his dialogues: much more consideration of the sort of data internalists 
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pay attention to would be required as well. But again, since the mere existence of 
these claims, and the best way of reading them, has not usually been seen, and if 
seen, has not been argued for in detail, my goal in this chapter is just to establish 
that the claims are in these texts, and (in Chapter 3) that they should be read as 
claims about spatial motion rather than generic change. Which positions these re-
sults happen to support in further debates about Plato is not immediately at issue 
here.5 
Less obviously, internalists should also find it significant that Socrates in the 
Phaedrus, the Athenian Stranger in the Laws, Timaeus in the dialogue bearing his 
name, and the Visitor in the Statesman all claim (explicitly or implicitly) that souls 
are in motion. Suppose, for example, that an internalist is asking why Socrates 
makes this claim in the Phaedrus, and proposes factors x, y and z as an answer. It 
may then be illuminating to ask whether any or all of these factors are also present 
for the Athenian Stranger, for Timaeus, or the Visitor. Of course the absence of the 
same factors for the other characters would not show that the original proposal 
was wrong; but if some of them turned out to be common to the other characters 
making this claim, this would provide a further result that the internalist could 
endorse as useful. More to the point here, my project is uncommitted to either 
externalism or internalism, for what I propose to compare are claims or contents, 
not characters. Further, I make no arguments about whether or not we should 
attribute the theories found in Plato's texts to Plato himself; when I occasionally 
write as if I am discussing views held by Plato, this should be taken as shorthand, 
to the effect that the views in question are present in Plato's texts. 
5In general, I see no incompatibility between internalism and externalism, except the most 
extreme varieties. But this issue too lies outside the scope of this dissertation. 
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In sum, I shall be arguing that certain claims exist in certain dialogues, and 
that these claims have the same content: these existence and identity claims are 
significant if put to either kind of further use, or even to no further use. 
My Views 
while the developmentalist-unitarian debate is important, and should be kept in 
sight, progress lies at the level of claims that can be defended more concretely. 
One's location on the unitarian-developmentalist continuum, by contrast, tends 
to rest on judgments less susceptible to exact treatment. None of the arguments 
in this dissertation supports grander narratives about Plato's life or thought, but 
only, perhaps, a miniature narrative about his thinking on one point. I take the 
arguments of this dissertation to fulfill a prediction made by Annas: 
The intellectual development story might be argued on the basis of 
the content of the dialogues alone, without depending on their formal 
features ... probably a careful study would produce a variety of changes, 
and also some radically different points of view, that do not fit into a 
single neat picture of development. 6 
The changes I argue for in this dissertation are not intended to hint at a larger, 
grander set of changes explaining Plato's writings; instead, I take them as one 
small piece of a very large puzzle. In my view we do not at the moment know what 
large-scale patterns, if any, we will find when more of the puzzle is assembled. 
Locating and describing the pieces of the puzzle may also be a more fruitful project 
than speculating about what the whole puzzle could eventually turn out to look 
like. 
6 Annas (2002, p. 16) 
13 
0.2 Chapter Contents 
chapter 1 argues that the Form of Soul is assumed in the Phaedo and Republic, and 
begins to ask what this theory implies about the nature of individual souls, that is, 
what individual souls must be like in order for this theory to describe their rela-
tions with the two worlds, those consisting of the Forms and visible items. Chap-
ter 2 sets the stage for the Self Mover Theory by introducing the Kinetic Theory, a 
theory found in the Timaeus, carrying far-reaching consequences for our under-
standing of the Self-Mover Theory. Chapter 3 argues that in each of the three texts 
that clearly advocates the Self-Mover Theory (the Phaedrus, Timaeus, and Laws) the 
best reading of "motion" and related words takes them to mean "spatial motion;' 
"locomotion;· rather than the more common reading, "change in general;' or "any 
kind of change." This claim gives the Self-Mover Theory a very specific content, 
and connects it to the Kinetic Theory, so that the conjunction of the two is itself 
a comprehensive theory of change. I also argue in Chapter 3 that the myth told 
in the Statesman commits its teller to certain claims from the Self-Mover Theory, 
specifically the thought that the soul of the Demiurge rotates in space, and the 
claim that constant spatial rotation in the same direction counts as a way of not 
changing. Chapter 4 extends my reading of Phaedrus 245c-246a from Chapter 3. 
Here I add the argument that ¢ux~ ("soul") in this argument refers to the sort 
of "stuff" from which individual souls are made, and not (directly) to individual 
souls. Chapter 4 shows that the Timaeus and Phaedrus both treat souls as having a 
two-level structure, the lower level consisting of "soul-stuff;' some kind of mate-
rial out of which individual souls are made, the upper level consisting of whatever 
features are added to the soul-stuff to make an individual soul. It further shows 
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that in neither of these dialogues is there a claim that individual human souls are 
immortal or imperishable. The common claims about souls and motions support 
the suggestion that the Self-Mover Theory and the Kinetic Theory complement 
one another, serving a common end. 
The metaphysics of individual souls under the Self-Mover Theory are more 
complex than previously realized. The arguments that follow attempt to reveal a 
small part of the landscape of the metaphysics of souls in the Platonic texts; by 
doing so, they also indicate how much more territory remains to be explored. 
Chapter 1 
The Imitation Theory 
The Phaedo's two most prominent philosophical topics are the theory of Forms 
and the immortality of individual souls.1 This would lead us to expect that the 
intersection of these should also be of central importance. That is, just as Plato 
explains that any instance of tallness is to be explained by participation in Tallness 
(Phaedo 102b-c), and that any instance of a bed is due to its participation in the 
Form Bed (Republic 596a-b), one also wants to know whether instances of souls are 
souls because they participate in a Form of Soul. If so, this Form would presumably 
contribute to explaining why souls are immortal, intelligible, divine, etc. (Phaedo 
BOb). On the other hand, if there is no Form of Soul, it is natural to ask how Plato 
explained what makes individual souls souls. It is hard to believe -perhaps even 
implausible- that he had no views on this subject. Plato's focus on Forms and 
souls in both the Phaedo and Republic makes these questions inescapable. But when 
1"Form" refers to the transcendent Forms of Plato's theory; "the form of x" refers to an im-
manent form, also sometimes called a "property-instance;• a "character," etc. The word "soul;' 
uncapitalized, will refer to an individual soul throughout, except when it occurs in a translation or 
quotation. When I mean a Form of Soul, either immanent or transcendent, I will write "the Form of 
Soul;' "the immanent form of soul," etc. Translations are taken (and occasionally modified from) 
those in Plato (1997). Greek text is from Plato (1989) or Plato (2003b). 
15 
16 
we see how central they are to his interests, it also becomes clear how carefully he 
has steered around them in these texts.2 This chapter first asks what conclusions 
we should draw about the existence of the Form of Soul in the Phaedo and the 
Republic. Having argued that this Form is assumed, I demonstrate how its presence 
is reflected in many of the claims these texts advance about individual souls, then 
discuss how to think about Plato's silence on this Form, and finally ask what the 
Form of Soul tells us about the nature of individual souls in these dialogues. 
This problem has been the object of only occasional comment, and even less 
sustained attention by scholars. A little more than a century ago, Archer-Hind and 
Burnet took opposite sides on this question in their respective commentaries on 
the Phaedo. First, Archer-Hind in 1894: 
It is true that an idea of soul is a metaphysical monstrosity; but we 
cannot escape it here ... This is one of the errors which Plato rectifies 
in his later dialogues; for the present we must bear with it. 3 
In 1911 Burnet, apparently in reply: 
There is not a word about the soul being itself a form or io€a, nor is 
such an assumption required. The soul may perfectly well be said to 
'occupy' the body without being itself an idea. It is a simple military 
metaphor ... and implies no metaphysical theory.4 
2See Dixsaut (1991, p. 397}, Loriaux (1975, p. 132}, Gueroult (1926, p. 488). 
3 Archer-Hind (1894, p. 116) 
4Burnet (1911, p. 123). Both comments are unclear about precisely what question is being 
addressed. The most reasonable inference, however, is that both are discussing whether there is 
a Form of Soul: no one should wonder whether individual souls are Forms, even if they are very 
like Forms. For first, each Form is unique (Republic 597b-d), while there are many souls. Second, if 
individual souls were Forms, they would be immortal by the most basic assumptions of the theory; 
no argument would be required. 
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Unfortunately, Archer-Hind provides only a hint of his reasoning that a Form of 
Soul is presupposed, and Burnet's answer explains just as little. Neither position 
can claim to be obviously right. 
I shall side with Archer-Hind in claiming that the Phaedo, and later, the Re-
public, are best read as assuming a Form of Soul, which nevertheless goes unmen-
tioned. While I would stop short of calling it a "metaphysical monstrosity;' it is 
not hard to see the source of his worry. Forms are unchanging, but it is hard to 
think of something perfectly unchanging as alive. Whether the charge of mon-
strosity sticks depends on details of the Form theory that lie beyond the scope of 
this dissertation. 5 
1.1 The Problem 
At Phaedo 78b Socrates proposes to investigate "to which class the soul belongs." 
Two pages later, he has found 
... that the soul is most like (O}lOt6rarov) the divine, deathless, intel-
ligible, uniform, indissoluble, always the same as itself, whereas the 
body is most like that which is human, mortal, multiform, unintelligi-
ble, soluble, and never consistently the same. (80a10-b5) 
The thought is clearly that individual souls are like the Forms in virtue of the fact 
that both souls and Forms share the properties of being divine, deathless, etc.6 One 
5For example, if there is a Form of Soul, and it is essentially connected to the Form of Life, it is 
a further question whether the Form of Soul is itself alive, or whether this only implies that indi-
vidual souls (and the bodies they occupy) are alive. The former alternative seems more monstrous 
than the latter. 
6The claim that the reference is to individual souls will be defended below. McPherran supposes 
the comparison is between souls and the gods, but the context of the passage is established at 
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might easily think that the explanation for this is that among the Forms is a Form 
of Soul; for if there is no Form of Soul, then souls and Forms are different kinds of 
thing in the most basic sense. This last statement requires some clarification, for 
any individual item is different "in the most basic sense" from any Form, in the 
metaphysics of the Phaedo. This is because Forms and visible items are defined by 
the theory as kinds that differ in strong ways: Forms are eternal and unchanging, 
whereas visible items are temporary and changing. But each visible individual 
(as I shall argue below) has some things in common with some Forms: each of its 
properties is an imperfect instance of a property that one of the Forms instantiates 
perfectly. My red sweater and the Form Red, for example, share the property of 
redness; each has the same property, but in different ways. But if there is no Form 
of Soul, individual souls do not share their property of being souls with anything. 
This is the sense in which I have just claimed that if there is no Form of Soul, souls 
and Forms are different kinds of things in the most basic sense: they differ even 
more than most visible objects differ from the Forms they instantiate. 
It would then require some explanation how souls can be O}lot6tat'ov, "most 
like" the Forms, when they are such different kinds of things. Again, while carry-
ing out this investigation, Socrates has posited "two kinds of existences, the visible 
and the invisible" (79a6-7), and the soul is meant to fall into one or the other of 
these. So if souls are part of the invisible realm, and their properties are those 
of the Forms, there is some close connection between souls and the Forms. Since 
no alternative is put forward by the text, the most obvious and straightforward 
explanation would be that there is a Form of Soul. 
78c10-d7 where the reference is exclusively to Forms. The gods are not mentioned in the course 
of the argument. (McPherran 2006, p. 93) 
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For most ordinary objects in our world, Plato's theory says that they rely for 
their being on a Form or Forms. Ordinary qualities and objects are thus analogous, 
in Plato's theory, to marionettes that dangle on the ends of strings. What we see 
in our world is dependent on, and in some mysterious way controlled by, what is 
going on up higher, in the world of Forms. The first question I ask in this chapter is 
whether souls dangle in the same way from a Form of Soul, or whether the souls in 
our world have some other way of existing that relieves them of this dependence 
on Forms, or at least of depending on the Form of Soul (since they depend on many 
other Forms for whatever knowledge and virtues they have). The theory made 
explicit by Plato in the Phaedo and Republic offers two alternative answers to my 
question: either souls depend on a Form of Soul, or they do not (and thus they 
have some other way of existing that does not depend on Forms). My answer will 
be that, although this is never made explicit, souls work in the same way as other 
entities; there is a Form of SouF 
Writing about the Phaedrus, Charles Griswold points out that there are dire 
consequences for self-knowledge if there is no Form of Soul: 
If there is no Idea of the soul, then there does not exist a comprehen-
sive and divine Episteme of the soul; not even the gods could know the 
soul in the highest sense of the term. Hence self-knowledge is not, in 
principle, perfectible. If there is no Idea of the soul, then there is no 
anamnesis of the soul qua soul, and self-knowledge cannot in prin-
7Robinson's view is similar to the one I will argue for here, although he gives only a kind of 
summary: "There [sc. in the Phaedo] the soul had been assimilated to the Ideas, and the hiatus be-
tween the unmoving Intelligible World and that of sensible things subject to motion had meant an 
inadequate explanation of the soul as we experience it in the world of movement ... the elementary 
attribute of all living things, movement, was quietly shelved, and the static, homogeneous, un-
changing entity whose immortality he was left to prove was recognizable only to himself:' (Robin-
son 1995b, p. 114) 
ciple be recollective in that sense. Human souls are not intelligible 
as images of an original principle of Soul, and the world is populated 
not by images of Soul but by souls. No one has ever had the experi-
ence of gazing directly into the immutable essence of man, for such an 
essence does not exist if there is no Idea of the soul... The question of 
the existence of an Idea of the soul, then, is by no means an insignifi-
cant one.8 
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Recall Phaedo 80a10-b5, quoted at the beginning of this section. There the soul is 
put in the category of the invisible, and among the properties of invisible things 
is being intelligible. How can individual souls be intelligible, given these claims, 
unless those souls have an essence? And in the Phaedo, having an essence means 
having a Form. More precisely, if souls are intelligible without an essence in the 
Phaedo, this will require some metaphysical explanation of how this is possible. 
But there is no hint of any such alternative explanation that would apply to souls 
in the text. Absent this additional theory, the inference consistent with the text 
is that the soul is intended to fit the same pattern as other objects that have cor-
responding Forms. 
It is sometimes asserted or argued, however, that the theory of Forms in the 
Phaedo recognizes Forms only for certain restricted classes. After giving the posi-
tive evidence for a rich domain of Forms I will show why the various attempts to 
limit that range are mistaken.9 I then argue that the final argument for the soul's 
8 (Griswold 1986, p. 89) See also p. 260 n. 21 for a summary of earlier scholarship on the question 
of a Form of the soul in the Phaedrus, all of which denies it (and, incidentally, with which I concur). 
9By "rich domain" I mean- roughly- a Form for every predicate or for every natural kind, 
with the caveat that if the details were completely filled in, some Forms suggested by this brief 
description might not appear in the list of all Forms. For example, some linguistic expressions 
describe artificial categories (e.g., "red ball to the left of a yellow cat"), and it is plausible that Plato 
would not want to include these. Again, some natural kinds might not need Forms, for Plato might 
want to account for them by appealing to combinations of other Forms (snow, for example, might 
be analyzed as water and cold, so there might be no need for a Form of Snow in a fully developed 
theory). On the other hand, in arguing for a "rich domain" of Forms I mean that there are Forms 
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immortality in the Phaedo (102a-107a) presupposes a Form of Soul, and that the 
argument for the soul's immortality in Republic X (608d-611a) also uses this Form. 
I then note a group of claims in the Phaedo and Republic that may be attributed 
to the influence of the Form of Soul. These are the claims that change is bad for 
souls, and stability good. The culmination of this view is found in the picture of 
the gods as perfect, changeless souls. I then address the question of why Plato is 
silent about the Form of Soul. Finally I outline what kind of thing an individual 
soul is, in the theory of the Phaedo and Republic. 
How and When to Fill In 
Some writers claim that treating the Phaedo and Republic as containing a single 
theory of Forms is a non-starter, because the various claims about Forms do not all 
fit together neatly. For readers who already accept that these texts contain a single 
theory of Forms, the argument of this section will be superfluous. Here I shall 
argue that even if the conjunction of claims about Forms in these two dialogues 
produces a rather messy theory, we should still treat this as a single theory. 
How specific a commitment to any claim or theory must we find in the text 
before we ascribe that claim or theory to the text? Plato's writing is often sugges-
tive, vague, and gestures toward positions and arguments that it does not pursue 
in detail, and not every target of such a gesture, of course, is legitimately imputed 
to a dialogue. I assume that if a passage can be read in more than one way, the 
best way is that which coheres with the other claims made explicitly in the text. 
for a class approximately equivalent to all the natural kinds or all the predicates, i.e. lots and lots 
of Forms, and without restrictions such as those I shall argue against below. 
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Second, when the text makes some rather general claim (as it often does), and 
there are several ways of filling in the details, we may not be able to decide on 
one as correct; several possibilities may remain. This is part of the difficulty of 
interpreting Plato. But it also happens that some ways of filling in the details gen-
erate problems of various kinds. These have to be weighed carefully, but I assume 
that the bare fact that such problems arise (on some ways of filling in the details) 
does not by itself show that we should not attribute the view in question to Plato, 
or to one of his characters. In these difficult cases, we have to make a judgment 
about the text while weighing all factors. So the difficulties produced by a certain 
reading are relevant, but not immediately decisive. 
Suppose I am a planner designing a city, and I issue a general instruction to 
put the entrances to buildings facing east. I give some illustrations of why this 
will be best, referring to supermarkets, gas stations and schools as I do so. I then 
die, and those who succeed me must try to decide whether I meant for all buildings 
to have east-facing entrances, or only those of the types I referred to. If nothing 
in the instructions gives a reason for restricting the range of my instruction, then 
the best inference is that I intended the instruction universally. Even if it turns 
out that for a few individual buildings, some fact about the landscape or their 
purpose makes it impossible to put the entrance on the east, this does not show 
that the instruction was not intended to be general. In the same way, the fact that 
problems arise with certain Forms does not show that Plato did not intend the 
theory of Forms in the Phaedo and Republic to be general, i.e. to include Forms for 
a wide range of terms and types. 
Here is an application of this issue. Gallop says about the theory of Forms: 
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"Immense difficulty is incurred if these [different] roles are conflated by treating 
all Forms alike as postulates of a single, comprehensive 'theory'," referring to the 
roles of Forms as paradigms and as universals. "The paradoxes incurred by at-
tributing the character F to the Form F were recognized by Plato and explored in 
the later Parmenides ... They can easily be generated if the paradigmatic and uni-
versal roles of the Forms are confused."10 This is the kind of problem described in 
the previous paragraph: if the details of Plato's theory are completed in certain 
ways, paradoxes result. Do these paradoxes rule out these ways of filling in the de-
tails? I agree with Gallop that it would be unlike Plato to accept paradoxes as part 
of his theory, provided that Plato would analyze the paradoxes as real ones, and 
not instead as problems requiring further work.U But against this consideration, 
there is the fact that the texts of the Phaedo and Republic show no recognition of 
the paradoxes, and the treatment of the paradoxes in the Parmenides may be taken 
to show that Plato thought of the difficulties as problems to be worked on, rather 
than as insurmountable obstacles. The unity of the Phaedo as a dialogue gives us an 
initial reason to attribute unity to philosophical theories expounded within it, nor 
do the characters show any awareness that there are different theories of Forms 
within the Phaedo. For these reasons I find it unacceptable to think there is more 
than one theory of Forms within either dialogue. 
In later chapters, however, I will often argue that a certain passage, which 
can be read in two ways, must be taken in the way I favor because the alternative 
10(Gallop 1975, pp. 97, 128) It is also sometimes argued that there is not enough in the Phaedo to 
qualify as a theory at all, e.g. by Gonzalez (2002), Hyland (2002), Annas (1981, p. 217). I (obviously) 
assume this is not so, but will not address the issue further here. 
11 Socrates makes much of his reluctance to accept a theory leading to paradoxes (at least in his 
view) at Phaedo 96d-100e. 
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produces some logical difficulty. This is consistent with the method I have just 
outlined. The difference is that in the Phaedo we have a rich supply of evidence 
pointing to a rich domain of Forms, and my argument is that we should follow 
this evidence, letting it trump the difficulties produced by some of the Forms it 
generates. On the other hand, in the cases that will arise later, there is no an-
tecedent evidence favoring one side over the other, so that difficulties on one side 
are the most decisive reasons we have for preferring the other. 
1.2 The Rich Domain of Forms in the Phaedo 
The theory of Forms in the Phaedo includes a Form of Soul, although this com-
mitment usually goes unrecognized. In this section I consider the evidence that 
Socrates intends to posit a wide range of Forms in the Phaedo; in the following sec-
tion I respond to specific arguments against a rich domain of Forms. Now many 
writers on the Phaedo do accept that there are meant to be Forms for some quite 
broad class, such as the natural kinds or predicates. But these comments are some-
times made hesitantly, and often do not point to the evidence in favor of this. In 
fact the evidence is broader than the hesitation would suggest, so it is appropriate 
to review it here. Given more explicit statements (e.g. Republic 596a) in other dia-
logues, perhaps scholars do not think it worth the trouble to adduce less definite 
passages. But I want to argue that the Phaedo itself posits a Form for every general 
term or natural kind, so the following passages are worth discussingY Some of 
these texts make no sustained arguments, but this is no reason that they cannot 
12! will not try to decide between the domains of general terms and natural kinds. 
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indicate the kinds of Forms Socrates has in mind during the conversation in the 
Phaedo. 
Phaedo 65d-e 
Forms come into view early in the dialogue. Socrates gets Simmias to agree that 
there is such a thing as the Just itself, the Beautiful itself, and the Good itself, then 
continues, "I am speaking of all things such as Bigness, Health, Strength, and, in 
a word, about the reality of all other things (rwv &A.Awv ... an:avrwv), that which each 
of them essentially is (rfj<; ouoia<; 0 ruyxavEl EKCXOTOV ov)" (65d13-el)Y If there is 
no Form of Soul, there is nothing that a soul essentially is, and the final argument 
for the soul's immortality is doomed from the start, since it tries to prove that 
individual souls are essentially related to the Form of Life. For something that 
lacks an essence cannot be essentially related to anything.14 
Phaedo 76d-e 
In the course of the argument from recollection, Socrates brings up the Forms, 
then says, "we refer all the things we perceive to that reality ... " (E:n:i raurrJv (sc. 
ouo{av) ra EK TWV aio8~0EWV n:avra ava<pEPO!-!EV, 76d9). Here all visible things 
are put in one group, to be contrasted with the other kind, the Forms. This too 
implies that there is a Form corresponding to every kind of perceptible thing. 
Again, consider this exchange from later in the same argument: 
13 Rowe (1993, pp. 140-141) doubts that the theory of forms is yet in view, while Ebert (2004, 
p. 137) agrees that the theory is being discussed. I assume that since the participants later affirm 
their familiarity with the theory, it is also in play here. 
14Note that this argument is effective whichever of the two interpretations of the nature of the 
"Form-bringers" is adopted (see page 46 below). 
What of the many beautiful particulars, be they men, horses, clothes, 
or other such things, or the many equal particulars, and all those which 
bear the same name as those others? Do they remain the same or, in 
total contrast to those other realities, one might say, never in any way 
remain the same as themselves or in relation to each other? -The lat-
ter is the case; they are never in the same state. (78dl0-e6) 
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One might easily read this passage as indirect confirmation of the hypothesis of 
a limited range of Forms. For Socrates comes close here to speaking of Forms of 
men, horses, and clothing, but careful reading shows that he is not speaking of 
such Forms at all. Instead, he is only picking out those particulars insofar as they are 
beautiful, and his reference is to the Form of Beauty. So this looks like a passage in 
which Plato has carefully steered around any reference to a rich domain of Forms. 
This might be thought evidence for the thesis (to be considered in a moment) that 
there are only Forms for some limited range. 
But this conclusion is not as strong as might first appear. If we reflect on Cebes' 
answer, it is clear that he is thinking of the whole class of visible entities. He does 
not need to consider anything about beautiful visible things in particular to give 
this answer; it is all visible things that change constantly, and it follows immedi-
ately that this is also true of beautiful visible things. So the import of the question 
is to contrast the visible and the invisible realms. Given this purpose, it is less cer-
tain that no Forms for substantives are involved. Cebes' statement suggests that 
Forms have something to do with the explanation of any property of any visible 
entity. The passage thus leaves it open that there may be Forms for any property 
and for any substance, while the limitation to a narrow range of Forms has no 
explicit support here. 
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Phaedo 100c 
Later in the dialogue, Socrates explains his approach to generation and destruc-
tion by saying, "if there is anything beautiful besides the Beautiful itself, it is beau-
tiful for no other reason than that it shares in that Beautiful, and I say that all things 
are in fact this way (Kai navm Sry ovrw~ Uyw)" (100c4-6).15 The correct reading of 
this statement depends on the meaning of mi:vra:, "all." 
The word navra: at 100c6 might echo the same word at 100b7; if so, it would 
continue to mean "all the Forms;' as it did there. On this reading, Socrates would 
only be endorsing his schema for instances where there is a Form available. So this 
reading does not imply a rich domain of Forms. Alternatively, navra: could mean 
"every particular thing [that shares in a Form]." On this reading Socrates would 
be endorsing a rich domain of Forms, since he would be assuming a Form for any 
particular someone might name. 
There are good reasons to prefer the latter reading. First, the earlier use of 
navra: to designate "all the other Forms" occurred at an earlier step in Socrates' 
development of his position. At 100c3 he asks Cebes to examine "ra E:~fi<; EKEi-
vot<;" ("what follows these things"), showing that the schema he proposes at c4-6 
is a distinct claim from his earlier assertion of the existence of the Forms at bS-7. 
So we should not necessarily expect the two instances of navra: to designate the 
same things. Second, the meaning of navra: at c6 is controlled by ourw<;. Since 
15 Another common translation of the crucial phrase is: " ... and I say so with respect to every-
thing"; the difference in translation makes no difference to the interpretations discussed here. 
Burnet takes this sentence to indicate a general argument that would generate Forms for any gen-
eral term, while Gallop takes the statement to express the same theory as Republic 596a, thus yield-
ing Forms for every general term: Burnet (1911, p. 110 ad 100c5), Gallop (1975, p. 182). So also 
Rickless (2007, p. 33): " ... and the phrase 'I say so with everything' indicates that Socrates takes the 
thesis to be fully general." 
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Socrates says "Kcxl mivra (5~ ourwc; Aiyw," whatever he means by "everything;' it 
must be something he can speak about "in this way." The way in question is the 
schema has just proposed: "if there is anything beautiful besides the Beautiful it-
self, it is beautiful for no other reason than that it shares in that Beautiful:' This 
schema, in turn, was introduced in order to find the cause of generation and de-
struction: the problem was first raised at 95e10, and Socrates has just repeated his 
promise to show Cebes r~v a:ir{a:v ("the reason or cause") at 100b8. Now genera-
tion and destruction happen only to sensible things and to souls. So it would not 
make sense here for Socrates to use mivra: to refer to "all the Forms," since they 
do not undergo generation or destruction. Rather, he must be referring to partic-
ular sensibles, since these undergo generation and destruction, and this is what 
he has promised to show the cause of. The correct reading of 100c6, then, is "and I 
say that all [sensible things] are this way." Note also that mxvra: gets extra weight 
from the following particle 8~. confirming that the application of this formula is 
general.16 And since the formula applies generally to all sensibles, Socrates must 
be supposing that there is a Form answering to any sensible thing or quality that 
might come up in discussion. There must be a rich domain of Forms.17 
Weak Nonidentity 
Vlastos identified a principle he called "weak nonidentity," whose structure helps 
to make clear the need for a rich domain of Forms. The principle says that "sen-
16Denniston (1954, s.v. !.iii) Nehamas asserts without argument that mivra: ("everything") must 
be restricted to incomplete predicates: Nehamas (1973, p. 472). 
17Terms of all kinds come up for discussion in Plato's dialogues, although the most difficult to 
define naturally get the most attention. For examples see Irwin (1977, p. 134). 
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sibles are not F in virtue of themselves; they are F by being suitably related to a 
form of F.''18 Socrates in the Phaedo and Republic thinks souls are virtuous by being 
suitably related to various Forms - perhaps to Forms in general (Phaedo 8la), or 
perhaps to a Form for each virtue, and to the Form of the Good most of all (Repub-
lic 505a, 526d-e, 534c). These passages suggest that weak nonidentity applies not 
only to sensibles, but to any individual item in Plato's metaphysics. If souls are 
invisible individuals, weak nonidentity applies to them too.19 
Here is how weak nonidentity appears in the passages we have already exam-
ined.20 The passage at 65d-67d argues that the Forms are separate from the body, 
that is, from anything physical. Then Socrates' "safe" explanation claims "if there 
is anything beautiful besides the Beautiful itself, it is beautiful for no other rea-
son than that it shares in that Beautiful..." (100c4-6). Since the Beautiful itself is 
completely separated from the physical, and therefore from sensible individuals, 
it follows that no sensible individual is ever beautiful in virtue of itself or any other 
sensible individual. This is weak nonidentity. The "safe" answer has the form "if x 
is f, it is f for no other reason than that it shares in F-ness" (lOOc). The safe answer 
thus has two slots to fill: "x" stands for an individual, and "F-ness" stands for a 
transcendent Form.21 The use of this principle in the Phaedo implies that souls are 
not souls in virtue of themselves, but in virtue of the Form of Soul. In order to 
defeat this inference, we would need to find some reason in the text that specifi-
18See Vlastos (1954, p. 326). The quoted version comes from Fine (1993, p. 207, punctuation 
modified). 
191 defend the view that the soul is an invisible individual in the final section of this chapter, 
page 80. 
20Rickless (2007, p. 39) also locates it at 74b7-c6. 
21The formula refers to "an individual" rather than "a sensible individual," since there may be 
invisible individuals as well. 
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cally rules it out, or gives an alternative explanation for souls. But there is no such 
evidence in the text. 
Phaedo lOlc 
A little later Socrates says, "you would loudly exclaim that you do not know how 
else each thing can come to be (E'Kcxo-rov ytyv6l-!Evov) except by sharing in the par-
ticular reality in which it shares (sc. a Form)" (lOlcZ-4).22 The specification of 
each thing that comes to be as the target of this theory implies that it covers all 
cases of becoming; this, again, was the general problem {raised at 95e10) to which 
Socrates is responding. So for every case of becoming there is some Form in which 
the thing comes to share. Socrates provides no limitation on the range of things to 
which he refers here; it is clear that he has some indefinitely wide range in mind. 
The emphatic affirmation Socrates imagines for Cebes, along with the refer-
ence to the "safety" (cf. &:crcpcx.Aou<;, lOldZ) of the hypothesis a few lines later, adds 
force to this implication, as does the declaration of Echechrates (102a4-6) that 
what Socrates had just said was "wonderfully clear to anyone of even small intel-
ligence."23 Echechrates takes the import of the theory to be easy to grasp, and this 
presumably means that he takes it to be perfectly general. Had it relied on under-
standing some limitation or definition of a special class not enunciated in the text, 
it could not seem accessible to someone "of even small intelligence." 
22For the translation "coming to be" rather than "being" (another meaning of ytyv6].1EVOV), see 
Dixsaut (1991, p. 380 n. 287). 
23The same point is made by Bostock (1986, pp. 196-197). I read Echechrates' statement as 
without irony; I see no hints of irony in any of his (few) statements in the dialogue. Whenever he 
speaks, he shows himself earnest, eager to learn as much as he can about Socrates, and serious in 
purpose. 
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Phaedo 102b 
A page later Phaedo sums up the argument so far, saying "it was agreed that each of 
the Forms existed (dvcd n E'KaoTov rwv ei~wv), and that the other things (raMa) 
acquired their name by having a share in them ... " (lOZbl-3).24 The most natural 
reading of "the other things" is as contrasted with the Forms.25 The statement 
thus says that the Forms exist, and non-Forms - that is, particulars - acquire 
their names by having a share in the Forms, implying that there is a Form for ev-
ery general term or for every natural kind. Since individual souls are particulars, 
the natural understanding of this statement is that souls acquire their names by 
having a share in the Forms, including the name "soul."26 
Given the persistence of these claims throughout the dialogue, it would be sur-
prising if some significant entity with a name failed to have a corresponding tran-
scendental Form. Souls are, for Plato, one of the most significant entities, so the 
theory must include a Form of Soul. 
24 0n dva:( n Rowe comments that it "is a typically Socratic way of introducing important items 
in argumentative passages: cf. 103c11, or Gorg. 464a (to Gorgias: 'I suppose you call body a some-
thing, and 1)Jux~?')." (Rowe 1993, ad 64c2) See also Gallop (1975, p. 119). Hackforth's view of this 
line is unclear: he first says that "the extent of the world of Forms is either as yet unconsidered 
by Plato, or not deemed necessary to specify in the present context," but a page later writes, "all 
predication, for Plato, involves the assertion of a Form ... " (Hackforth 1955, pp. 142-144) 
25Burnet (1911, p. 101): "r&Ma: i.e. particular things." 
26 (Rickless 2007, p. 29) Burnet (see last note) makes no comment on this implication for the 
domain of Forms. Gallop echoes both Burnet's reading of r&AAa: and his lack of comment on the 
question of domain. Loriaux concludes that the theory applies to any name: Burnet (1911, p. 101), 
Gallop (1975, p. 192), Loriaux (1975, p. 111). 
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1.3 Arguments Against a Rich Domain of Forms 
I begin with arguments that are easily refuted, and then move to those that require 
lengthier treatment. 
Most of the unambiguous examples of Forms in both the Phaedo and Republic 
have opposites, so some writers attempt to draw a line here, claiming that the 
theory only posits Forms for opposite qualities.27 But both dialogues also contain 
examples of Forms that have no opposite, so this line cannot hold.28 Some writers 
accept that there are Forms posited in these dialogues for every general term, or 
for every natural kind.29 Others expressly deny this.30 I will discuss arguments 
that are either recent or remain influential.31 
27Bostock (1986, p. 176) recognizes the argument without concluding that the range of forms is 
limited in this way. Others who discuss the view favorably are Dorter (1982, p. 125), Annas (1981, 
p. 223), White (1978, p. 149) (without finally endorsing the view). Adam notes that the examples 
of forms in the Republic are usually attributes, but thinks the reason for this is that Plato preferred 
"to cite relevant examples." This principle could be applied to the Phaedo as well: the examples 
there respond to Socrates' interest in physical and moral explanations rather than indicating a 
limit on the range of forms. (Adam 1921, p. 336) 
28Namely, Forms of fire, Snow, and Three in the Phaedo, Couch and Table in the Republic: Harte 
(2008, p. 199). 
29 Such as Rickless (2007, pp. 15-16, 29, 33), Finck (2007, p. 7). 
30 Among these are Crivelli (2008, pp. 218-220), Moravcsik (2000, p. 56), Fine (1987, p. 376 n. 42), 
Bostock (1986, p. 176)(who hesitates), Annas (1981, p. 221), and Hackforth (1955, p. 142). See also 
below. 
31 Here are my reasons for not discussing the other authors who deny a rich domain of Forms. 
I will comment below on Moravcsik's position. Gail Fine seems to have changed her mind on this 
point, acknowledging that "we have not uncovered any argument that precludes the existence of 
forms for every property, and we have seen that he sometimes seems committed to the existence 
of forms for every property" at fine (1993, p. 358 n. 3). Bostock acknowledges arguments on 
both sides of the question. Annas' position is part of her commentary on the Republic, so does 
not directly address the state of play in the Phaedo. Hackforth's comments seem inconsistent; he 
supposes that Plato has not thought about the range of forms he wants to endorse, but elsewhere 
he understands the theory as about predication, which implies a form for most, or even every, 
predicate. 
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Two Senses of "Becoming" 
Recall one of the passages discussed above (page 30), in which Socrates declares, 
"you would loudly exclaim that you do not know how else each thing can come to be 
(E'Kao-rov ytyvolJEVov) except by sharing in the particular reality in which it shares 
(sc. a Form)" (101c2-4).Attempting to avoid the implication of a rich domain of 
Forms, some scholars have distinguished two senses of "becoming" in this passage: 
it may refer to a thing's coming to have a property, or to the coming-into-being 
(and passing-out-of-being, or perishing) of a substance.32 It is possible that Plato 
did not recognize the distinction, but let us grant here that he did for the sake 
of argument.33 Socrates' examples in the Phaedo are mostly, if not all, of the first 
type, that is, they are about coming to have a property.34 This makes it easier to 
think that no Forms for substances are involved in the Phaedo. However, Socrates 
has introduced the Forms to explain how he has investigated "the cause of gen-
eration and destruction" (nEpl. yEvEcrEW<; Kat cp9opei<; -r~v ai-r{av, 95el0). He then 
describes his youthful interest in knowing "the causes of everything, why it comes 
to be (y{yvEmt), why it perishes (an6A.A.umt), and why it exists (£crn)" (96a8-9). As 
Hackforth reluctantly acknowledges, the discussion of the theory of Forms at de 
Gen. et Corr. 335b7 ff., attributed to "Socrates in the Phaedo;' shows that Aristo-
tle took the theory to be about generation and destruction of substances as well 
as acquisition and loss of properties. According to Aristotle, coming-to-be is ex-
32 (Loriaux 1975, p. 98) He comments only on the fact that both senses of becoming are involved, 
without discussing the import of this for the scope of the theory of Forms. 
33 Ancient Greek does not mark this distinction; we would thus need a passage where Plato 
clearly makes it, and this we do not find. 
34The uncertainty is due to the fact that at many points in the argument it is not clear what kind 
of entity is being referred to. 
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plained by sharing in a Form, destruction by losing the Form. Hackforth is forced 
to this conclusion by the fact that, while yiyvcrcn can have the sense of yiyve:rat 
n, coming to be something, i.e. acquiring a property, cp8e:ipe:cr8at (the word used by 
Aristotle) cannot mean "to lose a property." Hackforth concludes that Aristotle is 
reporting the doctrine of the Phaedo correctly, and that he understands the theory 
of Forms there as applying to both types ofbecoming.35 
Crivelli's Argument 
Recently Paolo Crivelli has focused on Phaedo lOZbl-3, and argued that it does not 
imply a wide range of Forms.36 His argument assumes, however, that Plato has a 
single theory of Forms across all his dialogues. The evidence he finds against a 
rich domain of Forms comes from the Parmenides and Statesman. Apart from this 
evidence, he gives no reason not to think that in the Phaedo (one the sources of 
the argument pro that Crivelli identifies) the theory of Forms has a rich domain. 
More importantly, Crivelli argues that the following passage does not imply 
a rich domain of Forms. Two translations of the key phrase will show where the 
issue lies. Phaedo is speaking: 
It was agreed that each of the Forms existed, and that other things 
acquired their name by having a share in them ... (Grube/Cooper) 
It was agreed that each of the Forms exists and the other things that 
partake of these derive their names from these themselves. (Crivelli) 
W~OAoye:iro e:ivai n eKacrrov rwv e:iowv Kai l:OUTWV r&A.A.a ~e:raAa~­
~avovra aUTWV 1:0U1:WV l:~V EITWVU~{av l<JXe:tV ... 
35Hackforth (1955, pp. 144-145 and p. 145 n. 1); de Gen. et Con: also cited by Burnet (1911, p. 112 
ad 101c2). 
36 (Crivelli 2008, pp. 218-219) 
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The difference arises from the participle metalambanonta, "having a share in."37 
Grube takes the participle instrumentally, while Crivelli understands it as repre-
senting a relative clause limiting the class of things doing the partaking. Both 
readings are grammatically possible.38 Crivelli's version does not imply a wide 
range of Forms, since Socrates is saying that only things that partake of Forms get 
their names from those Forms. Grube's version, on the other hand, implies a wide 
range of Forms, since his version says that everything (that is not a Form) gets 
its names from the Forms it partakes of. But context gives us a clear reason for 
preferring Grube's rendering. For the remainder of the paragraph shows that the 
characters think they have just established a principle on which, whenever any 
particular receives a name, this must be because it participates in the Form of the 
same name. Socrates continues: 
If you say these things are so, when you then say that Simmias is taller 
than Socrates but shorter than Phaedo, do you not mean that there is 
in Simmias both tallness and shortness? - I do. (102b3-6) 
Socrates' inference here is only valid on Grube's causal translation. On Crivelli's 
understanding, Socrates ought to show first that there are Forms of Tallness and 
Shortness in existence, participation in which explains the names "tall" and "short." 
None of the characters thinks this step is necessary, since they take the previous 
37 Authors who share Crivelli's understanding are Zehnpfennig (1991) and Gallop (1975, p. 192) 
(although it is not clear that he has the difference between the two readings in mind). Those 
following the approach I favor are Ebert (2004) and Loriaux (1975, p. 111). 
38"The circumstantial participle ... may imply various other relations, such as time, manner, 
means, cause, purpose, concession, condition, etc. But it is often impossible to assign a partici-
ple exclusively to any one of these relations (which are purely logical), nor can all the delicate 
relations of the participle be set forth in systematic form:' (Smyth 1920, §2060) 
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agreement (lOZbl-2) to have taken care of this.39 Being called by a name implies 
without further argument that Simmias participates in the Form of that name, and 
Crivelli's reading cannot account for this. 
Nehamas' Argument 
One argument against a rich domain of Forms has gained particular prominence, 
and seems to retain some influence.40 This is Alexander Nehamas' argument that 
the theory in the Phaedo is restricted to a special class of adjectives, those that 
are "incomplete."41 By "incomplete" he means adjectives that are "either attribu-
tive or relational." Attributive adjectives are those that make implicit reference 
to what is normal for some group. A baby elephant, for example, is small for an 
elephant, but large compared with many other groups. Relational adjectives are 
those that require that we fill in more than one place to get a complete expres-
sion. "Fred is between" is incomplete, since we must specify between what and 
39Smyth again: "The force of these circumstantial participles does not lie in the participle itself, 
but is derived from the context ... some participles may be referred to more than one of the above 
classes." (Smyth 1920, §2069, emphasis added) Crivelli's argument depends on claiming that his 
reading of the participle is the only correct one; if ambiguity is admitted in the way this participle 
functions, it supports my reading. 
40The argument to restrict the range of Forms based on the com presence of opposites is also 
found in McCabe (1994, p. 60) and Irwin (1977, p. 156). Irwin's version of the argument is rejected 
by Silverman (2002, Appendix). I respond to Nehamas here because he gives the most developed 
form of the argument. The continuing influence ofNehamas' formulation is seen in Griswold (1981, 
pp. 138-139) and White (1979, pp. 31-32), who both accept it without criticism. Perhaps most 
tellingly, though, in the Hackett student edition containing five of Plato's dialogues, Cooper in-
cludes Nehamas' article as one of just eight items in the bibliography for the Phaedo: (2002, p. 156). 
Recent authors discussing or referring to Nehamas' position (not all endorsing it) are Harte (2008, 
p. 203 n. 32), Finck (2007, p. 28 n. 57), Devereux (2003, p. 97), Levin (2001, p. 96 n. 43) and Gill and 
McCabe (1996, p. 23 n. 30). 
41Nehamas (1973, p. 470), Nehamas (1975, pp. 108-109). 
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what before we have a complete assertion.42 Nehamas claims that the arguments 
employed in the Phaedo support no Forms but those for incomplete adjectives. 
The argument begins by noting that the argument from recollection (72e-77a) 
claims that some properties go with their opposites whenever we observe them. 
Two sticks or stones that seem equal, for example, never seem perfectly equal; in 
some way they always also appear unequal. "Beautiful" and "good" are similar. 
Since each of these properties seems to be instantiated along with its opposite in 
observable objects, Socrates concludes that nothing justifies our ascribing one of 
these adjectives to any given object rather than its opposite. Helen is beautiful 
compared with other women, but ugly compared with a goddess. How then can it 
be true that Helen is beautiful, when the opposite assertion has just as much war-
rant? Nehamas argues that the theory of Forms in the Phaedo is meant to solve this 
problem. Since the problem only arises for incomplete terms, there is no evidence 
that the theory was ever intended to handle a wider class. 
Further, Nehamas thinks he has found a logical reason that the argument can-
not be extended to other terms, especially substantives. Since the argument de-
pends on the fact that certain adjectives are always instantiated with their oppo-
sites, there must be something stable for them to be instantiated in. For example, 
if the theory applied to Helen's status as a person just as it does to her beauty, then 
she would no more be a person than not a person. If this were the case, there could 
42 Another example that helps explicate the concept of incompleteness at issue is "George is 
the father." This is grammatically complete, but logically incomplete, since its meaning cannot be 
determined without a further specification saying whose father George is. Notice that this is not 
the sentence, "George is a father;' which leaves the identity of George's offspring deliberately un-
specified; by contrast, "George is the father" purports to say that George is the father of someone 
definite, either someone already known from context or yet to be specified. Nehamas' argument, 
as I understand it, employs the logical, not the grammatical sense of incompleteness. 
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not be any compresence of opposites for her beauty or size, and Socrates is cer-
tainly committed to the compresence of opposite for these properties. One could 
not say, for example, that Helen is beautiful, but also ugly, for we could say instead 
that Helen (the person) is beautiful, while the Helen who is ugly is not a person. 
"Accordingly, when Socrates generalizes to 'the beautiful, the good, and all such 
being' at 74d8-9 ... we have no license to infer that any Forms have been generated 
other than those corresponding to those properties which are instantiated along 
with their opposites:'43 
It is true that the argument based on compresence of opposites can only gen-
erate Forms for opposites that are co-instantiated.44 But Nehamas goes further: 
"[Plato] gives no argument which commits him to [the] existence [of the Form of 
Bed], and he does give arguments [sc. from the compresence of opposites] which 
preclude it."45 This reaches too far: nothing Socrates says or assumes precludes 
Forms for substantives, and in particular, the logical problem Nehamas identifies 
does not rule out Forms for substantives. 
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that there is a Form of Person. Nehamas 
claims this will prevent Helen from being both beautiful and ugly. But Socrates 
never argues that visible items like Helen suffer from the compresence of oppo-
sites when it comes to their substantive properties; that is, Socrates never claims 
that Helen is both a person and not a person. So it is open to Socrates to say that 
Helen is a person by participating in the Form of Person, but that she is also both 
43Nehamas (1973, p. 469) 
44A different criticism than the one I will develop: McCabe objects to Nehamas' argument on 
the general ground that it supposes that Plato's primary concern was linguistic rather than meta-
physical. (1994, p. 35 n. 24) 
45Nehamas (1973, p. 463) 
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beautiful and ugly because she participates in the Forms of both Beauty and Ugli-
ness. His arguments for the com presence of opposites need not apply to substan-
tives. 
Throughout the argument from recollection, Socrates works with the example 
of the Equal; only at the argument's end (75c-d) does he generalize to "all such 
things;' saying: 
Therefore, if we had this knowledge, we knew before birth and imme-
diately after not only the Equal, but the Greater and the Smaller and 
all such things, for our present argument is no more about the Equal 
than about the Beautiful itself, the Good itself, the just, the Pious, and, 
as I say, about all those things which we mark with the seal of 'what 
it is; both when we are putting questions and answering them. So 
we must have acquired knowledge of them all before we were born. 
(75c7-d5) 
There are two ways of taking Socrates' statement that "our present argument is no 
more about the Equal than about ... all [the Forms]." Nehamas reads this as saying 
that the argument for the Equal, involving the compresence of equality and in-
equality in every visible instance of equality, applies to every Form, and from this 
it follows that there are no Forms for properties that do not exhibit compresence 
of opposites. But the statement can be read equally well as expressing a piece of 
reasoning with two steps. First, Socrates says that the argument for Equality (and 
the other Forms mentioned explicitly) has shown that there is a Form of Equality. 
Second, he generalizes by saying that since we take ourselves to know what Equal-
ity is, and we have just concluded that there is a Form of Equality, we can draw the 
same conclusion for any property we take ourselves to know. So if we know what 
40 
a person is, there must be a Form of Person that we knew before birth, and so on 
for other Forms. 
Now Nehamas does not recognize the possibility of the second reading, and 
so gives no reasons for rejecting it; his argument depends on his reading being 
the only possible way of understanding the text. So his argument is incomplete 
at best. Moreover, the second reading I have just offered fits Socrates' claims else-
where in the dialogue better. In particular, contrary to Nehamas' account of the 
text, some Forms in the Phaedo are not incomplete. Malcolm points out the Form 
of Oddness (103e2-104b4), a Form that no one denies is referenced by the text, 
and which by itself refutes Nehamas' argument. For being odd is not an incom-
plete property: there is no sense in which a number is both odd and not odd. 46 
Patterson makes the same point about the Form of Life (lOSdS-6).47 The reference 
to it as a Form is unambiguous (auro ro rfj<; ~wfi<; doo<;, "the Form Itself of Life", 
lOSdS-6), and this form is of paramount importance in the purpose of the dia-
logue. Life cannot suffer from compresence of opposites, on pain of defeating the 
whole series of arguments for the immortality of the soul, and the final argument 
most conspicuously. For if Life is an incomplete property, and things that partake 
of it suffer from compresence of opposites, then any soul that is alive is also in 
some sense dead. And this would make nonsense of Socrates' efforts to show that 
the soul is immortal. 
46Malcolm (1991, p. 79). To complete his argument, we should also say that numbers are not odd 
in relation to anything else; that is, there is no missing term that needs to be filled in to complete 
the meaning when we say that three is odd. 
47Patterson (1985, pp. 99-100) 
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1.4 The Form of Soul in the Final Argument 
To deny the Form of Soul, a reading of the final argument must sustain two claims: 
first, each mention of "soul" in the text must refer to an individual soul (and not to 
a Form, of any variety), and second, the machinery of the argument must work (or 
come as close to working as plausible) without a Form of Soul in the background. 
While the first claim can be defended, the second is weak. 
It is important to keep distinct two closely related questions. I claim that the 
final argument in the Phaedo presupposes the Form of Soul, although it does not 
mention it. We must take care not to mistake claims about whether or not this 
Form is mentioned in the text for claims about whether or not the Form of Soul is 
presupposed by the text. Gallop, for example, says, "Whether or not Platonic on-
tology recognizes a Form of Soul, parallel to the Form of Three at 104d5-6, and 
despite the parallelism of language with that passage, a more coherent argument 
emerges if such a Form is not read into the present text:'48 The claim here is that 
the actual words of the text are best understood as not referring to a Form of Soul, 
but only to individual souls. I agree, but this does not decide whether the argu-
ment given in the words of the text implies or presupposes that there is a Form of 
Soul. (Gallop presumably accepts my claim as well, since on either of his proposed 
readings of the argument the Form of Soul is presupposed.)49 
Structure of the Argument 
I understand the argument as follows. 
48Gallop (1975, p. 214) 
49Gallop (1975, pp. 207-208) 
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Text Claim Justification 
1 100b-102a V xV f If x is a particular with quality f, then x is Assumed 5° 
f by the Form F (the "safe answer"), 
2 102a-d If x has opposite qualities f and g, then x has the Step 151 
Forms F and G in it. 
3 102d-103c IfF and G are opposite Forms, and f and g are the Assumed 
properties corresponding to them, F can never be 
g, G can never be f, f can never beg, nor can g 
ever be f. 
4 103c-104c 3x3f3g (x is a particular, f and g are opposite Steps 1 and 352 
properties, and whenever x exists it always has f, 
never g). (Introduces notion of"Form-bringers.") 
5 104d-105c Some "Form-bringers" have essential properties. Examples of 
three, fire, 
etc. 53 
6 105c-e The soul is a Form-bringer having life as an es- Instantiates 
sential property. Step 554 
Forms are introduced in the first part of the argument (100b-102a), so there 
is no doubt that the argument begins in the context of Forms and their interac-
50 Implied by 100c4-6. Silverman and Fine recognize that this statement implies a rich domain 
of Forms (although this need not be the final word on that issue), as the symbolization reflects: 
Rickless (2007, p. 33), Silverman (2002, p. 59), Fine (2003, p. 37 n. 76). 
51 Most writers agree that the distinction here is between accidental and essential properties: 
Ebert (2004, p. 371). A few think the section is about the difference between subject and predicate 
instead: Hackforth (1955, pp. 154-155), Loriaux (1975, p. 111). 
52 Gallop (1975, p. 197) and Dancy (2004, p. 310) note that 103c marks a new phase in the proof. 
53 104dl-3 is discussed by nearly every author writing about this passage, since these lines con-
tain the first definition of the "Form-bringers," whose identity is one of the major cruxes in the 
argument. The issue will be discussed below. 
54This section is sometimes described as the "proof" proper, taking the previous sections as 
setting up the assumptions put to work here: Rowe (1993, p. 261), Ebert (2004, p. 371). 
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tion with objects in our world.55 At the other end, the argument's conclusion is 
marked by Socrates' saying, "Therefore soul ... is most certainly deathless and in-
destructible and our souls will really dwell in the underworld" (107a). Here the 
word for soul (¢ux~) occurs without an article, but the context shows that the 
reference is to individual souls. First, it is a basic claim of the theory ofForms that 
no Form ever changes or is destroyed, so a proof that the Form of Soul is "deathless 
and indestructible" would be redundant.56 Second, the challenge that prompted 
Socrates to take up this argument was about the individual human soul that en-
ters a body at one time and leaves it at another. "You say it makes no difference 
whether it enters a body once or many times as far as the fear of each of us is 
concerned, for it is natural for a man who is no fool to be afraid, if he does not 
know and cannot prove that the soul is immortal" (95d5-el). Given this concern 
for individual souls at the beginning, it would be a gross non sequitur if Socrates 
were to respond by proving the immortality and indestructibility of something 
else. The challenge motivating the argument shows that individual souls are enti-
ties in their own right, and it must be these individuals whose immortality is being 
proven. 57 So the argument begins with Forms and ends with individual souls. 
55Gallop (1975, p. 97), Hackforth (1955, p. 162). Dancy (2004, p. 312), asserts without argument 
that the proof has no connection to the theory of forms. 
56For the claim that Forms do not change, see Harte (2008, p. 202) and Finck (2007, p. 39). 
57Dorter (1982, p. 151), Bostock (1986, pp. 188-189). Those like Rowe (1993, p. 256), who think 
individual souls are immanent forms, would not accept this argument. Silverman (2002, p. 63) 
and Hackforth (1955, p. 156) hold that the argument treats the individual soul like a property or 
immanent form at some points, but also like a substance at other points. 
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The "Safe" Answers 
Socrates begins the final argument by explaining what he calls a "safe" answer 
to any question about why some individual has some property (lOOd8, el). He 
also calls this answer "safe," "simple," "naYve;· and "foolish" (lOOd3-4), and I have 
symbolized the claim above as "VxV f If xis a particular with quality f, then x 
is f by the Form F" to reflect the generality implied by these epithets. But the 
answer is anything but safe if one has to worry about whether or not a Form can be 
found to answer to whatever one might be asked about. The safety of this answer 
thus implies that the range of Forms is not limited in any significant way, perhaps 
even that it is completely unlimited. Only on the assumption that the domain of 
Forms is rich enough to use without worry can the "safe" answers be called upon 
without fear of contradiction. 58 The safe answers suggest that there is a Form of 
Soul, especially since souls are the topic of this argument. 
Immanent Forms 
Next we can dispense with one of the most commonly discussed interpretive dif-
ficulties with the final argument. Up to this point I have mentioned only the 
transcendent Form of Soul and individual souls as candidates for the reference of 
"soul" in the text. But Socrates may also introduce a third kind of thing, the "Form 
in us:'59 He claims, for example, "not only Tallness itself is never willing to be tall 
and short at the same time, but also that the tallness in us (to £v ~}ltv }lfveao<;) will 
58Bostock (1986, p. 197) 
59Endorsing immanent Forms are van Eck (2008, p. 120 n. 15), Rowe (2003, p. 55, apparently 
changing his mind from Rowe (1993)), Ebert (2004, pp. 373, 375, 376, 378). Rejecting immanent 
Forms as separate entities are Dancy (2004, pp. 306, 308-309), Rowe (1993, pp. 249-250, 253), Fine 
(1986, pp. 304-305), Gallop (1975, pp. 195-196), Loriaux (1975, pp. 113-114). 
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never admit the short or be overcome ... " (102d6-9). This issue need not detain us, 
however, for any reading that recognizes immanent Forms must also acknowledge 
a transcendent Form corresponding to each immanent Form.60 Immanent forms 
are relevant because some writers think that the word "soul" (\flux~) in the final 
argument refers to the immanent form of soul. Suppose this is true even once. 
On this assumption it follows immediately that there is also a transcendent Form 
of Soul. For the Phaedo's only account of immanent forms makes them parasitic 
on transcendent versions of themselves: immanent forms are instances of tran-
scendent Forms. But there can be no instances of transcendent Forms that do not 
exist. Any reading that tries to deny that there is a Form of Soul, then, will have to 
insist that every use of "soul" in the text refers to an individual soul. These are the 
readings I will be discussing from here on, since all others will have to admit the 
Form of Soul. The question we must ask of these readings is whether, in addition 
to taking each instance of "soul" to refer to an individual, they can also explain 
how the final argument works without using the Form of Soul. 
"Form-Bringers" 
The part of the argument that is important for my thesis begins at Step Five, which 
introduces the notion of a "Form-bringer." This is an entity without an opposite 
that, when it occupies something else, brings along with it some Form that has 
an opposite. The thing occupied will not admit the opposite to the Form brought 
601 find the suggestion that there can be immanent forms without any corresponding transcen-
dent Form absurd, but it is proposed in a remark by Wagner (2001, p. 18). Dorothea Frede reaches 
the same conclusion as I have via a slightly different argument: "But how can there be a free-
floating immanent form which is neither "f.v fiJJiv" nor identical with the form as such "f.v -rij 
cpuoEl" (as Plato distinguishes them in 103b)?" Frede (1978, p. 290). 
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along. For example, the Form ofThree has no opposite.61 Nevertheless, when it 
occupies something, and thus makes that thing (or that set) into an instance of 
three, it brings along the Form of Oddness, and compels the sensible thing that 
is now three to be odd as well.62 Since the sensible instance of three is odd, it 
excludes the Form of Evenness, and cannot be even. Thus far the notion of a Form-
bringer is more or less clear, but things become more complicated when we try to 
pin down the details. 
We next need to ask, since Socrates never says, what kinds of thing can be 
Form-bringers: Forms only, or both Forms and individuals?63 The example of 
Three and Oddness follows the definition (104dl-3) as an illustration, suggesting 
that Form-bringers are Forms. But many scholars take the Form-bringers to be in-
dividuals.64 The major reason for thinking that Form-bringers are Forms (whether 
immanent or transcendent) is the language of"occupying" something, which also 
describes how Forms behave toward sensible items. Since both Form-bringers and 
Forms occupy other things, it is argued, this is a signal that the Form-bringers are 
themselves Forms. On the other hand, souls are also Form-bringers, and the ap-
plication to the soul is the point of the whole argument. The argument is futile 
61 Referred to at 104ds-6 as ~ 'tWV 'tptwv ioea. Most agree that this is an unambiguous reference 
to the transcendent Form of Three. Hackforth (1955, p. 152) takes the expression to refer to the 
immanent form of threeness, a suggestion rejected by Gallop (1975, p. 206). Dixsaut (1991, p. 391 
n. 310) also understands it as the transcendent Form. 
62Numbers involve a special complication, in that Plato is thought by some to have distinguished 
a separate metaphysical category for them. If so, the Form Three might be occupying the number 
three rather than a set of three sensible things. But this makes no difference to the argument here. 
The issue is discussed by Bostock (1986, p. 185 n. 5), Gallop (1975, p. 206), and O'Brien (1967, 1968, 
p. 212). 
63The position that Form-bringers can only be individuals is not plausible, since the examples 
ofThreeness and Oddness (104d1-3) rule it out. 
64Those reading them as Forms or immanent Forms include Gerson (2003, p. 176 n. 43), Rowe 
(1993, p. 256), Dixsaut (1991, p. 156). Those taking them as individuals include Ebert (2004, pp. 
383-384). 
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unless it proves the immortality of individual souls, so on this basis it is argued 
that individual items must also be Form-bringers, at least sometimes, and even if 
some examples in the text are clearly transcendent Forms. By my count opinion 
on this point is evenly split. 
We are now in a position to see that the group of readings taking Form-bringers 
to be exclusively Forms entails my thesis that there is a Form of Soul.65 Since 
souls are Form-bringers, this type of reading is committed to saying that individ-
ual souls are immanent forms, and as I have already argued, this claim entails the 
existence of the transcendent Form of Soul (see above, page 1.4).66 So we need not 
say more about this type of reading, and can turn our attention to the alternative, 
holding that Form-bringers can be both individuals and Forms. 
This type of reading maintains that souls are individuals, something like sub-
stances.67 I next discuss readings of this type, that avoid any commitment to 
the Form of Soul. So to summarize, we will next examine readings claiming that 
(1) Form-bringers can be either individuals or Forms, and (2) each use of "soul" in 
the argument refers to individual souls. 
Now the definition of Form-bringers includes two claims: (1) the thing occupied 
by the Form-bringer cannot admit the opposite of the Form brought along, and 
(2) the Fonn-bringer itself excludes the opposite of the one it brings along. I will re-
fer to the second claim as the Form-bringer Exclusion Principle (FEP). In the pre-
65Here I include those who say the soul is treated "like" a form, since I see no alternative other 
than holding that souls are immanent forms or that they are substantial things in their own right. 
Those who read the argument this way include Silverman (2002, p. 63), Keyt (1963, p. 169) and 
Hackforth (1955, pp. 161-162). 
661 am unaware of anyone who thinks the individual soul is the transcendent Form. 
67 Authors who attribute to Plato the view that the individual soul is an invisible individual 
include Gerson (2003, p. 95), Rowe (2003, p. 164), Fine (1993, p. 249 n. 27), Bostock (1986, pp. 
188-189), Gallop (1975, p. 222). 
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vious example, when the Form Three occupies a sensible set of items, and causes 
them to be three, both the set occupied and the Fonn Three itself are incompati-
ble with the Form Even.68 The FEP is crucial to proving the soul immortal: since 
souls bring life to bodies, and we can observe that those bodies are alive, the FEP 
allows Socrates to reason from this observable effect to an unobservable cause, 
drawing his conclusion that souls are themselves immortal. The FEP will figure in 
our account at a later stage of the analysis. 
The Examples of Form-Bringers 
Socrates gives two extended examples of Form-bringers: fire/ snow and three. He 
introduces the topic of Form-bringers by pointing out that some occupied things 
do not admit the opposites of qualities brought by a Form-bringer. 
"So the hot is something other than fire, and the cold is something 
other than snow? ... You think, I believe, that being snow it will not ad-
mit the hot..." (103d2-6). 
Fire and snow here must be individual, sensible fires and lumps of snow - pre-
sumably this is why Cebes is able to say without reflection what snow will do in 
the presence of the hot. The point would require more argument if the Forms of 
Fire and Snow were meant.69 Now the Form-bringers, and the FEP in particular, 
68Form-bringers are defined twice, at 104d1-3 and 105a2-5. Both definitions allow more than 
one grammatical understanding, either saying that Form-bringers do the occupying, or that they 
are the things that are occupied. Gallop (1975, p. 202 ff.) gives the most detailed account of both 
possibilities. But the difference is most relevant for trying to decide what kind of things can be 
Form-bringers, which we do not need to decide here. 
69Those taking "snow" and "fire" as physical individuals, include: Ebert (2004, p. 380). Those 
taking them as forms: Gerson (2003, p. 94), Bostock (1986, p. 185). Those who think it unclear 
which is meant: Silverman (2002, p. 61), Archer-Hind (1894, p. 109). 
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involve three roles: (1) the Form-bringer, (2) the thing occupied, and (3) the oppo-
site Form brought along. Here (at 103d2-6) Socrates has mentioned fire and Heat, 
the former a thing occupied by a Form-bringer, the latter the opposite Form being 
brought along, but the Form-bringer itself has not been named. This is under-
standable because Socrates has yet to define Form-bringers: he describes the role 
they play toward other things, and then introduces Form-bringers as the things 
that fit that role. Given this structure, the Form-bringers that Socrates has in mind 
in this passage (103d2-6) can only be the Forms of Fire and Snow. Since these are 
Forms of substances, this reconfirms the rich domain of Forms found in the Phaedo. 
It also provides a precedent for what I will shortly argue about the Form of Soul: 
the Forms of Fire and Snow are implicated in this argument, but are never men-
tioned directly. 
How might one resist the conclusion that the Forms of Fire and Snow are to 
be understood in the background here?7° Consider the hypothesis that a physical 
lump of snow "occupies" other physical items (e.g. a piece of ground), and makes 
them cold; this view looks promising as a way to avoid acknowledging that Forms 
of Fire and Snow must be understood here.71 But on this view Socrates has men-
tioned two different roles than we supposed, for if we suppose that snow occupies 
other physical items, it is itself the Form-bringer. Instead of mentioning roles (2) 
and (3), as I just supposed, Socrates has mentioned roles (1) and (3): snow as Form-
70This is, I think, the most natural way of developing the explicit positions of scholars such as 
Nehamas who deny that there is a Form of Soul. Some think that the fire and snow mentioned 
here are physical things rather than Forms, so a skeptic about the Form of Soul would likely adopt 
this claim, and then argue that not only are the things mentioned in the text physical items, but 
no transcendent items need be understood in the background. But as I shall argue, this position is 
untenable. 
71Bostock (1986, p. 184) 
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bringer and cold as the opposite brought along. But this does not fit the text, since 
Socrates immediately adds " ... being snow it will not admit the hot" (103d5-6). This 
statement and the parallel one about fire (103d5-6) treat snow and fire as filling 
role (2), the thing occupied, not role (1), the Form-bringer. The text thus implies 
that the Form of Snow (role 1) occupies the lump of sensible snow (role 2), thus 
making it snow, and at the same time bringing along the Form of Cold (role 3).72 
This is just the "safe" explanation Socrates has already introduced. The same rea-
soning shows that a Form of Fire is also assumed in this passage.73 Finally, Socrates 
brings back the safe explanation explicitly when he says, "what the Form of Three 
occupies must be not only three but also odd" (104d5-7). This case shows that 
the Form of Three is the Form-bringer, and confirms again that Forms of Fire and 
Snow are assumed in the previous example. 
As Socrates prepares to apply his notion of Form-bringers to the case of souls, 
then, both of his extended examples have presupposed the "safe" explanation as 
part of the more "sophisticated" explanation he is now advocating/4 The sophisti-
72Bestor (1988, p. 41) takes the same view. 
73 Another reading of this passage may also be possible: one might claim that when Socrates ob-
serves that "being snow it will not admit the hot;' "snow" refers not to the thing occupied (role 2), 
but to a Form-bringer (role 1). This would then be an early statement of the FEP. The difficulty with 
this reading is that these early statements of the FEP occur at 103d5-6 (for snow) and 103d10-11 
(for fire). Form-bringers are first defined a full page later (104d1-3)- but the first definition fails 
to state the FEP. Only the second definition (105a2-5) expresses the FEP. So this reading needs to 
explain why Socrates begins by giving an example of the FEP, but then fails to define it on his first 
try, and only gets the definition right a page and a half after giving the example. 
74 Agreeing that the "safe" answers are not superseded, but merely supplemented by the new 
answers are Dancy (2004, p. 310), Rowe (1993, p. 259), Bestor (1988, p. 36). Most discussion of 
this point focuses on the logical properties of each kind of answer. So most writers agree that the 
"safe" answers are both necessary and sufficient conditions, and that the new answers are merely 
sufficient: Silverman (2002, p. 57), Dixsaut (1991, p. 394 n. 317). Ebert and Bostock take the case of 
souls to be necessary and sufficient, and thus out of line with the other "sophisticated" answers: 
Ebert (2004, p. 391), Bostock (1986, p. 189). But I see no evidence of this in the text; one might 
cite 105d1-2 for support, but on my reading all this says is that soul is always sufficient, not that 
it is necessary for life. Hackforth alone (among the authors I have surveyed) takes the "sophisti-
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cated answers are just his earlier safe answers supplemented with Form-bringers. 
So the sophisticated answers say that the Form of Fire occupies an individual fire 
(the safe answer), and brings with it the Form Hot (the sophisticated part); the 
Form Three occupies a sensible group, making it a set of three things (the safe an-
swer), bringing with it the Form Odd (the sophisticated answer). In the first case 
the resulting sensible thing is both a fire and hot; in the second, it is a group of 
three and is odd. (In explaining each of these cases, we could add a level of im-
manent forms; this would make the explanation more complicated, but would not 
change the essential features we are concerned with.) 
A Shift in the Pattern 
After explaining these cases and defining the Form-bringers for the second time, 
Socrates inserts two briefer examples before turning to the soul. These two exam-
ples are crucial to his argument, and also execute a fascinating sleight of hand. The 
first seems to be a repetition of the earlier case of fire and heat; the second involves 
fever, a body and sickness; when he has introduced these two new cases, Socrates 
turns immediately to souls, arguing that they bring the Form of Life to the bodies 
they occupy, so they are Form-bringers, so they themselves exclude Death. The 
fever and soul cases both specify the thing occupied (role 2) as "a body" (m.6l-tan, 
105b9, c3), just as the case involving souls will do (105c8). These two cases also 
effect a transition from the earlier examples (of fire, snow, and three): in those 
cases the Form-bringer (role 1) and the thing occupied (role 2) were eponymous, 
cated" answers to be both necessary and sufficient, and therefore finds them philosophically weak: 
Hackforth (1955, p. 161). 
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and the Form-bringer was itself a Form. In these two new, transitional cases, how-
ever, the first seems to follow the earlier pattern, but on closer examination one 
sees that this pattern no longer fits. On the earlier pattern, the Form of Fire oc-
cupied a "body", and thereby made that body an instance of fire. But this pattern 
does not match the new cases of fever and souls, for in neither of those cases is the 
Form-bringer eponymous with the thing occupied. This forces us to notice that a 
second way of reading the new fire example is also possible: an individual fire is 
the Form-bringer (role 1), and it "occupies" some flammable body such as a stick 
(role 2). Here the Form-bringer does not make the thing occupied into an instance 
of fire, but makes it fiery or makes it the case that it is on fire. Either interpretation 
is possible for this fire case, depending on whether we read it to match the earlier 
or the following examples.75 
The second example of fever, however, cannot work both ways: the Form Fever, 
by occupying a body, does not make it into an instance of fever.76 Here the more 
usual meaning of O'W}la moves to the foreground, since the case involves an in-
stance of fever coming into a human body.77 The Form-bringer (role 1) can only be 
an individual instance of fever, since the body it occupies (role 2) becomes not a 
75Weller comments on the aptness of fire as analogue for the soul: "Fire as elusive, flickering, 
and not quite a body among others yet capable of heating them seems just the right analogue for 
the soul. As an element present in bodies, especially ones not in flames, fire is at least as seductive 
a model as immanent characters for understanding how souls are present in bodies. Moreover, it's 
easy to see how one might conclude from the fact that flre, as what heats, is itself hot that the soul, 
as what vivifies, is itself alive." (Weller 1995, p. 44) 
76For various comments on these examples, see Ebert (2004, p. 388). Each author chooses a 
different dimension of the cases to focus on. Philosophers usually try to fit these cases into as few 
types as possible, and the difficulty of the passage comes from the fact that no general scheme will 
fit all the cases here, plus the fact that the cases can be handled individually in many ways, even 
before taking up the problem of making them consistent with one another. It seems possible that 
the diversity of patterns, generally seen as a philosophical weakness, may be present intentionally 
because Plato considered it a rhetorical strength. 
77Liddell et al. (1996, s.v.) 
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fever, but feverish.78 Presumably the individual fever also participates in the Form 
of Fever, and is a fever in virtue of this sharing; but this relation is not mentioned 
at this point in the text. Instead, an individual fever (as Form-bringer, role 1) occu-
pies a human body (role 2), and the body is made feverish. This case thus abandons 
the previous pattern, in which Form-bringer and thing occupied were eponymous, 
but parallels the following example, that of souls. So the sophisticated explana-
tion for souls is that they occupy (human) bodies, and in doing so make them (not 
into a soul but) EJl¢uxo<;, "ensouled" or "alive."79 The soul, as Form-bringer, brings 
with it the Form ofLife.80 The Form Life excludes the Form Death from the body 
(so long as the soul occupies it), and the soul itself excludes the Form Death, since 
the soul participates in the Form ofLife.81 
What Plato has done, then, is to introduce the schema of Form-bringers us-
ing two putatively simple cases with the same structure, those of fire/snow and 
three. But this structure does not match the one Plato needs for individual souls, 
so he shifts the pattern without calling attention to it, in the examples of fire and 
fever. Rhetorically, the text takes advantage of the sense of clarity conferred by 
780r more precisely, the Form-bringer can only be an individual instance of fever on the as-
sumption that this case is a parallel with the case of souls, which follows immediately in the text. 
Since the souls there must be individuals, the fever must also be an individual item. Authors with 
a similar analysis of the fever case: Dorter (1982, p. 147), Rowe (1993, p. 260), Gallop (1975, p. 212), 
Archer-Hind (1894, pp. 114-115). Silverman (2002, p. 63) says we cannot decide what kind of enti-
ties are involved here, but agrees that interpretation of the cases should be controlled by the case 
of souls, which is the goal of the argument. 
79Ebert notices this as well at (2004, p. 395). 
80The fact that the soul "occupies" the body in a way similar to that in which immanent tallness 
"occupies" Simmias leads Hackforth and Keyt to think that Plato is treating the soul "like" an im-
manent form here. But a soul occupying a body is not a parallel to tallness occupying a body: in 
the latter case, the body is made tall, while in the former the body is not made into a soul. Keyt 
(1963, p. 169), Hackforth (1955, p. 156). Weller summarizes some features of the text that make 
this view attractive, although he rejects it (1995, p. 37). 
81Socrates also associates soul with life as its function at Republic 353d3-e3. 
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the eponymous relation between the Form-bringer and the thing occupied in the 
early examples of fire/snow and three; it then proceeds as if the same simplicity 
obtained for the later examples. The shift in structure is so artfully hidden that it 
is hard to believe Plato is unaware of it. Socrates establishes the soul as a Form-
bringer with the empirical claim that the presence of a soul makes bodies alive 
(10Sc8-10). The FEP then allows him to conclude that souls themselves excludes 
Death. 
These final steps are the important ones for deciding whether the argument 
for immortality assumes the Form of Soul in the background. We are now ready to 
present further arguments for the Form of Soul, based on the foregoing analysis 
of the final argument. 
The Safe Answers Imply the Form of Soul 
We have already seen that the safe answers are part of the notion ofForm-bringers 
(i.e., the Forms of Snow and Fire at 103d). The proof of the soul's immortality is 
carried out two pages later (lOSe-d). If there is no Form of Soul, then the safe 
answer is no longer valid when we reach lOSe-d. But the text continues to invoke 
the safe answers all the way to 106d. 
When Socrates introduces his last two examples (fire and fever) just before 
getting to the soul, he says that "beyond (napa) that safe answer, which I spoke 
of first, I see another safe answer" (&:n6Kptcrtv ... aAAfJV 6pwv &:cr<paA.e:tav, lOSb7-8). 
There is no indication here that the first safe answer is being rejected. He then 
rehearses the safe answer at each stage in his questioning in order to explain that 
he is not now looking for those answers, but for more "sophisticated" ones: 
" ... my reply would not be that safe and ignorant one, that it is 
heat ... " (105b9-cl) 
" .. .if you ask me what, on coming into a body, makes it sick, I will not 
say sickness ... " (105c2-3) 
" .. .if asked the presence of what in a number makes it odd, I will not 
say oddness ... " (105c4-5) 
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These lines suggest that for Socrates the safe answers remain perfectly accept-
able. He does not say or suggest that there is anything wrong with those answers, 
only that they are relatively uninformative where the more sophisticated answer 
is available. Further, in the question about souls, the safe answer to "what is it 
that, present in a body, makes it living?" would be the Form of Life. This Form 
is mentioned explicitly at 106d5-6, where it seems to be invoked as an especially 
clear example of a Form that is indestructible. This is further evidence that the 
safe answers are still valid; they are just not the focus of Socrates' questions in this 
section.82 Socrates' use of the safe answers throughout his argument about souls 
suggests that safe answers about souls would be equally acceptable to him, that is, 
that he would acknowledge the Form of Soul. 
An Elimination Argument 
A second argument for the Form of Soul notes that the first move in the final ar-
gument is to re-introduce the Forms. "I assume the existence of a Beautiful, itself 
by itself, of a Good and a Great and all the rest. If you grant me these and agree 
that they exist, I hope to show you the cause as a result, and to find the soul to be 
82Rowe also argues that the safe answers remain valid, citing 107b4-9: Rowe (1993, p. 259). 
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immortal" (lOObS-9). Socrates thus indicates that some Forms are necessary for 
his argument. 
Now if souls participate in the Form of Life without the mediation of a Form 
of Soul, it will not have been necessary to invoke the Forms in general. The argu-
ment's key claim will just be that souls are essentially alive. Putting that claim in a 
form that mentions the Form of Life will not accomplish the goal of showing that 
souls are necessarily or permanently alive. All we know about the Form of Life is 
that it is the essence of Life, or that it is what it is to be alive. This much implies 
no connection with souls. There is thus no way of reaching Socrates' conclusion 
using only the Form of Life. 
It is worth emphasizing that Socrates says nothing that would justify the claim 
that individual souls must always participate in the Form of Life. Individual souls, 
according to his own account of them, are sometimes very unstable. If they are 
unstable with respect to other properties, there is no reason for assuming - and 
Socrates does not try to argue - that they will be stable with respect to the prop-
erty of life. Nor is there any logical connection between souls and life or the Form 
of Life. The problem arises precisely because there is no such connection: it is all 
too easy to imagine that souls can die or be destroyed. 
It must therefore be the case that Socrates needs at least one other Form for his 
proof. He mentions several as he leads up to his conclusion: the Forms of Three, 
Snow, Fire, etc. But these have no direct application to souls, so they cannot aid 
his proof. So there is at least one Form that Socrates needs for his proof, but it is 
neither the Form of Life, nor Three, nor Oddness, Snow, Fire, etc. By elimination, 
it looks as if the Form Socrates needs can only be the Form of Soul. 
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The Earlier Progress of the Dialogue 
Socrates' earlier characterization of Forms and particulars began by ascribing the 
properties of stability and unchangingness to the Forms, and then extending those 
properties to souls in virtue of the resemblance created by the invisibility of souls. 
Socrates never claims that souls are stable in virtue of any quality of their own. So 
whatever stability souls have, they have in virtue of resembling Forms. If Socrates 
were now to argue that souls are stable enough to sustain a permanent and neces-
sary relation to the Form of Life, he would be reversing the order of his earlier in-
ference. Nothing Socrates has said has prepared the claim that souls have enough 
stability of their own to justify such a stable relation to the Form of Life, and nothing 
about the Form of Life implies that it has this relation with souls. 
Second, supposing the first point is wrong- that Socrates does mean to claim 
(sob) that souls are just as stable in their own right as the Forms- there is the 
further problem of the subsequent progress of the discussion. All the characters 
agree at sob that souls are much more like Forms than sensible objects. But the fur-
ther course of the discussion shows that even this leaves room to doubt whether 
souls are immortal. The assumptions at sob are thus insufficient for proving souls 
immortal, and Socrates realizes this. It is unconvincing, then, to suggest that he 
now recycles this earlier assumption, and tries to use it to finish off the final ar-
gument, when it has already been shown insufficient. Nor does anything he has 
added in the final argument, if combined with this earlier assumption, yield a valid 
argument that souls have the required relation to the Form of Life. 
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Why are Souls Bringers of Life? 
The proof has two phases, corresponding to two problems Socrates has to solve: 
first, he needs to show that as long as an individual soul exists and is a soul, it is 
necessarily alive. Call this Phase A; it runs from 102a-105e. But that, of course, is 
not enough. He must also show that individual souls cannot be destroyed; unlike 
lumps of snow, which are necessarily cold so long as they remain lumps of snow, 
but can also be melted, Socrates needs to show that souls always remain souls. If 
he can do both, he will have shown the immortality of individual souls. He tries 
to accomplish the second task in Phase B, 105e-107a. This part of the argument is 
inadequate, so the argument does not succeed overall. But this does not prevent 
us from drawing substantive conclusions about how the argument is supposed to 
work, based on its goal and the tools Socrates has given himself for reaching that 
goal. In what follows, I will focus on Phase A. 
The key claim in Socrates' argument is that souls are bringers of the Form of 
Life. This claim is justified by empirical observation, from the fact that bodies 
occupied by souls are alive. The FEP then allows Socrates to conclude that souls 
have the Form of Life in themselves as well, and so also exclude the Form of Death. 
One weak point in this argument is the alleged connection between individual 
souls and the Form of Life; what does Socrates think justifies this part ofhis argu-
ment? Broadly speaking, the following two accounts seem to exhaust the plausible 
answers to this question. 
One is that Socrates just asserts that individual souls have and bring with them 
the Form of Life. On this view, whether or not there is a Form of Soul, the important 
relation, the one doing the "work" here, is the one directly between individual souls 
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and the Form of Life. But this is perilously close to question-begging. Socrates 
spends many pages of the most important part of the Phaedo erecting a vast edifice 
of metaphysics - if this reading is correct, the argument is all smoke, designed 
to conceal what is nearly a bare assertion. The alternative is more respectable: 
to think that individual souls are related to the Form of Life via their essential 
relation to the Form of Soul, and because the Form of Soul is essentially related to 
the Form ofLife.83 This gives a point to the arguments found in the text, although 
it does not change the fact that those arguments are flawed. 
The safe answers are introduced, in the first instance, to show that every indi-
vidual (i.e. non-Form) item in the universe has one permanent and necessary rela-
tion, namely its relation to its eponymous Form. Individual souls have at least one 
necessary property, which is that they are souls. In the terms of the Form-theory, 
this means that individual souls necessarily participate in the Form of Soul. This 
necessary and permanent property is the best place to look for the necessity and 
permanence in the relation between souls and the Form of Life. The eponymous 
relation to a thing's own Form is necessary, has the strength of logical necessity, 
and persists so long as the thing remains whatever it is. So long as a hula-hoop 
remains a hula-hoop, it is logically certain that it participates in the Form of Hula-
Hoop. So long as souls are souls, they must participate in the Form of Soul. 
It is not hard to see why Socrates would prefer to explain the participation of 
individual souls in the Form of Life via their participation in the Form of Soul. The 
83Gerson (2003, pp. 94, 176 n. 43), Gerson (2002, p. 93), and Bestor (1988, pp. 30, 37-38) endorse 
this view of the argument. Bestor also argues that there is ample precedent in Plato's texts for 
relations among Forms. For they are described in hierarchical organizations, as co-present, as 
always co-present, and as incompatible with one another: Bestor (1988, pp. 39-40). For a sample 
of how baroque things can become when one tries to untangle the relations among a particular 
and more than one Form, see Weller (1995, p. 40). 
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theory of the Phaedo emphasizes at every turn that stability and permanence are 
found only in the Forms, while non-Form items are notoriously unstable. It would 
be surprising to suggest that there can be necessary and permanent relations un-
less both their terms are themselves permanent. No individual item has this kind 
of permanence, suggesting that necessary and permanent relations hold only be-
tween transcendent Forms. For things that have necessary properties in addition 
to their eponymous property of being what they are, these further properties must 
be explained by relations among Forms, not by relations directly between individ-
uals and Forms. Thus, sensible snow necessarily participates in the Form of Snow, 
and this Form necessarily brings the Form of Cold with it. In virtue of this relation, 
sensible snow is also obliged to participate in the Form of Cold, and thus prevented 
from participating in the Form of Heat. Souls, on my proposed reading, work the 
same way. Individual souls necessarily participate in the Form qf Soul. Since all 
Forms are perfectly stable, a relation between the Forms of Soul and Life will also 
be perfectly stable. Once something is an individual soul, then, it will go on stably 
participating in the Forms of both Soul and Life, and thus remain alive perma-
nently and necessarily. While this line of thought fails to provide the full proof of 
individual immortality Socrates wants, it is an interesting and inventive attempt 
at that proof. This is an argument worthy of ascription to Plato, whereas the al-
ternative reduces to question-begging couched in unnecessary complications. 
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1.5 Arguments Against the Form of Soul 
I now turn to three commentators who have produced arguments against the Form 
of Soul, or who might easily be thought to have done so. 
Dancy closes his recent book with a forceful declaration that initially seems to 
contradict my claim: 
... the repeated references to Forms in the course of this argument may 
create the illusion that there is some essential connection between the 
Theory of Forms and immortality. There is not. For as soon as Socrates 
fleshed out the Safe (but unlearned) Theory of Causality into the Learned 
Theory, he lost all essential reference to Forms. The intermediaries 
that import predicates into host entities in the Learned Theory are 
entities that possess the predicates as essential predicates, and that is 
all that is required. If you explain the presence ofheat by appealing to 
the presence of fire, you have, we may grant, appealed to the presence 
of something that is indelibly hot. And that explanation is just as good 
if your explanation of fire's essential possession of heat is quite alien 
to the Theory of Forms, or, for that matter, if you have no explanation 
at all. But the proof of the immortality of the soul depends only on 
that aspect of the Learned Theory: it depends on nothing specific to 
the Theory ofForms.84 
Unfortunately, these are the last lines of the book, and they do not explain Dancy's 
claim in much detail. Dancy is claiming that there is no essential, i.e. necessary con-
nection between the proof of immortality and the theory of Forms. For the same 
proof of immortality could be run by appealing just to the notion of an essen-
tial property, even if, as he imagines, one has no explanation whatsoever of what 
makes that property essential. This claim is true as far as it goes, so I am inclined 
to think this is what Dancy intends. But we must not confuse it with the claim that 
84Dancy (2004, 312-313, emphasis added) 
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the Phaedo is best read as arguing for the soul's immortality without any reliance 
on or reference to the theory of Forms. As I have just argued, this claim is false; 
the theory of Forms, and more specifically, the "safe" answers are woven into the 
text all the way to the end of the proof. Again, the basis for the exclusion of oppo-
sites is that the Form of the opposite is excluded: 104dl-3, dl4, el, 105a8-bl, b2 
all mention the Form of the appropriate opposite. This also shows that the theory 
of Forms is involved in the argument. 
I turn now to Gallop, whose painstaking commentary argues against finding 
the Form of Soul in the final argument. He draws no overall conclusions about 
the argument other than his discussions of particular points, so it is hard to do 
justice to the nuanced position that emerges. One part of his commentary takes 
roughly the position that no Form of Soul is mentioned explicitly in the text, and 
that reading the Form of Soul as part of the argument (whether or not it is ex-
plicitly mentioned) would yield an incoherent argument. It is not clear, however, 
whether Gallop means for this last claim to supersede the analysis he offers earlier 
(pp.203-205), in which he gives two alternate versions for the whole argument, 
and both invoke a Form of Soul. So Gallop at least sometimes acknowledges the 
need for the Form of Soul. Here, however, I consider his negative comments to-
ward the Form of Soul in their own right, in order to show that they do not succeed 
in ruling it out. 
At 105c9-d12, where the final proof of immortality is carried out, Gallop be-
gins, "Some commentators have wished to understand ['Soul'], rather, as the Form 
of Soul..."85 He does not say who has read the passage this way, but such a reading 
85Gallop (1975, p. 213) 
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seems impossible, as he himself recognizes. There would be no point in prov-
ing the immortality of the Form of Soul. But to illustrate the problems with this 
reading, Gallop takes up a schema proposed by Vlastos. (I will not repeat Vlastos' 
formula here, as it belongs to the class of readings that immediately result in ac-
knowledging the Form of Soul.) But to continue with Gallop's analysis, he argues 
that Vlastos' schema would lead to one of two alternatives, neither of which is 
acceptable. These are (followed by Gallop's comments): 
1. 'A soul is alive because, being a soul, it must participate in the 
Form Soul, and since the Form Soul entails the Form Life, a soul 
must also participate in the Form Life, and hence a soul must be 
alive.' or 
2. 'A body is alive because, being besouled [or being a soul (sic)] it 
must participate in the Form Soul, and since the Form Soul en-
tails the Form Life, the body must also participate in the Form 
Life, and so must be alive.' 
But neither (1) nor (2) is satisfactory. (1) will not fit the text, for it 
ignores the soul's relationship to the body, which cannot be elimi-
nated, even if the 'subtle' answers of 105b-d are taken as Forms ... And 
(2) clearly does not yield the conclusion for which Socrates wishes to 
argue. He needs a conclusion not about body but about soul. More-
over, he needs a conclusion not just about the Form of Soul, which is 
'immortal' like any other Form, but about a particular soul.86 
The problems raised here are illusory. First, the best reading must take "soul" in 
the final argument to be an individual. Second, the two alternatives can be con-
joined without contradiction, and the text seems to endorse both lines of reason-
ing. So (1) does not neglect the relation to the body, because (2) explains that; and 
86Gallop (1975, p. 214) 
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although (2) yields no conclusion about the individual soul, that job is done by (1). 
Socrates makes the argument in (2) because it provides empirical evidence that 
the individual soul is a Form-bringer; (1) is the best explanation of Socrates' rea-
soning justifying the conclusion that the individual soul is immortal. So Gallop's 
comments give no reason for rejecting the Form of Soul. 
Dixsaut makes the following interesting argument - unlike the two cases al-
ready surveyed, this one actually is, in part, an argument against the existence of 
a Form of Soul: 
[sc. S'il y avait une Forme de l'Ame,] Un autre type d'argumentation 
serait requis : il faudrait montrer qu'une arne ne peut jamais cesser de 
participer a l'idee d'Ame. On est libre de penser que Platon aurait du 
poser cette question : force est de constater que, ni dans le Phedon ni 
ailleurs, il ne la pose.87 
But no argument is required to show that a soul must always participate in the 
Form of Soul, so long as it remains a soul: if it ceases to participate in the Form of 
Soul, it will no longer be a soul. The problem, of course, is to show that a soul 
will always go on participating in the Form of Soul, and so will always continue 
participating in the Form of Life. But this is precisely what Socrates tries to do, 
albeit unsuccessfully, at 105ell-107a1.88 He attempts to do this by showing that a 
soul will always continue participating in the Form of Life, but given the cursory 
and unsatisfactory nature of the argument, we have little to go on in deciding how 
Socrates thinks he can show this. So Socrates does try to do what Dixsaut says he 
would try to do if there were a Form of Soul. In my view it is not possible to build 
87Dixsaut (1991, p. 397 n. 321) 
88 And, as we will see below, again at Republic X 608c-611a. 
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an argument for or against the Form of Soul based on that last abortive stretch of 
argument.89 
It might be thought that there is something wrong with this conclusion, for 
there is something discomfiting about a Form of Soul.90 This objection is easily 
answered. For the final argument explicitly involves Forms of Life and Death, and 
these have difficulties similar to those of a Form of Soul. A Form of Death may 
be even worse than that of Life, if it is explained as a Form of the destruction or 
separation of something.91 But the structure of the argument requires the Form of 
Death (105d9), since the argument is built around pairs of opposite Forms. Since 
Socrates permits himself Forms of Life and Death, it is hard to object to the Form 
of Soul for this reason. 
1.6 The Form of Soul in Republic X 
There is another argument for the soul's immortality in Republic X (608c-611a). 
This argument is brief, and has often been dismissed. Annas, for example, calls it 
"one of the few really embarrassingly bad arguments in Plato."92 But Eric Brown 
has recently given the argument a spirited and convincing defense. He does not 
89Most scholars agree on the failure of this last argument: Bostock (1986, pp. 191-193), Gallop 
(1975, p. 216), Loriaux (1975, p. 131). Some work hard to find something to redeem it: Burnet 
(1911, p. 123), Archer-Hind (1894, p. 116), Bluck (1954, pp. 191-194) (who admits the difficulty, but 
looks hard for a way out), and Dorter (1982, pp. 151-157). 
90I would suggest that the Form of Soul is unsettling because one tends to imagine Forms as 
objects, from a second- or third-person point of view, while one tends to think of souls from the 
first-person point of view. It is not at all clear how to think of an object from a first-person point 
of view, so the Form of Soul seems incoherent. Perhaps this is why Archer-Hind found it a meta-
physical monstrosity. 
91 Gallop (1975, p. 218) 
92Annas (1981, p. 345) 
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claim that the argument is cogent, but that Plato "pulls together some interest-
ing, intelligible, non-question-begging, and typically Platonic assumptions, and 
he constructs a valid argument from these."93 I think Brown has carried his point. 
My purpose here, however, is not to defend the argument, but to show that the 
most straightforward way of filling in the gaps in the text presupposes a Form of 
Soul in the background. There are two reasons for this: first, the earlier part of 
Book X shares its terms for Forms with terms used for souls in this argument, and 
second, the claims from the Phaedo's final argument easily fit Socrates' claims in 
this one. 
The argument for immortality occurs roughly in the middle of Book X, fol-
lowing a discussion of why poetry must be banished from Kallipolis. This passage 
makes central use of the theory of Forms: the very first move Socrates makes is to 
posit a Form "in connection with each set of many things to which we apply the 
same name" (596a6-8). Whereas the Phaedo merely hints several times that there 
is a Form for each set bearing the same name, Socrates says so explicitly here. In 
this section he also goes further than assigning a Form to each natural kind, since 
here he discusses the Form of Bed. He thus puts Forms for artifacts on the table 
as well. Souls are likelier to be a natural kind than artifacts.94 If there is a Form of 
Bed in Book X, then a fortiori there should also be a Form of Soul. 95 
93The negative reaction is summarized by Brown (1997, p. 297, quotation from p. 298). Those 
finding grave difficulties with the argument include: Purshouse (2006, p. 132), Gerson (2003, p. 
125), Waterfield (1993, p. 450), Annas (1981, p. 345), Halliwell (1988, pp. 159-162), White (1979, pp. 
259-260), Grube (1974, p. 252 n. 16), Cross and Woozley (1964, p. 119). Perhaps the best indication 
of its reception is that most books on Plato simply ignore it. 
94Based on the construction of the soul described in the Timaeus, one might regard it as a kind 
of artifact, but I will assume here that it is a natural kind. 
95There is a strand of interpretation that does not take 596a at face value, but proposes an alter-
native translation, on which Socrates does not claim that there is a Form for every general term. 
This reading begins from Smith (1917). While Smith's article is interesting, it is far from conclusive 
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We next need to look more closely at the Form-referring language in the first 
part of Book X, to see how it continues unbroken into the argument for immortal-
ity. Early in Book X Socrates calls the Forms iMat (596a6, bl, bs, b7). In addition 
to this easily recognized term, he has two other locutions that unambiguously re-
fer to Forms in this discussion. He calls the Form of Bed "what we say it is to be 
a bed" (o 8~ cpa~ev dva1 o icrn Kf..{vn, 597al-2). Finally, he calls the Form of Bed 
"the one that is in nature" (f) iv nj cpucre1 o?Jcra, 597b4-5). The last two locutions-
being "what a bed is" and the bed "in nature"- are used together again just after 
this (597cl-3). The third type of expression is in fact Socrates' most usual way of 
referring to Forms in this section: he uses expressions with the root cpu- repeat-
edly in this passage to indicate that the Form is something "natural," "in nature;' 
"produced naturally;' and so on.96 
When Socrates begins his argument for the immortality of the soul, one of his 
first claims is that "there is a good and a bad for each thing" (608e7), or "a natural 
(O"U~cpurov) badness and sickness for everything" (609a3, a8).97 His word for "nat-
ural;' crt5~cpurov, is derived from those he has just been using to refer to Forms (see 
note 106). Here he uses an adjective, while in the earlier passage Socrates chose 
- Smith himself never definitely endorses the reading he proposes, and appeals for help settling 
the issue. Sonnenschein (1918) calls Smith's argument into serious question. I consider Smith's 
proposal to have been refuted by Sharma (2006), who also provides a survey of other scholars who 
have followed or been tempted by this view. Those who cite Smith typically do not endorse the 
reading, but call it interesting and note that it has not been proven: Nehamas (1998, p. 272 n. 31), 
Patterson (1985, p. 203 n. 8), Fine (1980, p. 213 n. 25). One who does endorse Smith's reading is 
Burnyeat (1992, p. 298 n. 4). But he is refuted by Fine (1993, pp. 304-305 n. 40). In addition to 
596a, Socrates also posits a single Form for every set of many things at Republic 507b1-6. 
96Forms of <pvotc; occur at 597b5, c2, d2, d6, 598a2; forms of cpvw at 597c5, d2, d4 (in compound); 
cputevw at 597c4; also see Burnet (1911, ad 103b5). The Phaedo also uses ltE<pUKEvat (102c1 and 
104a3) to indicate an essential predication that is to be explained by referring to a Form, also noted 
by Burnet (1911, ad 102b8). 
97Brown thinks it better not to make this the first premise of the argument, but this decision 
does not matter for my purpose here (1997, p. 318 n. 7). 
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nouns (cpucru;) or verbs (cpuw).98 But all these words share the sense of "natural," 
"in nature:' These terms were used in the first section of Book X to refer to Forms, 
and Socrates continues using them in the argument for immortality. There is no 
sign that their reference has changed, so they apparently still refer to Forms. The 
shared vocabulary, the explicit reference to the Form of Bed, and the One Over 
Many argument at 596a, all show that when the topic shifts to immortality and 
individual souls become the focus, the Form of Soul is to be understood. 
As the argument for immortality ends, the conversation shifts to the soul's 
nature. Socrates argues that the soul "in its truest nature" ( rfj aAT)9Ecrr6:rn cpucret, 
61lbl) is not "full of multicolored variety and dissimilarity and conflict with it-
self:' Again, roughly a page further, Socrates uses the expression "the soul itself" 
(aurfj \jJuxij, 612b2). These expressions are a direct indication that a Form of Soul 
is present in the background. Given the metaphysics already postulated in Book 
X, to refer to the "truest nature" of something can only mean its Form, or the way 
the thing is when it is most successfully imitating its own Form. "The soul itself" is 
also most naturally understood as either the Form of Soul, or perhaps better, the 
way an individual soul exists when it is most like the Form. Finally, it is also worth 
noting that Socrates refers to the original appearance of Glaucus at one point as 
"what he naturally was" (oToc; ~v cpucret, 611d4-5). This expression too, given the 
analogy between Glaucus and the soul, is strongly suggestive that what the soul 
naturally was, is either a Form or very similar to the Form. 
The final argument of the Phaedo can be conjoined with the claims here to help 
explain the claim that there is "a natural badness and sickness for nearly every-
98Variations on the root also occur at 609b6 (nEcpux6roc;) and 610a2 (£pcpurov). 
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thing" (609a3).99 There Socrates appeals to relations among Forms in order to 
ground essential properties (e.g. fire's essential property of being hot, or three's 
of being odd).100 A thing x has an essential property because the Form X brings 
another Form along with it.101 The claims about function in the Republic copy and 
extend that metaphysical schema from the Phaedo. First, the virtue and vice of 
anything are opposites in the same sense as the Phaedo discusses: anything par-
ticipating in the Form of its own virtue will not be able to participate in the Form 
of its vice (at the same time, in the same way). That is, the virtue and vice of each 
thing exclude each other. Second, the Book X argument for immortality suggests 
an explanation for what makes something the vice of something else: something 
is a vice if it causes a thing it enters to lose its share of its own eponymous Form. 
So Disease is the vice ofbodies, because it (eventually) causes a body to stop par-
ticipating in the Form of Body, "and brings it to the point of not being a body at 
all ... " (609c4-6). This provides a metaphysical basis for a common sense intuition, 
that what makes something stop being the thing it is - that is, what destroys it -
is bad for that thing. 
This argument treats the question of the soul's immortality as equivalent to 
asking whether there is anything capable of causing an individual soul to stop 
participating in the Form of Soul. Socrates has an argument that the most likely 
candidate for doing this, vice, in fact cannot do it, and this justifies the conclusion 
that nothing else can either. One of the argument's key claims is that each kind 
99Some authors, looking for the explanation of this claim, point to earlier discussions of function 
in the Republic: Brown (1997, p. 307), Comford (1941, p. 341). But these passages (353b ff., 601d) 
provide no metaphysical justification for the claim that each thing has a single virtue and vice. 
1000r relations among immanent forms -we do not need to decide between the two here. 
101 I argued in the previous section that readings that avoid attributing this schema to Socrates 
are significantly weaker than those that accept it. 
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of thing has a specific evil, and each form of evil is bad for a specific kind of thing. 
So the Form of Ophthalmia can only destroy things occupied by the Form of Eye, 
never things occupied by the Form of Nose. If a bad thing does enter some indi-
vidual not occupied by the Form of the entity for which the bad thing is bad, it 
will not cause that individual to cease participating in the Form of whatever it is. 
Socrates' claim seems to come to this, that (1) for each thing, its identity as that 
kind of thing is guaranteed by its participation in its eponymous Form, and (2) the 
(immanent) form of each thing has a contrary whose "attack" is capable of forcing 
it to "retreat" or "perish." The first claim is just the "safe" answer of the Phaedo's 
final argument; the second builds on its "sophisticated" answer. 
The argument is therefore best understood as making its point via a Form of 
Soul. For, like the final argument of the Phaedo, this argument depends on estab-
lishing relations of contrariety among Forms, and in particular among immanent 
Forms. If none of the Forms that are the specific evils for a given kind of thing can 
succeed in driving out the eponymous that Form makes the thing what it is, the 
thing must be indestructible. The question whether the soul is indestructible can 
be recast, then, as the question whether anything can cause an individual soul to 
stop participating in the Form of Soul. Socrates' answer is that the best candidate 
for this, injustice, cannot cause this. Since observation shows that the approach 
and entry of the immanent Form of the soul's own evil, injustice, does not cause 
the immanent Form of the Soul to depart, Socrates concludes that, a fortiori, noth-
ing else can cause the immanent Form of Soul to depart either. The individual soul, 
which is what it is in virtue of being occupied by this immanent Form, is therefore 
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indestructible .102 
1.7 The Influence of the Form of Soul 
Since there is a transcendent Form of Soul in the background of these two dia-
logues, it is natural that its presence should make itself felt in Plato's characteri-
zation of individual souls, which are what they are in virtue of their participation 
in this Form. Both the Phaedo and the Republic claim that the better a soul's condi-
tion is, the less it changes. Change is a sign of something wrong in a soul, stability 
a sign of health. 
Socrates claims that visible things change constantly (Phaedo 78e), and that 
when human souls associate with such things, they are themselves the victims of 
increasing levels of change.103 This is bad for them. They are "dragged by the body 
to the things that are never the same, and the soul itself strays and is confused and 
dizzy as if it were drunk, insofar as it is in contact with that kind of thing" (65b, 
79c6-8).104 By contrast, an individual soul that separates itself as much as possible 
from the body in order to contemplate the Forms associates with things that never 
102The suggestion that the Book X argument takes over the logic of the Phaedo's final argument 
is not new. Several commentators have made the same proposal in a less detailed way, e.g., Leroux 
(2002, pp. 721-722). 
1030n 78e Archer-Hind remarks, "This is one of many passages which show that Plato thoroughly 
accepted the doctrines of Herakleitos and Protagoras so far as regards the material world." There 
seems to be no disagreement on the import of the passage: Rowe (1993, p. 184), Gallop (1975, p. 
139), Bluck (1954, p. 73), Burnet (1911, pp. 77-78), Archer-Hind (1894, p. 48). 
104Some note the weakness of Socrates' argument at 65b, but what matters for my argument is 
that Socrates (as well as Simmias) seems to believe its conclusion, whether on good grounds or 
not. My argument might even be somewhat stronger to the extent that the justification given in 
the text is weak, for this is reason to look elsewhere for the justification Plato had for making his 
characters accept the claim. See Ebert (2004, p. 134 and n. 12), Rowe (1993, pp. 139-140), Bostock 
(1986, p. 26}, Gallop (1975, p. 91). 
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change, and this is good for it (79d, 80d-81a). 
Socrates' imperturbability in the face of his own death, given special empha-
sis at the opening and the end of the dialogue (58e, 117b), illustrates how good 
a soul can be if it successfully resists change.105 One indication of this resistance 
comes when Crito asks Socrates for instructions about how his friends are to look 
after his interests. The response is, "Nothing new" (ouo£v Katv6rEpov, nsbs). 
Just afterward, Socrates reminds Crito that he is his soul, not his body. The les-
son is that Socrates' excellence is to be traced largely to the constancy of his soul 
(115b-c). By contrast, the friends who are present are subject to strong emotions, 
with Apollodorus singled out as especially upset, i.e. unstable. 
The Republic likewise claims that better souls will be less affected by change, 
and adds the general claim that "the best things are least liable to alteration or 
change ... " (380e3-4, 381a3-4).106 When he turns to the education of the guardians, 
Socrates recommends simplicity rather than complexity in both their physical 
and their intellectual training (404d-e).107 And since the realm of the bodily is 
the realm of change, when the soul does anything "by itself" it is ipso facto less 
subject to change. So Socrates observes that learning involves "the pleasures that 
the soul experiences just by itself," and ascribes virtues to souls that are like this 
(485d-e). In the analogy of the Sun, Socrates claims that souls possess knowledge 
when they focus on something that really is, i.e. something that does not change; 
1050n 58e, see Ebert (2004, p. 108). Commentators generally recognize this theme at the end of 
the dialogue, for example Ebert (2004, p. 458). Many commentators say nothing about the final 
pages, either because of their lesser philosophical interest or, like Hackforth, because they prefer 
to let Plato's moving text speak for itself. 
106Noted as a general principle of Platonic metaphysics by Leroux (2002, p. 566 n. 122) and White 
(1979, p. 93). 
107Noted by Moss (2007, p. 436). 
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when souls focus on things that change, they are "dimmed" and have no under-
standing (a~~Auwne:t, 508d7).108 Later in the discussion of the philosopher-rulers 
Socrates mentions the need to draw their souls from becoming to being (525c) -
that is, from changing things to changeless ones - and this what justifies the study 
of geometry (526e, 527b).109 
The Phaedo and the Republic also share the claim that the gods do not change. 
This is further evidence of the influence of the Form of Soul, since the gods are 
presumably nothing but souls.U0 The Republic argues that "whatever is in good 
condition .. .is least subject to change by something else" (380c-381c).111 Nor can 
the gods change themselves, since the only change possible for them would be 
to some worse condition. The Phaedo also claims, less directly, that the gods do 
not change.112 Socrates associates souls with the divine, and both terms with the 
predicate "deathless" (80bl-3). He later claims that "the god ... and anything that 
is deathless, are never destroyed" (106d5-7 ).113 If something is never destroyed, 
then it must be unchangeable too, for change is the beginning of the destruc-
tion.114 
108Noted by Leroux (2002, p. 670 n. 138). 
109Crombie, however, thinks "It is not very clear precisely why mathematical studies are given 
such importance": Crombie (1962, p. 132). The motivation of drawing one's attention "from the 
world of change to reality" (Cross and Woozley) is noted by Kamtekar (2008, p. 354), O'Connor 
(2007, p. 75), Denyer (2007, p. 303), Miller (2007, pp. 323-324), Leroux (2002, p. 683 n. 59). 
110 A simple argument for this claim: Plato's ontology recognizes bodies, Forms, and souls (at the 
most); the gods have no bodies; the gods are not Forms; so there is nothing else they can be but 
souls. 
111 Noted by Kamtekar (2008, p. 349), O'Connor (2007, p. 81), Moss (2007, p. 436 including nn. 
31-32}, Leroux (2002, p. 565 nn. 121, 124, 125). 
112Gallop goes further, claiming that "the Form world is virtually identified with the gods ... " Gal-
lop (1975, p. 141). 
113Bostock (1986, pp. 191-192) denies that this claim is meant as an argument. But this does not 
affect my point; the claim is one to which Socrates subscribes, so it can be combined with others 
to which he subscribes to reveal more about his views. 
114Rickless separates two senses of "changelessness": (1) something may never go in or out of 
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These claims pervade the Phaedo and Republic. Their presence does not, of 
course, prove that Plato had a Form of Soul in mind; I hope my earlier arguments 
have already accomplished that. But the Form of Soul is consistent with, and may 
be the best explanation for, Plato's firm commitment to these claims; its ability 
to explain, even if in a loose sense, some of Plato's most important commitments 
counts in favor of recognizing the influence of the Form of Soul. By recognizing 
the Form of Soul we are in a better position to explain some central and persistent 
claims in these two dialogues. 
1.8 Why is Plato Silent about the Form of Soul? 
It makes good sense to ask what the soul essentially is, or what its reality is, but 
Plato gives no clear answer to this question in the Phaedo or Republic.115 We cannot 
know why Plato was silent about this question, but silence on a topic so central to 
his interests should attract our interest. In this section I consider some explana-
tions for Plato's silence on this point. 
existence, or (2) it may be always in the same state. He comments, "It is not as clear why Plato 
accepts the ... proposition that forms are changeless along the former dimension, i.e. insofar as 
they neither come into nor go out of existence." (Rickless 2007, p. 42). But it seems clear that, 
whether or not he had good reason for doing so, Plato thought the second kind of changelessness 
was a necessary condition for the first. Phaedo sob provides evidence for this: divine things are 
uniform and always the same as well as immortal, while visible things have the opposite qualities. 
It is easy to infer that these lists of qualities are not assembled at random; remaining in the same 
state provides a kind of immunity to going out of existence. 
115Dorothea Frede notes this lacuna as well: "As to the exact nature of the soul we are left some-
how in the dark by Plato in the Phaedo and also in Republic x:· (Frede 1978, p. 293) Note that tripar-
tition does not address the question I have in mind. Tripartition concerns the internal structure 
of souls; I am asking about its metaphysical features, that is, the properties making it the kind of 
thing it is. This is why knowing whether there is a Form of Soul is relevant to this inquiry, in a way 
that knowing whether souls are tripartite is not: nothing can be said to exist, or to be immortal, in 
virtue ofbeing tripartite. But participating in the Form of Soul, and therefore in the Form of Life, 
may be relevant to why souls exist, or whether they are immortal. 
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The fact that Plato does not say explicitly that there is a Form of Soul in his 
metaphysics does not give us a strong reason to conclude that it is not there: the 
Form of Soul is too obvious a possibility to think that Plato never entertained the 
idea. So if we think that he entertained the idea and rejected it, we then have to 
ask why he is silent about the rejection. If Plato wanted to avoid affirming the 
Form of Soul, he had ample opportunity to insert a remark or a claim that would 
have ruled it out somewhere in the text of either dialogue. But he did not do this 
any more than he explicitly mentioned it. Would-be deniers of the Form of Soul 
thus have a problem to solve: why, if Plato did not accept the Form of Soul at this 
period, is he silent about his denial? Likewise, my position has the problem of 
explaining why, if Plato accepted the Form of Soul, he is silent about this. The 
silence itself tells us nothing, because the question is obvious, whichever answer 
Plato favored. 
Moravcsik offers an interesting general explanation for the lacuna: he divides 
ontologies into those whose primary contrast is real versus unreal and those whose 
main contrast is real versus appearance. Plato's is one of the latter, and therefore 
"we must not expect to find a metaphysical cage for every creature that was con-
strued in Plato's time or our own as real."116 Even if this claim is true in general, 
it is hard to accept the suggestion that Plato omitted to pronounce on the case 
of the soul because he did not intend to be exhaustive. The soul is not a detail in 
Plato's thought, but one of the main interests, and of course the same is true of 
the Forms. Second, at Phaedo 79a ff., Socrates proposes a division of entities into 
visible and invisible. This division must be exhaustive, or Socrates would not be 
116Moravcsik (2000, p. 56) 
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able, as he does, to draw any conclusion about the soul from it. So on this point, in 
this context, Moravcsik's thesis is not helpful: some of Plato's divisions are meant 
to convey information about his ontology, and some of these also provide a "meta-
physical cage" for every inhabitant. 
Another explanation for Plato's silence about the nature of the soul is that the 
gap could only be filled by a definition, and Plato does not at this point know any 
definition of the soul that he accepts. But this is also the case for Beauty and Good-
ness: he nowhere endorses definitions of these terms, but he does not hesitate to 
speak of Forms for them. We are to understand that the Form of Beauty is what 
beauty essentially is; Plato may not know how to fill in the definition that specifies 
this (or he may be cagey about revealing it for some other reason), but whatever 
the definition may be, that is what the Form of Beauty is.117 He could easily have 
made the same move regarding the soul, but does not. So this explanation is im-
plausible. 
Three French writers have agreed that Plato's silence on the Form of Soul must 
be intentional.118 For example, Loriaux writes: 
... nous avons d'abord la conviction que, si le Phedon ne dit nulle part 
que l'ame est une Forme, c'est parce qu'il n'ajamais eu !'intention dele 
faire. La prudence dont Platon fait preuve en ce domaine - en particu-
lier, dans des textes ou une affirmation plus massive aurait pu sembler 
plus payante- nous paralt, sur ce point, tout a fait significative ... 119 
Unfortunately, he does not go on to say precisely what conclusion should be drawn 
from the silence. This passage suffers from an ambiguity common to many au-
117Silverman discusses this feature of Plato's thought at Silverman (2002, p. 7). 
118 Dixsaut (1991, p. 397 n. 321), Loriaux (1975, p. 132), Gueroult (1926, p. 488). 
119Loriaux (1975, p. 132) 
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thors who touch on this subject. It is not clear whether Loriaux is discussing what 
kind of thing an individual soul is or whether or not a Form of Soul is included in 
Plato's metaphysics: "l'ame est une Forme" is ambiguous between these two inter-
pretations, as is the English, "the soul is a Form." The text continues by discussing 
what kind of thing individual souls are, so this suggests that it is this question that 
Loriaux has in view here as well, and not whether or not there is a Form of Soul.120 
The situation in the scholarly literature, then, is almost as striking as the one 
in Plato's texts: near silence about Plato's silence about the nature of the soul and 
about the Form of Soul, with those authors who do recognize the silence not at-
tempting to probe it very far. While we cannot show that a particular explanation 
is correct, we may still gain some insight into the possibilities. We can start by di-
viding explanations of this puzzle into two groups. The first group proposes that 
Plato is silent because he intends to avoid committing himself to the Form of Soul. 
To fill in the members of the group, consider two variables. First, the kind of in-
tention we attribute to Plato might vary, from thinking Plato was hesitant to affirm 
the Form of Soul to thinking he positively meant to deny or avoid it altogether. 
Second, one can imagine various reasons for whatever intention he had: he might 
have considered the Form of Soul a metaphysical monstrosity, or he might have 
seen problems with it but hoped he would be able to solve them. The plausible 
combinations of these two variables compose the class of explanations of the first 
type. These explanations all suppose that Plato saw some metaphysical or logical 
difficulty with the Form of Soul. We may be sympathetic to this kind of explana-
tion because we also find this Form metaphysically untenable. But this sympathy 
120Dixsaut (1991, p. 397 n. 321) at some points does seem to address the question whether there 
is a Form of Soul; see page 64 above. 
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should not cause us to overlook some difficulties with this whole class of explana-
tions. 
First, Plato is silent not just about the Form of Soul but also about the precise 
nature of the individual soul. Supposing that Plato saw problems with the Form of 
Soul does not explain why he should also be silent about the definition or nature of 
the individual soul, unless we also assume that he could not see how to discuss the 
latter without the former. Second, the supposition that Plato held some negative 
attitude toward the Form of Soul is not in harmony with the many passages noted 
above in which he writes as if there is no limit on the range of Forms. To suppose 
that he wrote these passages while at the same time thinking the Form of Soul was 
untenable is to come close to thinking that Plato wrote these sections of the Phaedo 
and Republic with his tongue in his cheek. Whatever we make of the metaphysics 
we find in these dialogues, it hardly seems plausible that their author did not find 
their central ideas worth taking seriously. But that is what this kind of explanation 
comes close to affirming. 
Given these difficulties, it is important to realize that another kind of explana-
tion is available for Plato's silence on both these topics: perhaps Plato had some 
reason other than a negative attitude toward the Form of Soul for keeping silent 
about it. 
Plato's silence may be, at least in part, a dramatic strategy to heighten interest 
in the theory by leaving out of view the key concept that connects the two major 
themes of the dialogue. From a dramatic point of view, silence on an important 
point creates interest and tension. Plato often uses this technique on a small scale. 
Consider, for example: 
• 
Socrates: Consider, then, what I am about to say. Glaucon: Say it. 
(Republic 436c4-5) 
Or this: 
Socrates: ... But you, I imagine, will agree to the following. Glaucon: 
What? (Republic 475e6-8) 
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Readers will recognize this pattern as one that Plato uses regularly: drawing at-
tention to some point as if it has already been enunciated when in fact it has not. 
Plato may be doing this on a larger scale with the Form of Soul. In the exam-
ples just given, one function of these questions is clear: they add a small touch of 
dramatic propulsion, and reduce repetition and flatness in Socrates' exposition. 
Their effect is local: tension is created and immediately resolved when Socrates 
goes on to spell out what he has just alluded to. Now ifPlato is carrying out the 
same strategy on a larger scale, it will be effective to draw attention to a thought, 
or to the territory near a problem, without ever resolving the tension by spelling 
it out. I suggest that this strategy, on a large scale, may be one of the elements that 
creates interest in the Phaedo and Republic. That is, these dialogues are centrally 
concerned with two theories whose intersection is never taken up directly. Writ-
ers often attribute to Plato's dialogues the intention of encouraging or provoking 
readers to improve on the arguments in the texts, and generally of motivating 
them to philosophize. The suggestion that the Form of Soul is missing from the 
text intentionally would be another way of carrying out this intention. 
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1.9 What is an Individual Soul? 
Although Plato does not give a definition of individual souls in either the Phaedo 
or the Republic, his statements allow us to reconstruct a rough theory of souls for 
these dialogues.121 The theory gives individual souls a unique metaphysical slot: 
they are both invisible, making them resemble the Forms, but also individual par-
ticulars, making them subject to change like the items in the visible world. 
I begin with an elimination argument, to the effect that the individual soul 
does not fit into any of Plato's categories except that of invisible individuals.122 
Individual souls cannot be numerically identical with the transcendent Form of 
Soul, since this would leave Socrates with no need to prove the immortality of 
individual souls: immortality would follow immediately from being a Form. In-
dividual souls cannot be immanent forms either, for immanent forms exist only 
in virtue of "being in" some individual item. The Tallness in Simmias ceases to 
exist if it "retreats" out of him. Likewise, if my soul is nothing but an immanent 
instance of the Form of Soul, then there is no reason to think that my soul is able 
to go on existing when it is no longer within me. Since I am a combination of my 
soul and body, if my soul qua immanent form withdraws from the combination, it 
will cease to be anything on its own.123 Perhaps it is re-absorbed into the transcen-
dent Form of Soul, or it may just disappear. However this part of the story would 
go, Plato has said nothing to make us suppose that the soul qua immanent form 
121 By comparison, Socrates searches for definitions in several Platonic dialogues; he gives a def-
inition of color at Meno 75b10-1; he defines soul at Phaedrus 245e. 
122Throughout this argument I will assume that individual souls would fit into one, and only one, 
of the categories to be discussed. It would also be possible to maintain that the individual soul 
occupies more than one of these categories, but I shall ignore these complications. 
123The claim that a person is a combination of soul and body is found at Phaedo 79bl-2. 
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can exist on its own.124 If the soul can exist by itself, then ipso facto it must be a 
substance-like thing rather than just an immanent form. Finally, individual souls 
are not identical with any member of the visible realm, since Socrates explicitly 
argues that souls are invisible (Phaedo 79b7-15). There are no other metaphysi-
cal slots that the individual soul might occupy, so it must be an individual, but a 
member of the invisible realm: an invisible individual.125 
This is still a rather unfocused picture of what individual souls are. I now turn 
to examine the pair of distinctions that carve out the soul's metaphysical niche 
more closely, to try to discern what each contributes to the properties of the soul. 
I take up the visible/invisible distinction first. 
Phaedo 79a-80b makes central use of the visible/invisible distinction, and at 
least initially treats it as fundamental and exhaustive.126 When Socrates asks, "Do 
you want us to assume two kinds of existences, the visible and the invisible?" 
(79a6-7), he is dividing everything real into two classes. That the distinction is 
exhaustive is shown by his subsequently asking Cebes whether the soul is visible 
or invisible (79b7, b12): there is no possibility of a third answer. Cebes hesitates, 
but Socrates puts him back on the track by pointing out that he means nothing 
124I argued above that no immanent form can exist without a corresponding transcendent Form; 
here I am adding the claim that no immanent form can exist without a "host" particular in which 
it is located. 
125Fine endorses this view of individual souls, although without giving her grounds for it: Fine 
(1993, p. 249 n. 27). There might be another slot to eliminate, namely the Form of the Good, since 
it is said to be "beyond being" (Republic 509b7-9), and this status might make it a special case that 
cannot be lumped together with the other Forms. But this is obviously not a candidate for the 
nature of the individual soul either; any of the Forms is automatically immortal, so the argument 
given above applies to all such cases. Nor can I see what claiming that the individual soul is identical 
with the Form of the Good would mean. It is clear that Plato would not countenance this claim. 
126We will see below that there is more than one way of taking this claim, and Plato hesitates to 
endorse the stronger of the two he uses. 
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more sophisticated than "visible and invisible to human eyes."127 Thus, Socrates 
is using the ordinary sense of these terms, in which any given entity must be either 
visible or invisible.128 
Invisibility is associated with being unchangeable in this passage. Socrates 
amplifies this association at some length (78c10-d7), then asks: " ... those that al-
ways remain the same can be grasped only by the reasoning power of the mind? 
They are not seen but are invisible?" (79a2-4) Socrates does not claim (1) every-
thing invisible is unchanging, but only (2) everything unchanging is invisible. This 
claim is compatible with saying that the soul is invisible but also able to change. 
Socrates does, however, imply that invisibility contributes to, or is somehow as-
sociated with the soul's ability to resist change, in a long speech emphasizing the 
constancy of the Forms along with their invisibility.129 The preeminent charac-
teristic of invisible things in this section is their immunity to change, so the soul's 
ability to resist change must somehow be due to its invisibility. 
We find more evidence that Socrates does not endorse (1), the claim that ev-
erything invisible is unchanging, in his handling of Cebes' answer to his questions. 
127Ebert suggests that Cebes wants to avoid saying the soul is invisible because he realizes that, 
combined with what he has already agreed to, this will allow him to be trapped in a contradiction 
by Socrates: Ebert (2004, p. 260). 
1280ne could add qualifications to this disjunction: any entity must be either visible or invisible 
at a given time, to a given observer, from a given point, using his eyes or other specified equipment, 
etc. But this would not change the basic point Socrates is making. 
129Rickless (2007, p. 43) also recognizes this association. Plato is consistent in associating the in-
visible with immunity to change throughout these two dialogues, except once in the Republic where 
he seems to mention motion among the Forms: "But these [sc. motions in the visible heavens] fall 
far short of the true ones -those motions in which the things that are really fast or really slow, as 
measured in true numbers and as forming all the true geometrical figures, are moved relative to 
one another, and that move the things that are in them. And these, of course, must be grasped by 
reason and thought, not by sight" (Republic 529dl-5). Perhaps there is a reading on which these 
are not actual motions among the Forms: either the motion might take place somewhere other 
than among the Forms (the numbers, for example), or the motion itself might be hypothesized or 
merely extrapolated from changeless facts about the Forms. 
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Socrates has asked Cebes whether the soul is visible or invisible, and has had to 
prod Cebes to say the soul is invisible by telling him that he means nothing but 
visible or invisible to human eyes (79b7-14)Y0 But when Cebes responds to the 
prompt by saying that the soul is invisible (79b14-15), Socrates immediately soft-
ens his answer to something that avoids commitment to the plain form of (1): "So 
the soul is more like the invisible than the body, and the body more like the visible" 
(79b16-17). Since he has been using the distinction in its exhaustive sense up to 
this point, the qualification "more like" must signal that Socrates is shifting to a 
second sense of "visible" and "invisible." In this second sense, "visible" seems to 
entail that something is always changing, and "invisible" that something never 
changes.131 
This new sense is no longer exhaustive: prima facie there is room for things 
that change a great deal at some times or in some ways, but very little at other 
times or in other ways. And this is precisely what Socrates says about the soul in 
the same passage: when it follows the body "the soul itself strays and is confused 
130Various views have been taken of this passage. Burnet says of this exchange: "The inference 
from 'not visible' to 'invisible' seemed more necessary to the Greeks than to us." (Burnet 1911, 
p. 68 ad 79b13) Archer-Hind more sensibly suggests that Plato has Socrates go step by step from 
aoparov to UElOE<; in order to stress the connection with '1\tOfl<;. (Archer-Hind 1894, p. 49) Rowe 
suggests that Cebes' hesitation represents the traditional and Homeric view of the dead, according 
to which disembodied souls were thought to be visible, although not to the living (Rowe 1993, 
p. 185). Loriaux also rejects Burnet's suggestion, and instead proposes that Socrates is trying 
to ease the path for Cebes' assent to his argument "par substituer au terme un peu mysterieux et 
inquietant de atoti ces mots plus simples que sont oux 6para." (Loriaux 1969, pp. 168-169) Bostock's 
explanation is that "while Plato evidently believes that the soul is ... immaterial, he would not be 
entitled to expect general agreement on that point;' citing Democritus as a contemporary view on 
which souls are material but invisible: Bostock (1986, pp. 118-119). 
131 Ebert points out that Socrates first asks Cebes (79b4-5) to which class the body is more similar: 
"Das ist angesichts des bisherigen Duktus der Argumentation eine ziemlich erstaunliche Frage." 
(Ebert 2004, p. 259) I suggest that Plato uses this form of question for the body before he has 
Socrates use it for the soul in order to treat the two cases in parallel, thus making the shift in 
treatment of the soulless salient. 
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and dizzy, as if it were drunk, insofar as it is in contact with that kind of thing" 
(79c7-8). On the other hand, when the soul investigates the Forms "it ceases to 
stray and remains in the same state as it is in touch with things of the same kind ... " 
(79d5-6).132 Socrates' hesitation to say that the soul is invisible tout court can be 
explained by the two senses of "invisible" in play here. In the ordinary sense, souls 
are straightforwardly invisible because we cannot see them; in the second sense, 
invisible things are changeless, and souls are only like the invisible.133 
The hedging in the text is a clear sign that Plato did not intend to call indi-
vidual souls unchanging without qualification.134 This affirmation that individual 
132Gallop points out that this claim rests on the tacit Empedoclean assumption that "like knows 
like," and also notes that the passage describing the soul as dizzy and drunk shows beyond doubt 
that it changes. He further suggests two reasons the soul must be subject to change: (1) if it is 
subject to incarnation, then it must be in a body at one time and not in it at another; (2) if it partakes 
of the Form of Life, "and iflife entails change, then soul must be subject to change." (Gallop 1975, 
pp. 140-141) Rowe and Ebert also conclude from this passage that the soul is subject to change: 
Ebert (2004, p. 258), Rowe (1993, p. 185). 
133Hackforth's reading begins with a single sense of "invisible;' so he justly wonders, "If it is in-
visible, what sense is there in saying that it is more like what is invisible than body is?" He modifies 
his position, however, when he comes to consider a slightly later part of the text, and reaches a 
conclusion very similar to what I advocate here. "What is the reason for the disappointing limi-
tation expressed in the words 'or nearly so' [80b11]? It lies, I think, in the ambiguity of TO chS€<;. 
If understood as the whole class of things invisible, this will, or may, include other members be-
sides Forms, and the dichotomy of 79a6 certainly leads us to believe that Plato at least begins by 
giving it this sense; yet if that is so, he almost immediately narrows the meaning so as to include 
nothing but Forms, and the question becomes not 'which of the two orders of things does the soul 
belong to?' but 'which of two kinds of things, Forms or sensibles, does soul resemble, and which 
does body?' Thenceforward the vague notion of likeness replaces the notion of membership of an 
order, all members of which have certain attributes; and Plato recognises in the end that, just be-
cause 'likeness' is a vague notion, his argument can at most establish approximate indissolubility 
of the soul:' (Hackforth 1955, pp. 85-86) Bostock has a similar view in (1986, p. 118). 
134See Ebert (2004, pp. 257-258). Gallop concurs: "This [talk of 'the seen' and 'the unseen'] is 
best taken as referring to the Forms and the sensible world as such, rather than as asserting, quite 
generally, that whatever is unseen is constant, and whatever is seen is inconstant." (Gallop 1975, p. 
140) Hackforth initially takes Socrates to be claiming that the individual soul is changeless, without 
explaining how this could be squared with observed experience (1955, p. 84). Bostock begins with 
the common sense observation that souls change, then writes: "Indeed one wonders why Plato 
dared to make this comparison [between the soul and the Forms on one hand, the body on the 
other] at all, for it is obvious that the soul is a changing thing, and in this respect is like the body 
and not like the forms." (Bostock 1986, p. 119) 
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souls change is echoed in the Republic, where Socrates describes the philosopher 
who "looks at and contemplates things that are orderly and always the same ... he 
imitates them and tries to become as like them as he can" (500c3-6).135 Imitation 
implies, of course, that the imitator is not already just like the thing imitated.136 
Had he asserted that individual souls do not change, Plato would have severed 
the link between what we are phenomenally aware of as our own minds and his 
theory of the soul. He would have been claiming that some important part of us 
does not change, but this claim would have seemed unimportant to many in his 
audience, since it would not correspond to anything they were aware of directly.137 
By allowing that individual souls do change, Plato can maintain that he is talking 
about souls in the same sense in which people take themselves to be directly aware 
of their own souls, meaning their internal experiences or their own minds. So to 
say that souls are invisible individuals is not to claim that they are changeless. 
Instead, the claim is that souls have the capacity to resist or escape change.138 
Casual reading of the Phaedo and Republic may produce the impression that 
135Leroux notes the similarity of this passage to Phaedo 79c-d inter alia (2002, p. 664 n. 93). White 
thinks the desire to imitate the Forms is a basic feature of Plato's psychology, not derived from any 
other feature (1979, p. 173). 
136 Another possible reading: the philosopher's soul is already changeless, and what the philoso-
pher is imitating is some other characteristic of the Forms. Or one might think that Plato is using 
"imitate" (J.llJ.lEio9at, 500c6) in an unusual way, such that one can be just like something, but "im-
itate" it by intentionally remaining in the same state as what one is imitating. These readings are 
strained, however, and would require some compelling argument before claiming more of our at-
tention. The natural sense is that the philosopher is trying to become more changeless, since that 
is the property of the Forms mentioned in the text. 
137Thus Robinson: "There [sc. in the Phaedo] the soul had been assimilated to the Ideas, and the 
hiatus between the unmoving Intelligible World and that of sensible things subject to motion had 
meant an inadequate explanation of the soul as we experience it in the world of movement ... the 
elementary attribute of all living things, movement, was quietly shelved, and the static, homoge-
neous, unchanging entity whose immortality he was left to prove was recognizable only to him-
self." (Robinson 1995a, p. 114) 
138Bluck writes, " ... hence, it is implied, there is at least some prima facie ground for supposing 
that [the soul] may be invariable:' (Bluck 1954, p. 74) 
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Plato advances claim (1) frequently, since he often mentions "the invisible", and 
typically associates it with lack of change. In fact, however, these passages avoid 
claiming that everything invisible is changeless. They rather claim that those 
things that are changeless (or the things that really are, a synonymous expres-
sion) are invisible. I briefly consider three such passages. 
Socrates describes how philosophy encourages souls to leave the physical be-
hind in the Phaedo at 82d9-83c3. Here, too, he makes much of the claim that every-
thing visible is changing, and thus implies that what is invisible does not change. 
But the closest he comes to saying simply that everything invisible is changeless is 
the following. "[F]or [what can be sensed] is different in different circumstances 
and is sensible and visible, whereas what the soul itself sees is intelligible and in-
visible" (83bl-4). Although this statement implies that what is intelligible and 
invisible does not change, this is said about "what the soul itself sees;' and so is 
most naturally taken to exclude souls themselves. This passage thus leaves it open 
that individual souls may change.139 
In the famous Line passage in the Republic, Socrates gives the following account 
of knowledge and belief: 
When [the soul] focuses on something that is illuminated both by truth 
and what is, it understands, knows, and manifestly possesses under-
standing. But when it focuses on what is mixed with obscurity, on 
what comes to be and passes away, it believes and is dimmed, changes 
its beliefs this way and that, and seems bereft of understanding. (Re-
public 508d3-8) 
139Loriaux agrees that this passage does not claim that everything invisible is unchanging: " ... il 
est vrai que Platona dit plus d'une fois que ce qui est aUl:O Ka9' auc6 est aussi ad woaUl:W<; f.xov (cf. 
78 c et suiv.), mais il n'est pas prouve que les deux expressions signifient formellement Ia meme 
chose ... " (Loriaux 1969, p. 183) 
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It is easy to see that here there is no claim that everything that really is, or every-
thing that is invisible, is changeless. This passage leaves no doubt that individual 
souls are capable of changing, of course, since it describes souls changing from 
knowledge to belief. The passage claims only that what the soul focuses on, if it is 
something real, is changeless. It says nothing directly about whether the soul is 
changeless, and implies that it is not. 
Finally, here is one more passage that might leave the impression Plato is say-
ing that everything invisible is changeless. Socrates criticizes astronomy because 
it studies changing things. Reeve translates: "I just cannot conceive of any subject 
making the soul look upward except the one that is concerned with what is - and 
that is invisible."140 As before, a moment's attention shows there is no claim here 
that everything invisible is changeless, only that what is changeless is invisible. 
These three selections seem the ones most likely to leave the mistaken impres-
sion. Plato mentions what is invisible or what is changeless in many other places, 
but I have found no passage in which he endorses the view that everything in-
visible is changeless. This is strong, if indirect evidence that Plato thought it an 
important fact about the soul that it is invisible but also subject to change. Since 
his main examples of invisible things are the Forms, and they do not change, the 
fact that he avoids claiming that everything invisible is changeless suggests that 
he was leaving room for the individual soul. 
But even if this picture so far is correct, there is something unsatisfactory 
about classifying the soul this way. For Plato must be aware he is playing with 
two distinct senses of the visible/invisible distinction. On the first sense souls are 
140£yw yap a?J ou SuvaJ.lal illo n VOJ.ltOal avw 1tOlOUV ljlux~v ~AE1tElV }lU9f]Jla ~ EKEivo 0 av 1tEpi 
'tO ov 'tEn Kai 'tO a6pa-rov ... , Republic 529b3-5. 
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straightforwardly invisible. On the second sense, they are merely like the invisi-
ble, and this leaves it unclear how their membership in that category helps make 
them less changeable, and to what extent it does so. Not surprisingly, then, Plato 
seems to try out a different kind of answer in the Republic, especially at 611b-612a. 
(As we have seen, many passages in the Republic continue to assert that reality is 
invisible and changeless, but there is less emphasis on the soul's invisibility.) Here 
Socrates suggests that in spite of his earlier argument that the soul has three parts, 
we should not conclude on this basis that this is what the soul is like "in its truest 
nature" (tij &Art9EO"tarn cpuoEt). He then compares the soul to 
... the sea god Glaucus, whose original nature cannot easily be made 
out by those who catch glimpses of him, because some of the original 
parts of his body have been broken off, others have been worn away 
and altogether mutilated by the waves, and other things - shells, sea-
weeds, and rocks - have grown into him, so that he looks more like 
any wild beast than what he naturally was. Such, too, is the condition 
of the soul when we see it beset by myriad bad things. (611c6-d6) 
The "myriad bad things" must refer to the changing physical world that our souls 
find themselves involved in. I argued earlier that this phrase, "rfj &:A.rt9EO"tarn cpu-
oEt;' implies that there is a Form of Soul, since Plato's only explanation for how 
something can have a "truest nature" at all is that there is a Form of it. The pas-
sage, however, is not directly about the Form of Soul, since it describes the soul 
as undergoing many changes by analogizing it to Glaucus who undergoes many 
changes. The passage is therefore about individual souls. Nevertheless, when it 
refers to what the soul is like "in its truest nature," we should take this as an allu-
sion both to (1) what the Form of Soul is like, and (2) what an individual soul is like 
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when it most successfully imitates the Form of Soul, and is thus most like what it 
really is. 
In this passage Plato is pushing toward the answer that the real soul is change-
less tout court, and so is not like the self-awareness we have of our own minds.141 
We are aware of our minds as changing, whereas Plato suggests here, somewhat 
tentatively, that our real selves/ souls never change. Perhaps his reason for try-
ing this explanation is that the one we have just examined fails to tell us anything 
very specific about the soul. This solution would have the virtue of being definite 
and of associating souls firmly with the Forms; it comes with the cost of severing 
the tie between the phenomenal self and the soul Plato says is immortal. On this 
view, it may be hard to see why we should care that the soul is immortal, since it 
may have nothing in common with anything we are aware of.142 
This view is not confined to the passage just cited. Earlier in the Republic 
Socrates speaks of the soul as if it is only properly identified with its rational part. 
Here Socrates' statement implies that the appetitive part is not really part of the 
soul: 
Then when a person's desires flow toward learning and everything 
of that sort, they will be concerned, I imagine, with the pleasures that 
141 Adam takes a similar view: "According to the theory which is rather suggested (612a) than fully 
worked out in this chapter, the so-called lower 'parts' are not of the essence of soul at all, but only 
incidental to its association with body, and consequently perishable ... Plato expresses himself with 
great reserve (612a), but apparently intends us to believe that soul in its truest nature is A.oytanK6v, 
and that the A.oytonK6v alone is immortal." (Adam 1921, Volume II p. 427); in agreement with 
Adam is Leroux (2002, p. 722 n. 40). Other authors treat this passage as ambiguous, as failing to 
say whether the whole soul is a unity and immortal or if some part(s) only are everlasting: Lorenz 
(2008, pp. 253-254), Waterfield (1993, pp. 451-452), Robinson (1967), Cross and Woozley (1964, p. 
288), Crombie (1962, pp. 152-153). 
1420f course, Plato might respond that this depends on how philosophical we have managed to 
become. 
the soul experiences just by itself (autfj<; Ka9' mitrtv), and will be indif-
ferent to those that come through the body (Oux toO crw}lato<;) ... (485dl0-12) 
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Socrates has just shown that the soul has three parts, so in this passage he must 
mean that the appetitive part, the one that is sensitive to the pleasures of the body, 
is not part of the soul insofar as the soul exists "just by itself." This passage agrees 
with Socrates' suggestion in Book X that the real soul is only its rational part, and 
that part is changeless. 
This second answer seems to say that changes are only apparent, and do not 
pertain to the soul's true nature. He has provided himself with the resources to 
make the following argument, although we do not find it laid out as such in the 
text. Since change is a property of visible things, Plato could claim that all the 
alleged changes to which souls are subject come via visible, physical things. That 
is, souls change their opinions, memories, preferences, etc. because of the influ-
ence bodies have on them. I come to believe that I must eat soon because my body 
is hungry; without my body I would presumably be immune this kind of change. 
Socrates has already made a similar claim earlier in the Republic, to the effect that 
each of the Forms is only one, but "because they appear all over the place in part-
nership with actions and bodies, and with one another, each of them appears to 
be many things" (476a6-8). If this is his explanation for the various appearances 
of the Forms, it is reasonable to suppose he would endorse the same explanation 
for souls. 
Plato could account for many kinds of change with this analysis. But some 
types of change might resist it: my opinions about mathematical questions, for 
example, might have no direct relation to any body or set of bodies, since on Plato's 
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view these questions are about invisible, changeless entities. But he might appeal 
to his doctrine of anamnesis in these cases, to claim that our false opinions on 
these subjects are again due to our involvement with the body. Remove the body 
in question, and we would have a soul as it was prior to entering a body, when it 
remembered all it had seen of the Forms. In this state, Plato could say, the soul 
would be immune from changes related to mathematics or the Forms. 
This solution might appear inadequate on its face, but it is stronger than it 
might seem. One objection to it is that our souls undergo all kinds of changes 
while they inhabit our bodies, but according to Plato's myths they also undergo 
changes in between incarnations. Both the Phaedo and Republic end with myths in 
which souls have many experiences in the afterlife. They forget their former lives, 
make choices about their next lives, and so on. Each of these experiences implies 
changing mental states on the part of the souls undergoing them. But these souls 
are no longer in their human bodies; does this not contradict the claim that souls 
only appear to change insofar as they are involved with bodies? In fact it does 
not, for Plato can reply that while involvement with a particular human body is 
the source of changes for souls in this condition, it does not follow from this that 
when a soul leaves its own body, it also leaves the realm of the visible as a whole. 
Part of the point of these myths may be precisely that separation from one's own 
human (or animal, or plant) body is not sufficient to separate one from the realm 
of the bodily; the souls in these myths are still interested in and thus involved with 
the bodily, visible realm in general. This is enough, Plato could say, to account for 
the changes these souls exhibit. And Socrates explains the afterlife in just these 
terms. First he suggests that the soul of a philosopher goes to Hades, "if it is pure 
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when it leaves the body and drags nothing bodily with it ... " (80e2-3). He then 
explains the phenomenon of ghosts with reference to the soul's involvement with 
the physical: 
... these are not the souls of good but of inferior men, which are forced 
to wander there ... They wander until their longing for that which ac-
companies them, the physical, again imprisons them in a body, and 
they are then, as is likely, bound to such characters as they have prac-
ticed in their life. (Phaedo 81d6-e4)143 
The souls of good men, we may suppose, may be experiencing something better 
than this prior to their next incarnations; the souls of the best have escaped the 
realm of the visible altogether. 
A second objection might say that if the true individual soul is changeless, and 
thus includes none of the memories, preferences, plans, and so on that we typ-
ically identify as ourselves in this life, then Plato's theory will not after all show 
that there is any personal survival in reality. What we think of as personality turns 
out to be an artifact of the soul's involvement with change, and Plato's message is 
that this is what souls have to divest themselves of. So the individual personality 
would be an illusion, a sort of disease caused by the soul's involvement with the 
body. Socrates' remark that "our souls will really dwell in the underworld" (Phaedo 
143 Archer-Hind comments: "The presence of this material alloy is sufficient to inspire the soul 
with bodily desires but cannot afford the means to gratify them: so that the longing grows more 
and more intense until the soul is once more confined in her earthy prison." (Archer-Hind 1894, 
p. 54) Authors with similar comments: Bostock (1986, p. 27), Dorter (1982, pp. 78-79), Burnet 
(1911, p. 73). Halliwell notes that the souls depicted in the myth ofEr resemble the souls discussed 
through the previous nine books of the Republic, defeating the expectation that the myth would 
present the soul in the pure state alluded to by the analogy with Glaucus (2007, pp. 462-463). 
Bostock (2001, p. 247) spells out an absurd view on which Plato means that particles of matter 
cling to souls, even when they are disembodied. He points out that this view would lead to many 
absurdities, and concludes, "His point was just that the soul retains its desires for things bodily." 
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107al) is consistent with this thought: perhaps Socrates means that our souls will 
continue to be personally identifiable in the underworld, since if they are in the 
underworld ipso facto they will not have managed to escape to the changeless realm 
where they go back to being what they really are, namely something lacking any 
personality. There are at least two ways of filling in Plato's position on this point. 
On the first, there are in reality no individual souls, or alternatively, individual 
souls are numerically distinct but qualitatively identical (if we allow violations of 
the law of identity of non-discernables). On the second, souls are both numeri-
cally and qualitatively distinct, in virtue of some feature(s) analogous to those of 
the numbers. The justification for this view is that if the numbers can be eternal 
and distinct from one another, then there must be features by which souls could 
also be differentiated. It is thus possible for Plato to maintain both that souls are 
changeless in reality and also that they are distinct from one another. Neither of 
these views solves the problem that the real soul would have little, if anything in 
common with the things of which human beings are aware in themselves. 
This concludes the discussion of the visible/invisible distinction. The other 
important distinction for the theory of the soul is that between Forms and partici-
pants. Individual souls fall on the opposite side of this division from the Forms, and 
are grouped along with the objects in the visible world. This distinction presents 
fewer philosophical problems than the first. The main problem here is why Plato 
chose to put souls on the participant side of this distinction, but it seems obvi-
ous that this was his only way of addressing his concerns about the individual 
soul. Putting souls on the Form side of the division would have made them au-
tomatically changeless and eternal, but would have suffered from two disadvan-
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tages. First, as already noted, individual souls would have had nothing in common 
with the personalities and minds of which we are aware in our ordinary conscious-
ness.144 Second, Plato would have had to either give up his One Over Many argu-
ment for Forms, or if he retained it, it would have implied that there can be at most 
one soul, the Form of Soul. For both reasons, then, given his assumptions, Plato 
had little choice but to treat souls as participants in Forms alongside the members 
of the visible realm. 
Republic 611b-612a may be the most direct evidence that Plato treats individual 
souls as individuals rather than as Forms. In this passage Socrates also claims that 
the number of individual souls must always remain fixed. This suggests that he 
does not think that individual souls merge into the Form of Soul or otherwise lose 
their individuality, even if they succeed in leaving the realm of the visible and 
changing. Plato's attempt to provide an argument for this claim suggests that he 
is aware of these problems. 
Combining these two distinctions, souls are invisible individuals, and it turns 
out that only souls occupy this position. This in turn provides some foundation 
and justification for a common claim among scholars, that individual souls oc-
cupy an intermediate position between the Forms and the physical world.145. We 
can add that without the Form of Soul, souls could not be intermediates. They 
144To be clear: even if we accept that souls are invisible individuals, this is not yet enough to 
show that or how personal identity can survive through different incarnations. But it is at least a 
start. If souls were not individual items, the problem would be insoluble at the outset. Given that 
they are individuals, I take it that the problem might be soluble. 
145Bluck finds this relation generated by the affinity argument (78b-84b): "It is probable, then 
that Plato's primary intention here was simply to emphasize the peculiar nature of the object with 
which our arguments are concerned - that it is not like ordinary physical phenomena at all, but 
something that has strong affinity with a very different class of things. The soul is thus brought 
into relation with the theory of Forms ... " (Bluck 1954, p. 22) 
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would instead occupy a metaphysical space not related either to the Forms or to 
the physical world. 
1.10 Conclusion 
We have seen that in both the Phaedo and Republic there are ample grounds for 
recognizing the Form of Soul, in spite of the fact that it is never mentioned. The 
Form of Soul is essential to the Imitation Theory; without it, individual souls would 
have nothing to imitate qua souls. That is, it is clear that souls imitate the Forms 
of the virtues, for example, in order to become more virtuous. But we can also ask 
whether souls imitate anything in order to be souls, and the answer is momentous: 
either souls are what they most basically are in virtue of imitating a Form, or they 
are metaphysical free agents, unbound to anything outside themselves, at least so 
far as Plato's texts make explicit. The Phaedo and Republic opt for the Imitation 
Theory, making souls dependent, in some sense, on Forms for all their properties. 
On this theory, the common observation that souls stand between and mediate the 
two worlds of Plato's metaphysics seems justified. 
Chapter 2 
The Kinetic Theory 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter 1 was about the Form of Soul, and its role in the Imitation Theory; this 
chapter is about the theory of KlVT]crtc; ("motion") in the Timaeus; Chapter 3 will 
explain the Self-Mover Theory in the Phaedrus, Timaeus, Laws and Statesman.1 
Why think that KlVT]O't<; is a central concept in some of Plato's dialogues? First, 
Plato twice gives a definition of the soul as "motion capable of moving itself" (Phae-
drus 245e7-246al, Laws 896al-2). Given Plato's pervasive interest in definitions 
and in souls, his willingness to endorse a definition of soul cannot fail to be impor-
tant. Second, Plato's use of KlVT]O'l<; and related words is frequent within a group 
of Plato's works sometimes classified as late, but rare outside this group.2 
11 shall usually use the Greek word, to avoid prejudicing my argument by translating it one 
way or another, since this is the issue I will be discussing. JdVTJCJt<; is the singular, while the plural 
is Ktv~oetc;. Throughout this chapter and those following, "motion" means locomotion, motion 
through space. 
2Cooper lists as Plato's latest works the Laws, Timaeus, Sophist, Statesman, and Critias, and adds to 
them the four "latest of the non-late group," Republic, Pannenides, Theaetetus, and Phaedrus For my 
purposes it makes no difference whether this attempt to sort out the chronology of the dialogues 
succeeds; my point is just that there is a subset of Plato's dialogues in which motion-words are used 
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A TLG lemmatized search for forms of Ktvew and KtVllO't<; shows that of the 445 
times these two words occur in Plato's texts, only 20 instances fall outside the (so-
called) late dialogues. Thus, roughly 96% of instances of these two terms fall in the 
"late" group. This does not tell us much, of course. But, like an irregular bump 
on the surface of an archaeological site, it may indicate something beneath the 
surface that is worth investigating. For developmentalists, it is worth asking why 
Plato begins using forms of KlV- in roughly the last period of his writings, when he 
had found little occasion for them earlier. For unitarians, it is worth asking why 
Plato uses this family of words so often in these dialogues, but rarely in his others: 
the disparity prompts us to look for other features that differentiate these sets 
from one another. I propose that in these works (and especially in the Timaeus) 
Plato constructs a theory of change, according to which changes are nothing but 
instances of locomotion. The theory is quite broad, covering not only qualitative 
changes such as those of color or temperature, but extends to changes of material 
composition, and even to temporal changes. The theory can be summarized as the 
slogan that KtVllO'lc;, in the sense of "locomotion;' is the genus of y£ve:otc;. 
This chapter explains how Timaeus' account makes all non-psychic changes 
into locomotion, in four parts. First I survey Plato's remarks on shape and motion. 
This is the place to begin, since shape and motion are more basic concepts than 
spatial motion, and it strengthens my case to show that Plato's dialogues employ 
much more often than outside this set, and it happens that the set showing intensive use of these 
words largely, but not perfectly, coincides with Cooper's chronological grouping. I ran several 
searches in the TLG, using both the lemmatized and word index functions. None are perfect. Issues 
include whether to include works known or suspected of being spurious (I excluded them), and 
whether to include the Timaeus, since its subject matter easily accounts for its many instances 
of Ktv- roots. The result is nearly as striking, however, if the Timaeus is excluded. Further, it is 
important to ask which of these hundreds of uses carries some philosophical weight, and which 
are philosophically uninteresting. Numerical results cannot tell us this, of course. 
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consistent approaches to shape and motion, prior to arguing that they contain a 
more ambitious theory of spatial motion. For example, Shorey assumes that the 
classification of ten motions in Laws X is casual, writing, "Plato amuses himself 
with a classification of ten kinds of motion:'3 If he is right, my claims cannot go 
forward; so I first argue that a number of dialogues classify shape and motion in 
the same ways. Second, I discuss the part of Timaeus' theory that describes the 
composition of matter out of the four elements, and ultimately out of two kinds 
of triangle (53b-64a). This aspect of Timaeus' theory presents few philosophical 
difficulties, so for my purposes I need do little more than point out how it comple-
ments the other parts of the Kinetic Theory. Third, Timaeus adds time to the Ki-
netic Theory by claiming that time is nothing but the spatial motions of the heav-
enly bodies (37c-39e). In this part I will argue that Timaeus' comments, although 
somewhat cryptic, express a reductionist theory about time. Fourth, Timaeus in-
troduces a metaphysical category he calls the receptacle ( unol'ioxJ1), seeming to 
say it is space, or perhaps matter, or some combination of the two. This section 
of the Timaeus is one of the murkiest, and I will not claim to solve its many prob-
lems. But the Kinetic Theory's existence does create a consideration relevant for 
readings of the receptacle. This consideration does not solve the debates about 
the receptacle's nature, but it does add weight to one side of that debate.4 
Timaues makes the concept of KlVTJolc; the genus into which he puts all forms 
3Shorey (1933, pp. 643 ad 893-894) 
41 am not aware of any discussion of this overall claim about Plato's theory of change in the 
scholarly literature. The position closest to mine is Johansen (2004, p. 125). He draws the con-
nection between Timaeus' geometric theory of the four elements and the fact that the receptacle 
must provide the space or place for these geometric motions to occur. My account goes somewhat 
beyond his in that I include time as another form of change that is reduced to spatial motion in the 
Timaeus. 
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of change. His arguments for including each kind of change are not always clear 
or cogent, and he also fails to draw attention to the fact that his explanations of 
the elements, of time, and of the receptacle, are like three pieces made to fit to-
gether, but lying apart from one another. As with the Form of Soul in the previous 
chapter, there is a significant theory, with important implications, available in the 
Timaeus, but the speaker is content to present its pieces without ever mentioning 
its existence as a single theory. I will not speculate why Timaeus never mentions 
this as a single theory; to do so would involve other quite involved aspects of the 
dialogue, such as how much Timaeus thinks we can know about the visible world, 
what form of the theory of Forms Timaeus subscribes to, and what he means by 
calling his account a "likely story" {Et.Kwc; pueoc;). 
2.2 Spatial Motion 
Round and Straight Shapes 
Plato's dialogues make only brief and scattered remarks about shape and motion.5 
But these fragmentary analyses present nearly the same divisions of types each 
time they occur in one of the dialogues. 
Since Plato's dialogues sometimes claim that the visible world is in constant 
change (and never contradict this, so far as I am aware), these works imply that, 
strictly, there is no such thing as a static shape in the visible world.6 Anything visi-
5Cornford notes a complication, writing, "The figures [sc. the Platonic solids] are not the actual 
shapes of existing particles, which can only be imperfect copies, but the perfect types, belonging 
to the intelligible world of mathematics" (Cornford 1937, p.210). But this point will not make any 
difference in my argument. 
6Phaedo 78d10-e6, Republic 509bl-3, 529b5. On Phaedo 78e Archer-Hind remarks, "This is one 
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ble is somehow changing, and in the Timaeus this means being in motion spatially. 
Thus, his view about the possible shapes of appearances leads into his views about 
the possible types of motion. I begin at the most general level, with his analysis of 
appearances, then move on to discuss his analysis of motion. 
Plato holds that shape (-ro crxfi}la) and color (ro xpw}la) make an exhaustive 
division of the genus appearance.7 • Plato has the habit of mentioning color and 
shape together1 implying that he believes these two elements account for the ap-
pearance of physical things.8 This pairing occurs in dialogues of all periods, and in 
widely varying contexts: from Gorgias 474b, where Socrates characterizes cosmet-
ics as a kind of flattery, to Republic 373b, where he describes the professions that 
the enlarged city will contain, to Laws 797c, where the Athenian complains about 
innovation in children's games. Going beyond the mere association of the terms, 
Plato also provides a definition of shape. When Meno asks Socrates to illustrate 
the kind of definition he wants, Socrates offers him two definitions of shape, of 
which the first is: "[S]hape is that which alone of existing things always follows 
colour" (Meno 75bl0-11, emphasis mine).9 Since shape is the only thing always 
of many passages which show that Plato thoroughly accepted the doctrines of Herakleitos and 
Protagoras so far as regards the material world:' There seems to be no disagreement on the import 
of the passage: Rowe (1993, p. 184), Gallop (1975, p. 139), Bluck (1954, p. 73), Burnet (1911, pp. 
77-78), Archer-Hind (1894, p. 48). 
7Noted by Wedberg: "When figure is said to be the only thing that is always copresent with 
colour, Plato obviously has our visual percepts in mind: he asserts that, in visual perception, colour 
and figure are always combined" (Wedberg 1955, p. 47) 
80n this point I attribute the view in question to Plato, since it appears in so many and such 
varied contexts in his work, and is never contradicted. An incomplete sample of passages where 
these two terms are used in tandem: Cratylus 423d4, 431c6, 432b7, Gorgias 465b4, 474d4, 474e2, 
Laws 668e3, 669a1, 669c5, 797c2, Meno 75a1, 75b10, 76a7, Phaedo 100d1, Philebus 47a7, 51b4, Republic 
373b6, 601a2, Sophist 251a9, Theaetetus 163b10. The association is also noted by Thompson (1901, 
p. 89 n. 24), and easily visible in Ast (1838, p. 559 s.v. xpw}la). 
9'toUt'O oxfj}la, 0 }lOVOV t'WV OVt'WV t'Vy){avEl XPW}lat'l ad ErrO}lEVOV. I assume that Socrates en-
dorses the definition he gives Meno; it would be strange to offer him a model that he himself con-
siders bad. Socrates says in the same passage that a good answer must be true (75d5-6). Socrates 
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accompanying color, it follows that appearances (in the visible world, of course) 
can be exhaustively divided into their shapes and colors. If one performed this 
division, Socrates is saying, there would be no further element one could point 
to in any given appearance that would have escaped the division into shape and 
color.10 Both Plato's habit of associating "color" and "shape" and the way he has 
Socrates define "shape" imply that he thinks the two together exhaust the cate-
gory of appearance. This suggests that Plato would say that other visible appear-
ances (tables, mountain goats, triangles, etc.) occupy lower levels of classification. 
This is why these others do not always accompany color: if I am seeing a patch of 
a certain color, it will sometimes turn out that I am also seeing a mountain goat, 
sometimes not. But it will always turn out that I am seeing some shape.U 
offers a second definition of shape as "the limit of a solid" (76a7), and there is a controversy among 
scholars as to which of these definitions is better and why. For general discussion see King (2007, 
pp. 397-401) and Tuozzo (2003). Thompson thinks the first definition commits "the fallacy of 
defining ignotum per ignotius." (1901, p. 89). But this criticism takes "color" as a particular color 
rather than the genus; when understood as the genus, as it must be, there is no fallacy. Merkelbach 
calls the second definition "technisch besser;' but finds no substantive fault with it (1988, p. 30 n. 
39). Day observes that "all three definitions can be faulted for not picking out the right phenom-
ena," and leaves this exercise "to the reader" (1994, p. 20). But if the thought is that geometric 
figures may be imagined without color, one can reply that 1) in fact it is not clear that this is possi-
ble, and 2) on the reading I am proposing, the fault does not arise because the definition applies to 
shapes in the realm of appearance, not in the ideal realm of Forms or purely mathematical objects. 
Day and Crombie point out that this definition is similar to one Socrates rejects in the Euthyphro, 
but as Crombie remarks, "it seems fair to comment that the models Socrates offers suggest that 
he is not too clear what he wants as an answer to a Socratic question": Day (1994, p. 20), Crombie 
(1976, p. 188). The issue here is whether it is reasonable to attribute this definition to Socrates 
and to Plato; the questions raised about the definition within its immediate context do not trump 
the larger pattern of statements about shape, which suggest that Plato did think this definition 
true. Agreeing that Socrates endorses this definition are Weiss (2006, p. 153), Weiss (2001, p. 29), 
Gonzalez (1998, p. 161). 
10Noted by Thomas (1980, pp. 98-99), Klein (1965, p. 59), Guthrie (1962, Volume IV p. 248). Of 
course this is not the claim that nothing exists but appearance; it is only the claim that appearance 
as such is exhaustively divisible into shape and color; this point is also made by Thomas (1980, p. 
100). 
110rdinary items like mountain goats would need to go into an altogether different classifica-
tory scheme, since each of them includes both a shape and a color. The appearance of a table, for 
example, cannot be exclusively a species of color or of shape, since it has both. This does not in-
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So Plato divides appearances into color and shape. He divides shape, in turn, 
into two kinds: straight (ro EU8u) and curved (or round, ro orpoyyuA.ov)P As with 
"shape" and "color;' the main evidence for this is the fact that these two categories 
are named together in a wide variety of contexts: in the following passages, they 
appear together without reference to any other term at the same level. First, in 
the Philebus, Socrates says, "For shape is all one in genus, but some of its parts 
are absolutely opposite to one another, and others differ in innumerable ways" 
(Philebus 12e7-13a2). So Plato thinks of shape as a genus- presumably as a real 
genus in nature, not merely an artificial oneY Presumably round and straight are 
two of the opposites mentioned here; the reference to other "parts" of shape must 
be to items lower down on the classificatory scheme. (The reference to other parts 
of shape that differ "in innumerable ways" will be taken up below.) 
This division of shape into straight and curved is oflittle philosophical interest, 
but was also a commonplace among Greek thinkers. Wedberg writes, 
If it is asked what concepts Plato had in mind, it is here sufficient 
to point out that he entirely shared what may be called - without 
any pejorative implications - the naive intuitive understanding of the 
concepts of Euclidean geometry ... 14 • 
He goes on to illustrate this claim with the definition of straight from the Par-
validate the division of appearance into shape and color; it only suggests that Plato would accept 
different classification schemes as equally valid. 
12 Noted by Morrison (1959, p. 104). Brisson notes that in geometrical contexts, oxfiJ.W: means ei-
ther a two-dimensional shape bounded by lines or a three-dimensional shape bounded by surfaces 
(1992, p. 233 n. 143). 
13Cf. Statesman 262a-263e. 
14Wedberg (1955, p. 47). Another comment to the same effect: "As in Euclidean geometry, all 
shapes are derivable from the circle and the straight line, as required by the classical'compass and 
straight-edge' restriction" (Scolnicov et al. 2003, p. 82 ad 137e1) 
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menides. Heath identifies the classification oflines, at least, into straight and curved 
as part of the doctrine of the Pythagoreans, ofPlato and of Aristotle.15 And Gould 
observes, 
... Greek mathematicians attempted habitually to limit their mechan-
ical tools to the compass and the straightedge, as though rectilinear 
and circular lines were the chief and natural species of all things in 
two dimensions.16 
Finally, Ballew identifies straight and circular as common and basic themes per-
vading Greek literature and philosophy: 
Images of straightness and circularity ... pervade all extant Greek lit-
erature, including philosophicalliterature ... Straight and circular are 
generally considered to be the two basic shapes and motions: neither 
is reducible to a form of the other, and all other shapes and motions 
are usually described as subspecies of these two.17 
If there were other categories than "round" and "straight" at the first level 
of division below "shape," then we could expect Plato to mention some of them 
somewhere; in fact, however, he mentions only these two in a number of passages 
where shape comes up. For example, as Socrates is trying to show Meno how to 
answer his question about virtue, he uses shape as a model: " ... what is this which 
applies no less to the round than to the straight, which you call shape; and you 
15Heath (1908, p. 159). He implies vaguely that Plato understands "shape" as either round or 
straight, without any more detailed comment on this question (1921, p. 293). 
16Gould (1963, p. 138) 
17Ballew (1979, pp. 1-2). Although I have cited her conclusion in support of my own claims, I 
must add that she frequently cites passages as if they discuss straight-line motions where this is 
no more than a possible inference from what is said. But my claims are considerably less sweeping 
than hers. 
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say that the round is no more shape than the straight?" (Meno 74d7-e2).18 In 
the Parmenides as well, Parmenides reasons that the One "is also without shape; 
for it partakes of neither round nor straight" (Parmenides 137d8-e1).19 And in the 
Seventh Letter Plato (if it is Plato) writes, "The same thing is true of straight-lined 
as well as of circular figures ... " (Seventh Letter 342d3-4). Later in the Parmenides 
passage, Parmenides gives definitions of"round" and straight": 
Round is surely that whose extremities are equidistant in every 
direction from the middle. -Yes. -Furthermore, straight is that 
whose middle stands in the way of the two extremities. -just so. - So 
the one would have parts and be many if it partook of either a straight 
or a curved shape. - Of course. -Therefore it is neither straight nor 
curved, since in fact it doesn't have parts. -That's right. (Parmenides 
137el-138a1)20 
No candidate for any other member of the genus "shape" is mentioned in any of 
these passages, so the division into round and straight seems to be exhaustive.21 
The examples of the method of division in the Sophist and Statesman typically in-
volve divisions of a genus into two species; this fact also suggests that round and 
straight divide "shape" exhaustively for Plato. 
18 
... on £crdv t'Oi}ro a ou~£v ~t't'OV Kat'fxEl t'O arpOyyUAOV ~ t'O EU9u, a ~Tt OVO'f.lcX~El<; axfi'f.la Kai 
ou~£v 'f!CiMov cp!Jc; ro arpoyyuJ..ov axfi'f.la dva1 ~ ro Eu9u; White gives the implicit argument of this 
passage (1976, pp. 33-34). 
19Noted by J. S. Morrison (1959, p. 109). 
20Essentially the same definition for "round" is given at Timaeus 33b4-5. Rickless comments 
that these "certainly appear to be" definitions of "round" and "straight"; on his analysis of the 
argument, it is not strictly true that anything with shape must be either straight or round. But 
he adds that this "is also the kind of objection that D1A5 [his designation for the deduction here] 
could easily be massaged to avoid:' So he concludes that "Far from being obviously false, these are 
eminently reasonable assumptions, at least from Plato's perspective." (Rickless 2007, p. 116) 
21Later Platonists took "round" and "straight" as symbols; I take them in the "vulgar mathemat-
ical sense" rejected by Proclus; see Morrow and Dillon (1992, pp. 469-470). 
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We find further confirmation that this division is exhaustive when Plato twice 
says that shapes other than the round and the straight are combinations of these 
two. Parmenides reasons at a later stage of the deductions that, "Since the one 
is like that, it would partake of some shape, as it seems, either straight or round, 
or some shape mixed from both" (Parmenides 145b3-5).22 Here the deductive con-
text also shows that the division must be exhaustive; were it not, Parmenides' 
argument would be invalid.23 And in the Philebus, Socrates says (a propos of the 
beauty of shapes), "What I mean, what the argument demands, is rather some-
thing straight or round and what is constructed out of these with a compass, rule, 
and square, such as plane figures and solids" (Philebus 51c3-6).24 Both statements 
imply that Plato thinks all shapes are either round, straight, or a combination of 
the two. Aristotle also treats straight and curved as an exhaustive set of alterna-
tives, at least for the sides of plane figures (de Caelo 286b13-14). 
However, Plato does sometimes refer to shapes other than round and straight, 
without saying just what shapes he has in mind; so we must consider whether this 
shows that he has a more complicated taxonomy of shape than the simple alter-
native of "round" or "straight." We have seen one example already from Philebus 
12e-13a. Another occurs at Meno 75a6-8, where Socrates puts a question in the 
mouth of an imaginary interlocutor: "What is this which applies to the round and 
the straight and the other things which you call shapes ... ?" Again, Timaeus speaks of 
"'triangle' or any of the other shapes that come to be ... " (Timaeus 50b2-3). These pas-
22Kat OX~!laro<; I)~ nvo<;, W<; E01KE, T0100rov ov flETEXOl av TO EV, ~TOl e:ue£o<; ~ OTpoyyuP.ou ~ 
Ttvo<; flEtKroO £~ Ufl<poiv. 
23 Rickless recognizes this point as well (2007, p. 116). 
24 
... au e:ueu n Myw, <pT]OlV 6 Myo<;, Kat ne:pu:pe:pE<; Kat ano TOUTWV I)~ Ta TE TOt<; TOpVOl<; ytyv6-
flEVa btine:M Te: Kat oTe:pe:a Kat Toi<; Kav6ot Kat ywviat<;, ... 
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sages refer to shapes other than the round and the straight, but need not imply 
that there are more categories than "round" and "straight" as immediate divisions 
of the genus "shape:' There are two ways of taking these references consistently 
with my argument. First, one might suppose that the imaginary questioner in ei-
ther passage (Meno 75 or Timaeus sob) thinks there are more shapes than the round 
and the straight, and the language uses terms that this questioner would find nat-
ural. The answers, then, mention other shapes because the speaker does not as-
sume that the questioner shares the theoretical commitment to Plato's way of di-
viding the genus "shape." In particular, Meno is clearly a newcomer to Socrates' 
ideas about definitions, so it would be natural for Socrates to speak to him with-
out assuming his own views on the division of shape. Timaeus mentions other 
shapes along with "triangle;' which is neither round nor (simply) straight. So it is 
reasonable to think that Timaeus is not discussing this level of classification; plau-
sible candidates for "other shapes" at the same level as triangle are square, oval, 
rhombus, etc. So in neither of these cases do we have a clear reference to any 
further category at the same level as round and straight. 
Round and Straight Motions 
Motion should divide into the same categories as shape, so we should expect Plato 
to divide motions into the straight and the rounded, with others analyzed as a 
combination of the two. Timaeus 43b mentions six motions: forward, back, right, 
left, up and down; these are straight-line motions, since, as we will see, Plato dis-
tinguishes them from rounded motions in other contexts. 25 In another passage 
25Timaeus 43a7-b5: ... W<Tt£ 'tO JlEv OAOV KlVEioSal ~4>ov, a'taK'tW<; JlfJV onn Wx0l1tpo'i£val Kat O:A6-
yw<;, 'ta<; E~ anaoa<; KlV~O'El<; f.xov· El<; 't£ yap 'tO np6oee: Kat omoee:v Kat 1taAlV e:i<; Se:~la Kat apl<rtEpa 
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Timaeus mentions seven motions: six of these are presumably the same as those 
given at 43b, and the seventh is the one the demiurge gives to the body of the 
universe:26 
In fact, he awarded it the movement suited to its body - that one of 
the seven motions which is especially associated with understanding 
and intelligence. And so he set it turning continuously in the same 
place, spinning around upon itself. All the other six motions he took 
away, and made it free of their wanderings. (Timaeus 34al-5)27 
Since the body of the universe is spherical (Timaeus 33b), "the movement suited 
to its body" is rotation on an axis, i.e. a rounded movement. 
But a completely different list of motions appears at Laws X, 893b-894e. 28 Here 
the Athenian says there are ten motions, but does not identify all of them clearly. 
The first motion is described as rotation about a center or axis (Laws X 893c4-d5). 
Like the rectilinear motions from the Timaeus, this list seems to be organized in 
pairs of opposites, and this helps to sort out what the members are supposed to 
K(XrW tE Kat avw Kat mxvrn Kata rou<; E~ t01tOU<; M.avwpEVa 1tpOJlElV. The phrase ra<; E~ cmaoa<; 
KW~OEl<; is translated by Zeyl "all six of the motions", but does not necessarily assert that there are 
only six motions. A more literal rendering, that preserves the ambiguity of the Greek, would be "all 
the six motions:• Aristotle also uses these six as a classification of motions: de Caelo 284b20-286a2, 
IA 705a26-28. 
26This is also the reading ofKarflk (2004). Brisson, in addition to implicitly endorsing this anal-
ysis, notes that Plato has created a hierarchy of movements, from the universe itself, which has 
only rotation, to the fixed stars that partake of rotation and also one of the six rectilinear motions, 
to the bodies described at 43b which have all six rectilinear motions, but no circular ones. The 
hierarchy shows the extent to which the young creatures of 43b are chaotic: Brisson (1992, p. 242 
n. 265), followed by Miller (2003, pp. 47-48). 
27KlVl10W yap altEVEt}.lEV aut'G;> TIJV t'OU O'WJ.lat'O<; oiKE{av, t'WV £ma t'JlV 1tEpi VO-
UV Kai <pp0V11<HV J.lcXAlOt'a ol3oav· 010 of] Kat'a t'aUt'a EV t'G;> aut'G;> Kai EV ea\Jt'G;> ltE-
playaywv aut'O E1t0l110'E KUKA(fl KlVEio8al Ot'pE<pOJ.lEVOV, t'a<; of: E~ anaoa<; KlV~OEl<; 
a<pElAEV Kai an.Aavf:<; <iltTIPYcXOat'O EKElVWV. 
28The difference is noted by Archer-Hind (1888, p. 148 ad 4). 
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be.29 Since the first type is called motion "in one place" (Ev ~1~ EBpg, 893c3), the 
second type seems to be motion in several places (Ev n.Aefoaw, 893c4).30 
Skipping to the end of the list, the last two types of motion do not fit on the 
same level of classification as the other eight: 
ATHENIAN: The one kind of motion is that which is permanently ca-
pable of moving other things but not itself; the other is permanently 
capable of moving both itself and other things by processes of combi-
nation and separation, increase and diminution, generation and de-
struction. Let these stand as two further types in our complete list of 
motions. (Laws 894b8-cl, emphasis in Saunders' translation)31 
These two kinds of motion are defined by whether or not they are capable of mov-
ing themselves; thus they cut across the other types. 
Assuming that the text between 893c and 894b mentions the six missing kinds 
of motion, then these must be the ones that the Athenian describes just after he 
explains his tenth type of motion, for he goes on to specify the motions by which 
the tenth type is able to work. They are "combination and separation, increase and 
diminution, generation and destruction" (croYKp{a£1(; €v T£ Buxxp{<J£<J1V au~au; T£ 
Kai -r(\> £van{<p Kai yeVE<J£01 Kai cp8opai~. 894b10-11). These six processes can be 
matched up with the text from 893e-894a, although without these external clues 
it would be considerably less clear what the missing six motions are supposed to 
29Karfik adds that the list seems to proceed by the method of division (2004, p. 228). 
300ne way of getting alternatives to the list I present above is to count motion in several places 
as more than one type, as mentioned by Skemp (1942, p. 99). 
31"Eorw 'tOlVUV ~ liEV E'tEpa SuvaliEvTJ KlVEiV KlVTJO'l<;, E:aur~v Se &:Suvarouoa, &:ei lila nc;, ~ se: 
aun1v r' &:ei Kat Erepa Suva~TJ Kara 't£ O'U)'KplO'El<; Ev 't£ StaKplO'EO'lV au~atc; 't£ Kat r<A;l E:vavd<y Kat 
YEVEO'EO'l Kat cp9opaic; cXAATJ lila no ao rwv Ttaowv KlV~O'EWV. 
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be.32 Other lists have also been proposed.33 Before discussing the significance of 
this list, there are more details of its classificatory scheme to attend to. 
First, the division of motion into self-moving and non-self-moving is exhaus-
tive. There is logical space for three other types, but no reason to think Plato 
recognized any members of those types. For example, motion that moves only 
itself but not other things: presumably Plato would think any motion capable of 
moving itself a fortiori capable of moving other things. Motion capable only of mov-
ing itself would conflict with the Athenian's claim that self-moving motion is "the 
most powerful and radically effective" (Laws X 894dl-2). Again, there is a possible 
category of motion that moves neither itself nor anything else. An object in this 
kind of motion would not interact causally with anything (neither itself nor any-
thing else), at least not if the transmission of motion were involved. But no text 
mentions objects of these sorts, so the division of motions into self-moving and 
non-self-moving must be exhaustive. It follows that this division is independent 
of the eight other categories of motion listed in the passage. 
Shortly after the speech quoted above, the Athenian claims that the definition 
of soul is self-moving motion; it follows that motions in soulless things belong 
to the category of non-self-moving motion. Since the non-self-moving motions 
32This is the list favored by Mayhew (2008, p. 118) and Skemp (1942, p. 99). 
33 Solmsen finds little use of the method of division in this passage, while Karfik thinks there is 
little but this method: Solmsen (1960, p. 34), Karflk (2004, p. 228). Carone follows Skemp, and adds 
that the list in the Laws does not contradict those in the Timaeus, since the six rectilinear motions 
there (in the Timaeus) would be classified under the category of"motion in several places" here in 
the Laws (2005, p. 254 n. 10). For a survey of the lists of some prominent commentators, as well as a 
careful classification of everything mentioned in this passage, see Karf!k (2004, pp. 227-233, esp. n. 
109). Parry accepts the same list I give above (2001, p. 269). Steiner also gives a careful discussion 
and survey of the history of interpretations of this passage (1992, pp. 127-149). Solmsen is unsure 
how to identify the members of the list, and doubts that it is intended to be precise (1960, pp. 
34-36). Shorey writes, "Plato amuses himself with a classification of ten kinds of motion:' (Shorey 
1933, pp. 643 ad 893-894) 
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can be either straight or rounded, it follows from this consideration also that the 
division of motion into self-moving and non-self-moving is orthogonal to the divi-
sion into round and straight and their subtypes. So we should expect to find both 
straight and round instances of self-motion: all possible combinations of these two 
ways of classifying motion should be represented.34 This is confirmed by Timaeus' 
description of human souls being affected by collisions with the motions of other 
things (Timaeus 43d). The key claim in this passage is that motions from outside 
the body affect the motions of the soul. The most natural reading is that straight-
line motions from outside the body add a component of straightness to soul- mo-
tions, and conversely, that the study of circular motions (somehow) helps souls 
restore their own circular motions. We find some confirmation for this reading 
in the closing passages of the Timaeus, where the origin of non-human animals is 
described. 
Land animals ... came from men ... who made no study of the heavens 
whatsoever, because they no longer made use of the revolutions in 
their heads but instead followed the lead of the parts of the soul that 
reside in the chest ... The tops of their heads became elongated and 
took all sorts of shapes, depending on the particular way in which 
the revolutions were squeezed together from lack of use. (Timaeus 
91e2-92a2)35 
34Here I assume that if a motion is not perfectly circular, it is to be analyzed as a combination of 
rounded and straight. So when we read that some soul-motions are imperfectly circular, it follows 
that their motions are partly straight. I doubt, however, that it is possible for any soul to have 
exclusively straight motions; this might be part of what differentiates souls from visible objects. 
35Noted by Carone (2005, p. 211 n. 68) and Karffk (2004, p. 240). Taylor considers the passage 
"pure humor" (1928, p. 642). Some note the role of this passage in Plato's explanation of evil: 
Scolnicov (1997, p. 364), Brisson (1994, p. 452). 
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This explanation assumes that the revolutions of the soul can be more or less cir-
cular, and so can partake of either of the basic types of motion.36 
Having seen how Plato's texts categorize motions, we can turn to the Kinetic 
Theory expounded by Timaeus. Since this theory reduces all kinds of change to 
spatial motions, it will at certain points be useful to know how spatial motions are 
analyzed in their own right. 
2.3 Qualitative Change 
This section discusses Plato's classification of qualitative change as a kind of KtVTJ-
ou;. The range of changes involved here is wide, taking in most of physics, chem-
istry and biology, including the physiological changes leading to perception in 
animals. For the most part the claims in this section should be uncontroversial. 
They are best known from the Timaeus, although they are also alluded to in the 
Parmenides, where I begin. 
Parmenides 138b7-139b2, says that the only kinds of motion are change in place 
and alteration.37 Parmenides and the "young Aristotle" agree on this claim as if it 
is self-evident. 
The claim that a/J..o{wotc; ("alteration") is a kind of KlVTJOtc; ("motion"), if read 
in isolation, might well seem odd or inexplicable.38 But it is worked out in explicit 
detail in the Timaeus, by explaining how alteration is reducible to the motions of 
36 Aristotle endorses a similar analysis with regard to the relative size of the upper and lower 
parts of the bodies of animals, holding that heavier bodies force animals onto all four limbs and 
also prevent them from thinking rationally: PA 686a25-bll. 
37"0n KWO\JJ.lEVOV ye ~ Cj)Eporro ~ aAAowlro av· a?Jrat yap J.lOVal KW~OEt<:;. (138b8-cl) The claim 
is implied again at Parmenides 16Zd8-el ff. 
38For Burnyeat's reaction to the same claim in the Theaetetus, see Chapter 3, page 157. 
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particles of four of the Platonic solids, and even more ultimately, to the motions 
of their constituent triangles. 
A significant chunk - about fifteen percent - of the Timaeus (53a-64a) de-
scribes the composition of the four elements out of two types of triangle. Three 
elements are interchangeable, in virtue of being made of the same kind of triangles 
(54b-d). Timaeus gives an account explaining which Platonic solid corresponds to 
each of the four elements, and which kind of triangle makes up each of the solids 
(54d-56c). He explains why there are many kinds of each of the elements rather 
than just one - this is due to the existence of triangles of different sizes, so that 
there are also, for example, particles of fire of various sizes, these in turn account-
ing for different kinds of fire (57c-57d). There is also an account of how various 
ordinary substances owe their properties to combinations of the four elements: 
wine, for example, is a kind of water with some fire in it (60a). Finally, Timaeus 
explains how ordinary objects are able to cause sensations in bodies, again resort-
ing to the properties of the Platonic solids to justify the sensations each element 
is responsible for (61c-68d and 43c). We need not linger over the details of this 
theory, as it is well known and not very philosophically interesting.39 The point 
here is just that Plato's theory spells out how nearly all the changes in the observ-
able world are reducible to the spatial motions of two sorts of triangles, which in 
39This is not to say there are not interesting problems in working out its details, but just that 
those problems are not relevant here. For example, one much-discussed problem is if and how the 
constituent triangles of the solids are able to drift about by themselves when they are not part of 
one of the Platonic solids. Various answers have been proposed, but none of them affects the point 
here that the changing properties of observable objects are being attributed to the spatial motions 
of the Platonic solids and their constituent triangles. Even if parts of the theory suffer from prob-
lems, the point stands that this is the kind of explanation Timaeus is appealing to. For discussion 
of the difficulties with the theory, see Vlastos (2005, pp. 66-97) (on general questions about the 
status of the account as science or something else) and Miller (2003, pp. 165-166, 169-186). 
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turn are assembled into the particles of which the four elements consist. This is 
the rather pedestrian part of the theory; the interesting part will arrive with his 
claims that time is also reducible to motion. 
I agree with johansen's recent work on the Timaeus, when he writes: 
The important point for our purposes is that the transformation of 
bodies consists in the division (diakrisis) and composition (sunkrisis) of 
basic triangles. The transformations simply are the movements of tri-
angles in space. The coming-into-being and corruption of fire, earth, 
water, and air boils down to different triangles congregating and sep-
arating in space.40 
This part of the Kinetic Theory is admirably clear and straightforward, so we 
can move on quickly to the parts requiring work to explicate. The elemental the-
ory does not stand by itself, but forms the major part of the Kinetic Theory, which 
brings time under the explanatory scheme covered by spatial motion. 
2.4 Time 
So far we have seen that Plato advances a theory on which physical, chemical and 
biological changes are just various sorts of spatial motion. This idea is sufficiently 
similar to current scientific theory that it likely strikes us as neither controver-
sial nor surprising. But Plato's project is broader than this: Timaeus also claims 
that time itself is nothing but another sort of spatial motion. The two claims thus 
combine to form a much broader theory, covering all changes other than those 
occurring in minds, and claiming that every instance of such change is at bottom 
40Johansen (2004, p. 125, emphasis in original). Miller also recognizes that in the Timaeus, 
" ... physical change ... is reducible to the motions of elemental bits ... " (2003, p. 51). 
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a spatial motion. In this section I will argue that Timaeus' account of the origin 
of time is meant to reduce time to the motions of the heavenly bodies. That is, 
Timaeus holds that there is no such thing as time in the sense of an invisible, in-
exorable progression of moments independent of the motions of physical objects. 
Rather, he claims that time is nothing but the motions of the heavenly bodies, 
since comparisons of their spatial positions are all that allow us to measure by 
how "long" one event precedes or follows another. I begin by commenting on the 
texts in which Timaeus makes these claims; after this I will say more about how 
Timaeus' view answers to contemporary discussion of the nature of time. 
Text and Comment 
Timaeus introduces time by explaining that the Demiurge's model when making 
the universe was the eternal Living Thing. Wanting to make the universe as much 
like its model as possible, he would have liked to make it eternal as well. But this 
was not possible: nothing that has come into being can be fully eternal: 
And so he began to think of making a moving image of eternity: at 
the same time as he brought order to the heavens, he would make an 
eternal image, moving according to number, of eternity remaining in 
unity. This image, of course, is what we now call "time." 
e:iKw li' enev6et Kwrrr6v twa aiwvoc; notfjoat, Kailita:Ko<Jllwv a}la 
oupavov 1t0l£i }lEVOVt'O<; aiwvoc; EV EVl KO:t'' apl8}lOV iouoav aiWVlOV 
£iK6va, t'OUt'OV ov l)~ xp6vov WVO}lcXKO:}l£V. (37d5-7) 
The first things we learn about time are that it is an image (EiKw) of eternity, and 
that it is in motion (Ktvf]r6v). To call time an image, I take it, means that when we 
115 
look at the heavenly bodies we are reminded of eternity. In other dialogues, be-
ing an image is closely related to recollection: something that resembles another 
thing, and also prompts recollection of that thing is an image of it. 41 Timaeus, too, 
explains the purpose of eyesight as allowing us to see the heavenly bodies; this in 
turn leads us to think of number, time and philosophy (47a-b). So in this passage 
too, Timaeus suggests that the heavenly bodies remind us of number and time, 
and it is a reasonable conjecture that he would include eternity. Since time is an 
image of eternity, it would be odd for Timaeus to deny that the sight of time makes 
us think of eternity. 
In the Republic, Socrates had said that the number one is "among the subjects 
that lead the soul and turn it around to look at what is" (525al-3); here we have 
the converse claim that time, which moves "according to number," also has the 
property of reminding us of eternity "remaining in unity." To say that time, i.e. 
the heavenly bodies, moves according to number, must mean that the periods of the 
sun and planets can be measured with numbers and put into relation with one 
another in ratios, and that these movements are extremely regular so that they 
can be used reliably to make comparisons. 
To say that eternity "remains in unity" is less straightforward; it is at least 
clear that the number one is being contrasted with the rest of the number series, 
and that one is associated with timelessness, the other numbers with time.42 If I 
am right about my reading so far, at least one ofTimaeus' claims is true, namely 
the psychological claim that viewing the heavens is likely to remind us of eternity. 
41 See Phaedo 72e-77a, Republic 523a-525b. 
42Parmenides 141a-b also claims that the One is not in time. 
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Later I will argue against a competing reading ofTimaeus' theory of time, on 
which the heavenly bodies are not themselves time, but instead form a giant clock 
that allows us to measure time.43 I will refer to this competing view as the New-
tonian view, for reasons explained below. But the passage just quoted already 
provides one reason for rejecting this reading. For on that view (to be elaborated 
below), time itself is an invisible, regular progression of instants, while a clock is 
something that visibly recreates this regular progression, allowing us to measure 
the invisible change from one instant to the next. But on that view, what a clock 
must imitate is not eternity, but something else, also changing, namely the invis-
ible progression of instants. Timaeus' initial description of time already makes it 
clear that what time imitates is something which is not itself in motion, but eter-
nity "remaining in unity." Unless we find this statement retracted or qualified in 
a way that alters this simple point, Timaeus' theory of time is incompatible with 
the view that the heavenly bodies are merely a giant clock. Instead, Timaeus is 
saying that the heavenly bodies are time - there is nothing more to time beyond 
the motions we can observe. 
Timaeus continues, 
For before the heavens came to be, there were no days or nights, no 
months or years. But now, at the same time as he framed the heavens, 
he devised their coming to be [sc. the coming-to-be of days, nights, 
months and years]. These [days, nights, months, years] all are parts 
of time, and was and will be are forms of time that have come to be. 
Such notions we unthinkingly but incorrectly apply to everlasting be-
ing. For we say that it was and is and will be, but according to the true 
account only the expression is is appropriately said of it. Was and will 
43 See below, page 134 ff. on Richard Mohr's view. 
be are properly said about the becoming that passes in time, for these 
two are motions. But that which is always changeless and motionless 
cannot become either older or younger in the course of time ... 44 
~}.tEpa<; yap Kai VUKTC£<; Kai llfiva<; Kal. EV1C£UTOU<;, OUK OVTC£<; rrpl.v 
oupavov YEVE0'9C£1, TOTE cl}lC£ EKElV(f> O'UV10'TC£}lEv(f> ~v YEVEO'lV CCUTWV 
WJXCCVcXTC£1' TCCUTC£ ~€ ltCXVTC£ }lEPfJ xp6vou, Kai TO T' ~v TO T' EO'TC£1 xp6-
vou YEYOVOTC£ El~f]. a ~~ cpepovrE<; A.aveavO}lEV Eltl ~v a{~lOV oucriav 
OUK op9w<;. AEyO}lEV yap ~~ W<; ~v EO'T1V TE Kai EO'TC£1, Tfi ~€ TO EO'T1V }lO-
vov KaTa Tov &A.1']9fj A.6yov rrpocrt1KE1, To ~€ ~v TO T' ecrTa1rrEpi ~v £v 
xp6v<p YEvE0'1V ioucrav 1tpE1tE1 A.EyEcr9a1- K1V~O'E1<; yap EO'TOV, TO ~€ &Ei 
KC£Ta TCCUTa EXOV aK1V~TW<; OUTE rrpEO'~UTEpov OUTE VEWTEpov 1tPOcrtlKE1 
ytyYE0'9C£1 ~1a XPOVOU ... (37el-38a4) 
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Timaeus calls days, nights, months and years "parts of time" (}lEpf]), but "was" and 
"will be" he calls "forms of time" (d~f]). The smallest whole unit of measurement 
observable in the heavens is a day or a night (i.e. a period of continuous daylight 
or darkness; the 24-hour sense of"day" is a pair made up of one day and one night 
in Timaeus' sense). Timaeus means that time consists of the four units of mea-
surement he mentions and their mutual relations: we measure months using the 
unit of days, and years using months or days. Thus, time in general is made up of 
these four units. Later Timaeus will reveal that there are other units available as 
well, since the periods of any of the planets could also be used to measure time 
(39c-d). In describing the parts of time this way, Timaeus shows again that he is a 
reductionist. For on the Newtonian view, it is not plausible that the smallest parts 
of time are days or nights: Newtonianism claims that we are internally aware of 
time's passage, allowing us to distinguish much smaller units than entire days and 
nights. A typical Newtonian view is that we are aware of "moments" or "instants:· 
Since time passes regularly and invisibly, on the Newtonian view, our most direct 
44Zeyl's translation, slightly modified. 
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access to its passage is through an (alleged) internal awareness of successive mo-
ments. IfTimaeus held this view, it would make no sense for him to say that the 
parts of time are units as large as days and nights. On the reductionist view, how-
ever, this is just what he should say, since days and nights are the smallest units 
made available by the motions in the heavens. 
just after naming the parts of time, Timaeus also says that "was and will be are 
forms of time that have come to be." It is not immediately clear what Timaeus 
wants to express when he speaks of was and will be; his phrase in Greek is t'O t'' ~v 
t'o T' eoTat, something like "both the it was and the it will be." But his subsequent 
statements show what he intends with the neuter article plus finite verb, namely 
a reference to the linguistic expressions following the article; this construction thus 
functions analogously to contemporary uses of quotation marks (by logicians and 
philosophers) to refer to linguistic expressions rather than the customary refer-
ents of those expressions. 
Here is how we can be sure that this is what Timaeus intends. He immediately 
says that of all the expressions we apply to everlasting being, most are inappropri-
ate, then adds, Myo~EV yap <5it we; ~v ecmv TE Kal. EOTat, Tfj ()f: TO eonv ~6vov KaTcX 
Tov aATJ8fl Aoyov npoot1KEt ("For we say that it was and is and will be, but according 
to the true account only the expression is is appropriately said of it"). This sen-
tence first quotes our generic statement "it is" (AEyO~Ev ... wc; ... ~v), and then refers 
to the linguistic form using the neuter article construction TO eonv ("the expression 
'it is'"). In this sentence it is clear that the second part refers to what was quoted 
in the first part, so this establishes what Timaeus means when he uses the t'O + 
finite verb construction. We shall see in a moment that this explanation works for 
119 
Timaeus' first two uses of this expression, while for the third and final use we will 
have to modify it. Finally, once this is seen, it is also clear that Timaeus is using 
the third-person singular finite verbs as stand-ins for their tenses; that is, "the 
expression 'it was' " stands for any expression using a past tense, and similarly for 
the present and future. 
We can now examine the most puzzling statement in this passage: t'O ~€ ~v 
t'O t'' E<Jt'at 1tEpi t'~V EV xpov~ YEVE<Jtv ioucrav npE1tEt Af.yecr9at ... Ktvrl<JEU; yap E<Jt'OV 
("Was and will be are properly said about the becoming that passes in time, for 
these two are motions"). The first part of this sentence follows the analysis we 
have just given: the t'O + finite verb construction again means "the expressions 
'was' and 'will be' ;• and this is confirmed by the fact that the sentence makes a 
claim about what is properly said. But the end of the statement declares, "these 
two are motions." If we keep strictly to the explanation we have been using, Timaeus 
is saying that these two expressions or tenses are motions. But this cannot be right: 
if expressions for the past and future are motions, expressions for the present 
should also be motions; but Timaeus wants to contrast the past and future with 
the present, so this cannot be what he intends. 
Plato's sentences, imitating real speech, often fail to follow strict grammar or 
logic, so we need not abandon our results so far. The dual verb E<Jt'OV guaran-
tees that Timaeus' reference is to the past and future; but he cannot mean the 
expressions for the past and future. He must therefore mean the past and future 
themselves. But as we have already seen, Timaeus is not a Newtonian. Rather, for 
Timaeus the past consists ofjust the motions of the heavenly bodies that have been 
observed, or have been used to measure events prior to the present (and similarly 
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for the future).45 On this view, the past and future are both motions in a straight-
forward and non-mysterious sense. That is, each consists of the motions of the 
heavenly bodies that did or will take place either prior to or after the present. 46 
Finally, we can also see why this initially puzzling sentence shifts from refer-
ring to linguistic expressions for the past and future, to referring to the motions 
that constitute the past and future. For Timaeus' point in this sentence is that the 
past and future are motions, and this is why they are correctly applied to the be-
coming that passes- or more literally, 'goes' (iouoav)- in time. His claim is thus 
that the pair past/future and becoming are both characterized by motion, while 
the present and eternity are both characterized by motionlessnessY 
We have now seen enough to justify ascribing the reductionist view of time to 
Timaeus, but there is further confirmation. Later he adds, 
... people are all but ignorant of the fact that time really is the wander-
ings of these bodies ... " 
[avepwnot] we; Enoc; EinEiv OUK lCJ<XCJlV xp6vov ovra rae; rourwv n/..6:-
va:c; ... (39c7-dl) 
Here Timaeus says directly for the second time that time is the wanderings of the 
planets. Timaeus uses the strong verb 1oaow ("they know"), so he is saying that 
45More generously, I think Timaeus could also agree that the past consists of all events that have 
happened at the same time as the motions in the heavens that took place prior to the present. 
46This definition might seem to rest on a Newtonian view of time, and thus to undermine my 
claim: how can the future consist of motions that take place after the present, if Timaeus denies 
that there is any such thing as after that exists independently? But we can give a reductionist 
account of 'before' and 'after' if we are careful not to carelessly invoke Newtonian time. Briefly, 
the motions in the heavens allow us, if we take advantage of them, to set up a dating system using 
numbers. It is then easy to define past and future as events that happen at an earlier or later date 
than whatever happens to be the present. 
47Wagner points out Greek writers typically speak of time as consisting of past and future -not 
of past, present and future as we do. (Wagner 2008, p. 73) 
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someone might, at least in principle, come to know this fact.48 
We also have to consider the phrase we; erroc; e:irre:iv, "in a word;' in this decla-
ration. It softens or hedges expressions it is applied to, so perhaps Timaeus is not 
asserting that time is the wanderings of the planets, but instead only that time is, 
"so to speak" those wanderings. On such a reading, Timaeus is not asserting the 
identity at all, but indicating that he is only adopting a picturesque expression 
to emphasize some other point - presumably something about the ignorance of 
most people with regard to planetary motions. But this is not the natural way of 
reading this sentence, since the softening phrase occurs with ouK i'oamv ("they do 
not know"). Had Timaeus wanted to hedge his claim about time, rather than about 
the ignorance of people, he would have indicated this more clearly by putting 
the softening phrase with the assertion about time.49 Further, it is easy to see 
why Timaeus would soften his statement about peoples' ignorance. For on his ac-
count, time consists of days, nights, months and years. And it would be absurd to 
claim that people are unaware that days, nights, months and years are the units 
by which we measure time: at least in that weak sense, everyone knows what time 
is. Timaeus' softening claim makes sense, however, given that he is a reductionist. 
For this claim goes well beyond what most people are aware of about time and the 
planets, so he has reason for saying people are unaware that his view is correct. 
The phrase we; erroc; e:irre:iv can apply to either the claim that OUK i'oaotv ("they 
do not know"), or to the claim that xp6vov ovt'a t'ac; t'OUt'WV rr.Aavac; ("time is the 
48He is not claiming to know it himself as he says it, for this would go beyond his own warnings 
that his speech is an dKwc; ~ii9oc;, or "likely story:• 
49 Another reading would apply the softener to the entire statement as a whole. Then the trans-
lation would be, "in some sense, people do not know that time is the wanderings of the heavenly 
bodies." This, however, is vague, and if we want to know what it means we will have to adopt one 
of the two readings considered above. 
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wanderings of these [bodies]"). If it applies to the former, the sense must be that 
people are "in a way," or "more or less" ignorant of the fact he mentions. The 
meaning could then be that while people do notice the role played by the sun and 
moon in keeping time, they fail to notice that the other planets could be used in 
the same way. 5° But if this is the application of we; enoc; Eineiv, it cannot also apply 
to the claim that time is the motions of the planets. So on this reading Timaeus is 
stating flatly that time is the motions of the planets. 
On the other hand, suppose that we; enoc; Einetv applies to xpovov ovta 't'ac; 
't'OU't'WV rtA.avac;. Now Timaeus is saying that time is "in a way" or "more or less" the 
motions of the planets. This suggests that he is only referring to the motions of the 
planets as measuring devices, not that they are time in the stronger sense I have 
been arguing for. But on this alternative, he must also mean that people are simply 
unaware that time has this status. This claim hardly seems plausible; how could 
Timaeus claim that no one knows that the sun and moon are used for reckoning 
periods of time? Because this claim would be very surprising, and because of the 
placement of we; enoc; Einetv next to OUK i'aaow, it makes better sense to read the 
passage in the first way. Timaeus thus says that people are "more or less" ignorant 
of the nature of time, but what they are ignorant of is the fact that time is identical 
with the motions of the planets. 
We have seen that Timaeus is a reductionist about time, and have also indi-
cated at certain points how my reading is preferable to its main competitor, the 
Newtonian view. I next indicate how Timaeus' claims stand in relation to contem-
porary discussions of time. Now Timaeus says far too little to map his views about 
50These readings are, however, not defended by their authors, only suggested: Cornford (1937, 
p. 116), Taylor (1928, pp. 213-214 ad 39d1), Archer-Hind (1888, p. 129 ad 14). 
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time onto current debates with much precision. My goal is thus the limited one 
of showing that Timaeus is some kind of reductionist, denying the existence of 
Newtonian time. The first step is to explain what these terms mean. 
Contemporary Philosophy of Time 
I shall adopt the terminology used by Newton-Smith for describing positions on 
the reality of time, with one modification. He describes two important positions 
on the ontology of time, thus: 
The Ontological Thesis of Reductionism: All assertions involving reference to time 
or temporal items can be analysed in terms of assertions not involving such 
reference but involving instead reference only to things in time and to the 
temporal relations between things in time. 
The Ontological Thesis of [Newtonianism]: The existence of temporal items is onto-
logically independent of the existence of things in time. Temporal relations 
between things in time hold in virtue of temporal relations holding between 
the times at which the things in time occur.51 
I have replaced Newton-Smith's name for the second position. He calls it "Platon-
ism;· intending to refer to the Cambridge neo-Platonists, whereas this is precisely 
the position Plato rejects. 52 So I shall call this thesis Newtonianism, since Newton 
gives the best-known version: 
Absolute, True, and Mathematical Time, of itself, and from its own 
nature flows equably without regard to any thing external, and by an-
other name is called Duration ... 53 
51 Newton-Smith (1980, pp. 9-10) 
52Newton-Smith (1980, p. 7) This unfortunate terminology is followed by Markosian (Winter 
2010). 
53Newton (1729, p. 9) 
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These theses express roughly what I take Timaeus to endorse and reject, respec-
tively. But they should not be pressed too hard: Timaeus says nothing, of course, 
about translating claims about temporal items into equivalent sentences involving 
only things in time and their temporal relations. Even this much goes far beyond 
what Timaeus says. The key point of opposition between the two theses, which 
is also at issue in Timaeus' speech, is the question of the existence of "temporal 
items" in their own right. 
Newton-Smith describes temporal items by opposing them to "the things in 
time": 
The term 'things in time' will be used as a label to cover all types 
of item that are both in time and involve change. Thus, among the 
things in time are events, changes, processes, occurrences, happen-
ings, incidents and so on ... 
Prima facie there is not just the ordered history system but also the 
times (moments, instants, intervals, etc.) at which the things in time 
occur. By temporal item I will mean things of this ilk which are ordered 
in a certain manner. 54 
Following this terminology, the question at issue for our reading of the Timaeus be-
comes: are there, in addition to the things in time, also temporal items? Timaeus, 
as we have already seen, denies that there are. 55 
54Newton-Smith (1980, pp. 5-6) 
551 will not make use of another way of describing positions in the philosophy of time, one which 
is more prevalent than the terms I will use here. This is to describe positions following McTaggart's 
terminology of A-series and B-series. When events are ordered by the A-series, each event takes 
on successively different temporal properties: it begins by being future, then becomes present, and 
finally becomes past. On the B-series, on the other hand, each event retains the same properties 
at all times: if my eating a sandwich occurs earlier than my eating an apple, then this relation will 
hold permanently, no matter whether the pair of events is in the future, occurring at present, or 
has already happened. For these reasons, the two series are typically described as "tensed" and 
"tenseless" theories of time. Advocates of the B-series are thought to claim that the passage of 
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Two Questions We Can Ignore 
Before giving further arguments about how to read Timaeus' claims, let me men-
tion two controversies we can leave aside. The first is the debate over whether the 
creation story in the Timaeus is meant literally or metaphorically. One argument 
for the figurative reading is that if the story were literal, a contradiction would 
ensue from supposing that there was some "time" before time was created. 56 We 
need not take up this issue because both positions are compatible with my claim 
that Timaeus thinks time is nothing but the motions of the planets. If the creation 
story is metaphorical, then time has always existed, meaning that the planets' 
motions have always existed. If the creation story is literal, then time came into 
being along with the planets. Time, for Timaeus, is nothing but the motions of 
the planets - there are no temporal items in addition to these motions, and this 
claim is independent of the claim that time had a literal beginning. That is, decid-
ing whether the creation account is literal or metaphorical will not help decide 
whether Timaeus is a reductionist or a Newtonian about time. So we need not 
concern ourselves here about the status of the creation story. 
A second controversy that we need not enter is the question whether Plato (or 
time is an illusion, since the real temporal relations that exist never change. So in some sense the 
A-series corresponds better with the Newtonian view, and the B-series corresponds better with the 
reductionist view. But these correspondences may not go very deep. Advocates of the B-series, for 
example, do not usually say that temporal items are not real: they simply wish to claim that the 
nature of temporal items is of one sort rather than another. So I take it that mapping McTaggart's 
terminology onto the labels I adopt from Newton-Smith is not straightforward. Since Newton-
Smith's labels do a better job picking out the issue relevant to my reading of the Timaeus, I use his 
labels. I do not wish to commit myself to any claims about how these labels match McTaggart's 
terms, beyond the rough observation that reductionism is probably closer to the B-series than it is 
to the A-series. For a recent discussion of McTaggart's terms, see Oaklander (2008, pp. 13, 17-18). 
56The controversy goes back to ancient times. For its recent episodes see Zeyl (2000, pp. xxii, 
xxiv, xliii with notes), Carone (2005, p. 33), Vlastos (1964, p. 409), Vlastos (1939, pp. 388-390). 
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the Greeks) thought of time as circular (or cyclical). Vlastos points out that the 
fact that Timaeus represents time as consisting of circular motions does not en-
tail that he conceives of time as circular. 57 Nor is it immediately clear what would 
follow from conceiving of time as circular. It is sometimes thought that this would 
imply that the same events would occur each "time" the same time came around. 58 
But this implication would only follow on some versions of the reductionist view, 
where the identities of individual temporal items are reduced entirely to the phys-
ical events taking place at those times. On views such as these, identical physi-
cal events would suffice to determine an identical time, so to say that the same 
time has arrived again implies - trivially - that the same events are happening 
again. But on Newtonian views, the same physical events could recur any num-
ber of times without making it the case that they would occur at the same times: 
time, on this view, marches blissfully on, oblivious to whatever is happening in 
space at each instant. We need not untangle this knot here. If Timaeus reduces 
temporal succession to the spatial motions of the planets, as I claim he does, this 
is compatible with his conceiving the time that results as either linear or circular. 
Timaeus' remarks on time are brief for such a deep and difficult subject, and 
his brevity leaves some inescapable ambiguity in his position. There are roughly 
three candidates for what Timaeus means to assert about time: 
1. Time is identical with the motions of the planets (reductionism). 
2. Time is generated by, and supervenient on, the motions of the planets. 59 
57Vlastos (1964, p. 409) 
58 For an example, see Zeyl (2000, p. xliii) 
59Cf. Wagner: "Even in Plato's case, however, there may be a confusion between time as some-
thing generated by the Heavens, and time (as Plato himself had at first asserted at the outset of 
his account of time [Tim. 37e]) as equated with the Heavens, or Heavenly motions, themselves:' 
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3. Time is independent of the motions of the planets; those motions amount 
(merely) to a giant clock which is able to measure time (Newtonianism). 
View 1 is reductionism, since it claims that time is identical with certain physi-
cal motions, and does not exist independently of those motions. View 2 is a sort 
of compromise, and in the form given here is insufficiently spelled out. In or-
der to differ from reductionism, View 2 will need to say something about what 
time is, such that it differs from the physical motions that generate it (View 1), 
and also such that it is not something independent of those motions (View 3). 
Since Timaeus says nothing to address either side of this dilemma, he cannot hold 
View 2. So while View 2 would be an interesting and, as far as I can see, viable 
option for philosophers who wish to defend it, the only candidates for reading 
Timaeus' account are Views 1 and 3. View 3 is the Newtonian position, accord-
ing to which there are ordered temporal items existing independently of physical 
items. 
We can now appreciate a simple and decisive reason for adopting View 1 over 
View 3: Newtonian time would be something at once invisible, changing, and soul-
less. Timaeus' (and Plato's) metaphysics has no room for this conjunction of prop-
erties.60 Timaeus locates change within the visible world, and also within souls, 
which are invisible.61 But apart from souls, Timaeus recognizes only two other 
kinds of thing that are invisible, namely the Forms and the receptacle. The Forms, 
(Wagner 2008, p. 119) 
60Note that Newtonian time will be something changing whether we prefer the A-series or the 
B-series. On the A-series view, each instant changes its properties from future to present to past; 
on the B-series, instants retain their properties of being earlier than or later than other instants, 
but some sort of change will be required to account for the apparent fact that not all times are 
present simultaneously. On either view, the time series will have some property or properties that 
change. 
61Timaeus distinguishes our visible world from the invisible/intelligible world (at 28b7, 29b3-c3, 
30c7-dl, 39el, 48e4-49al, Slb7-c5, 92c5-9). 
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of course, are immune to change, so time is not a Form or a set of Forms. There 
is no possibility of the receptacle's being identical (in whole or in part) with time. 
First, the receptacle is described as either space or matter, but never in any way 
suggesting it is time. Second, the receptacle is said to lack any determinate prop-
erties, but the most salient characteristic of time is its regularity. The receptacle 
is also said to lack qualities of its own, and to be in "disorderly" motion when con-
sidered on its own. Neither description fits the concept of temporal succession, 
which both has qualities (transitivity, asymmetricity, and irreflexivity), and is or-
derly in virtue of those qualities. 
Finally, Timaeus never suggests that time could be identical with some soul 
(nor is it even clear what such a suggestion would mean). Since time fits none 
of these invisible kinds, to attribute the Newtonian position to Timaeus is to in-
vent a new, invisible member of his ontology. But Timaeus himself says explicitly 
(48e-49a) that his ontology contains three kinds: one that is changeless, a second 
that is changing, and the third, which is the receptacle. Time is not changeless 
and is not the receptacle; it follows that time is changing. The set of changing 
things consists of visible items and souls. Time is not a soul, so it follows that time 
is something visible. And this fits what Timaeus says, which is that time is the 
motions of the heavenly bodies. 
On the other hand, Timaeus claims that what is visible changes, so if time is 
visible it must change. This fits Timaeus' pronouncement that time is identical 
with the movements of the planets. 
Reading Timaeus as a reductionist is not a new position. But those who have 
endorsed the reductionist reading have merely summarized the view, without 
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showing how it follows from what Timaeus says. So I hope to have added both 
specificity and new arguments to the grounds for this reading. 
Endorsements 
Vlastos at one point agreed with this reading: "If Aristotle takes the heavenly rev-
olutions as a necessary condition of time, the Timaeus seems to identify them with 
time."62 He later qualified this view, but the movement amounted to a change 
from View 1 to View 2; View3 he considered obviously false.63 Wagner has also 
recently endorsed View 1: 
Why should we suppose that the natural universe, just by keep-
ing track of its own processes and movements, thereby keeps track of 
time? The answer, for Plato, seems clear: Time's "parts" are nothing 
other than the Heavenly bodies' motions; and time surely is nothing 
other than its own parts.64 
Taylor, too, denies the Newtonian characterization ofTimaeus' theory: 
The point is that time is not something existing before or after or be-
sides the events which make up the life of nature, a sort of frame into 
which the events are put, which might still be something with a struc-
ture of its own, if there were no events to fill it. It is itself a character 
of the events, or rather an expression of the most universal character 
62Vlastos (1939, p. 388). I will introduce below most of the evidence for this reading that Vlastos 
cites here. 
63Vlastos (1964, p. 410) 
64Wagner (2008, p. 119). Archer-Hind does not seem to see the issue that I am focusing on; he 
writes sometimes as if temporal flow and the planets are independent of one another, at other 
times as if temporal flow depends on the existence of the physical universe in general. See e.g. 
Archer-Hind (1888, pp. 122 ad 38e-39e, et ad 1, 129 ad 14). 
of nature, its 'passage'. Fully thought out this implies a thoroughgo-
ing 'relativist' theory of time such that an empty time, a time without 
events, like that which Newton is rightly or wrongly credited with as-
serting, is a phrase without meaning.65 
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Taylor's most concise statement on Timaeus' view of time is also worth quoting: 
There was a question whether Plato means that time actually is uni-
form movement or only that it is measured by such movement...It 
seems to me ... that the language ofTimaeus plainly identifies time with 
the uniform movement of a planet.66 
Reductionism about time is counterintuitive, but its motivation is easy to see.67 All 
measurements of time consist of a comparison of one state of affairs with another, 
where at least one of the states involved is (in some sense) a clock. Clocks in this 
sense are regular, repetitive motions that have (or can have) numbers assigned to 
them. These motions can be nearly anything that is sufficiently regular, repeti-
tive, and observable, from the motions of the sun or other heavenly bodies to the 
vibrations of atoms.68 It is easy to lose sight of the fact that all "measurements" of 
time have this form, and to suppose that we are measuring something else - an 
abstract, non-physical "flow" of something that exists independently of physical 
items. But if we consider how these measurements are carried out and validated, 
65Taylor (1928, p. 188 ad 37e1-3). In a previous note, Taylor seems to ascribe the Newtonian view 
to Timaeus. But reading both notes together makes it clear that what he is attributing to Timaeus is 
only the part of Newton's view which claims that time advances uniformly, as the series of integers 
does. 
66Taylor (1928, p. 191) 
67 Newton-Smith (1980, p. 51) 
68The notion of "regularity" might seem circular here: how can a motion be described as "reg-
ular" except by reference to uniform, stable time-flow? But "regularity" here need only mean 
that a motion appears regular by comparison with other motions. Thus there is no vicious circle. 
For further discussion of this problem see Wagner (2008, pp. 180-187), Newton-Smith (1980, pp. 
156-158). 
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it is clear that we have no contact with time as an object of our senses in the way 
that we have contact with trees, tables, or lions.69 Thus the reductionist position 
is at least prima facie plausible; it is not in conflict with any obvious fact one could 
point to.7° 
Newton-Smith summarizes the reductionist case thus: 
In developing his case the reductionist places great stress on the fact 
that whenever we have occasion to talk about some particular tem-
poral item we identify it by citing some event which in fact occurred 
at that temporal item. For example, I might single out some moment 
as the moment I last turned a page of this book. Of course, we cannot 
equate the moment with that event. For we want to say that that mo-
ment is, say, the same moment as the moment you dropped your pen. 
As the same moment may have different identifying events the mo-
ment cannot be some one of these events. However, we can form the 
collection of all events simultaneous with any particular event used in 
identifying the moment. This collection, the reductionist claims, just 
is the moment...Clearly this is a most attractive project.71 
I take Timaeus' position to be just what Newton-Smith describes here, with one ex-
ception. Rather than identifying moments with enormous sets of events, Timaeus 
prefers to identify them with a very limited set of events, namely the motions of 
the heavenly bodies. As a practical proposal, this has clear advantages. Newton-
Smith's more democratic but unwieldy sets of events would not be usable un-
less one adopted something very much like Timaeus' identification of time with a 
much more limited set of motions. Moreover, Timaeus has available a strong de-
fense of his choice of reference-motions. This is that it would be nonsense to talk 
69For a more detailed discussion of reasons favoring reductionism about time, see Wagner (2008, 
Chapter 1, pp. 19-41). 
70The early Vlastos agrees with the reading I give here (1939, p. 387 and n. 2). 
71Newton-Smith (1980, pp. 6-7) 
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about "time" unless we define it using something regular. Newton-Smith's sets of 
events are more democratic, but would also make time unpredictable and irreg-
ular. Since, according to Timaeus, time was created with the purpose of making 
the universe more like the eternal, and also in order to allow humans to appreciate 
this order and move closer to the eternal, given these concerns, Newton-Smith's 
proposal is a non-starter. Timaeus thus succeeds in defining time both so as to 
make it regular and useful, but also in ridding himself of a potential extra entity, 
one which would have violated his metaphysical bias against changing, invisible 
and soulless entities. 
Aristotle mentions three theories when he considers "the traditional accounts" 
of time: 
(1) Some assert that it is the movement of the whole (2) others that it 
is the sphere itself. (Physics IV.lO 218a33) 
(3) But as time is most usually supposed to be motion and a certain 
change, we must consider this view. (Physics IV.lO 218b9-10)72 
None of these three states Timaeus' view precisely, since he claims that time is 
the movement of the heavenly bodies. This is neither the movement of the whole, 
nor is it the sphere itself (apart from its movement), nor finally is it motion and 
a certain change.73 Timaeus' claims correspond best to some combination of the 
72 218a33: ot J.IEv yap r~v roO oA.ou KiVTJOW dvcn cpacnv, ot of:: r~v ocpaipav aur~v. 218b9-10: 
End OE OoKEi ).lcXAtOra K{VT]Ot<; dvat Kai ).IEra~OA~ nc; 6 xpovoc;, rour' O:v dT] OKEnr£ov. (Barnes' 
translation, slightly modified; the numbering is, of course, mine.) 
73Pace Wagner (2008, pp. 167 et passim Chapter Five (pp. 167-187)). He writes, "The first two 
harken to Plato's account...Distinguishing these two may reflect Aristotle's recognition of this am-
biguity in Plato's own account in his Timaeus. Or, Aristotle may have in mind differing ways others 
in the Academy understood Plato:· But in fact Aristotle dismisses the second theory as "too naive 
for it to be worth while to consider the impossibilities implied in it." Nor does the second theory 
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first and third views. Perhaps Aristotle's third view is meant to characterize a 
whole family of theories, all those according to which time is or depends on any 
motion or change. If this is so, Timaeus' view falls within this genus, and Aristotle 
intends to refute it along with other members of the genus when he argues that 
time is not motion. 
The important point is that Aristotle recognized the claim that time is motion 
as what was "most usually supposed" by his predecessors. He denies the thesis, 
but does not call it naive or incredible; he refutes it by argument (Physics IV.lO 
218bl0-20). It is likely, but by no means certain, that Aristotle is referring to the 
Timaeus, among other sources, when he identifies this view.74 But no matter: that 
he takes it seriously is enough to show that it was possible to entertain this view 
seriously in Plato's time. 
We have seen so far that the reductionist view is sufficiently coherent to have 
been held by some famous philosophers of the past, and continues to have adher-
ents. We have also seen that the text supports a reductionist reading. It remains 
to respond to a recent and spirited defense of the Newtonian reading by Richard 
sound at all like what Timaeus says. Wagner adds a careful consideration of how Aristotle's first 
and third theories may correspond to Plato's. Coope also takes Aristotle to refer to the Timaeus 
here (2005, p. 32). Other ancient and modern writers also read the Timaeus this way: The spurious 
Definitiones include: "Xp6voc; ~ft.{ou KlVTlOl<;, ~E-rpov <popii<;" ("Time: motion of the sun, a measure 
of motion;· 41lb3); Simplicius reports that Plato, Eudemus, Theophrastus and Alexander all con-
sidered time to be "-r~v "tOV OAOU KlVTlOlV Kai 1t£pl<popav "tOV xpovov Elva\ <paaw:· "they say that 
time is the motion and revolution of the whole;' (Simplicius 1882, 1895, pp. 17-19). Aetius agrees: 
"(IIAci"twv) oua{av liE xpovou ~v oupavoii KlVTloW;' "Plato [says that] the being of time is the mo-
tion of the heavens." (Aetius 1879, pp. 11-12). For further ancient references and concurrent 
opinion on this point, see Taylor (1928, pp. 190-191). Note that while all these authors disagree 
with me over how, precisely, to read what Timaeus says, all these sources support my contention 
that identifying time with the motion of the heavens was a respectable and plausible view to hold 
in the ancient world, as was attributing this view to Plato. 
740n the other hand, Plotinus does not seem to read Plato as having identified time with the 
motions of the planets (Wagner 2008, p. 275). But Aristotle's testimony is weightier on this ques-
tion. 
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Mohr. 
Objections 
Mohr 
Mohr holds that what Timaeus describes is the building of a giant cosmic clock, 
but no more- in particular, not the creation of temporal succession itself.75 On 
his view, the workings of the clock are motions, but time itself- that is, the se-
quence of temporal items - is not characterized as a motion by Timaeus. Mohr 
reads Timaeus as a Newtonian, since he attributes to Timaeus the view that time 
is both real and unaffected by physical events. These assumptions allow him to 
claim that temporal succession existed prior to the construction of the clock; the 
only change effected by the clock was that temporal succession could then be mea-
sured. I agree with Mohr that, according to Timaeus, the Demiurge creates a giant 
clock; we disagree on the claim that this is all the Demiurge does. I hold, instead, 
that in building this clock the Demiurge also creates time. 
Mohr distinguishes three senses of"time": (1) what is measurable, i.e. the tem-
poral succession itself;76 (2) what measures the temporal succession, i.e. a clock 
or clock-like device; (3) a measurement actually taken, e.g. "three days" or "seven 
minutes." He claims that those who think Timaeus is a reductionist are confus-
ing the first and second senses. Since I have already given the positive evidence 
favoring my view, I will move quickly through Mohr's arguments. 
On Mohr's view, when Timaeus calls days, nights, months and years "parts 
75 Mohr (2005, pp. 51-80). For discussion of the notion of "clock," see above, page 130. 
76"Temporal succession" is Mohr's term. An equivalent would, I think, be "the sequence of tem-
poral items, plus regular progression through that sequence." 
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of time," he means they are parts of the celestial clock.77 This much is compati-
ble with reductionism: days, nights, etc. are the phenomena of which time con-
sists; they are parts of time. And since Timaeus holds that the phenomena by 
which we measure time are identical with time itself, it makes sense on his view 
to say that days, nights, etc. are both parts of the celestial clock and parts of time. 
Mohr, however, must add that days, nights, and the other units only measure the 
phenomenon that time actually is. But Mohr cannot point to any statement of 
Timaeus' that says this or suggests it. 
Again, the claim that "was and will be are forms of time that have come to be" 
is difficult for a Newtonian account. Since was and will be have come to be, Mohr 
must hold that they are either identical with the clock that the Demiurge creates, 
or parts of that clock, or else have come into being as a result of the creation of 
that clock. For the temporal succession itself (according to Mohr) has not come 
to be. The best reading for Mohr's view, then, is this. Since was and will be are 
expressed in Greek with the -ro + finite verb construction, and this construction 
has already been used twice to refer to expressions using past and future tenses, 
Mohr can take this third instance also to refer to linguistic expressions referring 
to the past or future. And Mohr can explain that these are "forms of time" in that 
they are forms of reference to past and future times. This much is open to Mohr. 
But he is not able to read the statement in the most natural way, as saying that the 
past and future themselves are forms, or kinds, of time. 
Now let us focus on one of the crucial sentences for my reading, the one in 
which Timaeus says, "Was and will be are properly said about the becoming that 
77Mohr (2005, p. 57) 
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passes in time, for these two are motions."78 Here Timaeus calls the past and fu-
ture motions tout court, and this too is more easily understood as a metaphysi-
cal claim about temporal succession than about a clock or the measurements of 
a clock. Mohr's only comment on this statement is to claim that Timaeus says 
this "casually or elliptically;' and that Timaeus speaks more accurately a few lines 
farther, when he says, "none of the characteristics that becoming has bestowed 
upon the things that are borne about in the realm of perception are appropri-
ate to [being]" (38a5-6). Here, according to Mohr, past and future are described 
as properties rather than motions.79 But this goes beyond what the text says. The 
text says merely that nothing bestowed on sensible things by becoming pertains to 
changeless being - in particular, it does not say or imply that there is a distinction 
between "was" and "will be" on one hand, and properties or characteristics on the 
other. The word that Mohr takes as "properties" is ocra (38a6), literally "as many 
things as." There are two problems with Mohr's reading here. First, ocra is vague 
in Greek; taking it to mean "properties" imports much more specificity and even 
a technical sense. There is no evidence that Timaeus intends anything so specific. 
Second, even if we accept the interpretation that makes ocra into "properties;· it 
remains to show that Timaeus is thinking of properties as somehow opposed to 
"was" and "will be." The text is compatible with thinking that Timaeus is describ-
ing the past and future as both motions and properties; on this reading, there is 
nothing to decide whether Timaeus thinks either description is privileged. 
Finally, Mohr himself slips out of his Newtonian reading when he comments 
78
-ro OE ~v r6 r' loralnEpi r~v f.v xp6v<p ytvEow iouoav npenEl A£yEo8a1- KlV~OEl<; yap Eorov, 
Timaeus 38al-2 
79Mohr (2005, p. 70) 
on this passage: 
.. .it turns out that past, present and future (38a4-5) are not viewed 
as motions but as properties which supervene on motions: they are 
things "which becoming attaches to sensible movings" (38a6). The 
past, future, and even the present, on this fuller account, are those 
temporal properties which we describe in judgments of measure ... 80 
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If the past and future supervene on motions, then there is no such thing as "tempo-
ral succession" in the absence of those motions. Here the past and future are said 
to depend on (since they co-vary with) the motions of the heavenly bodies. This 
contradicts Mohr's supposition that time must have existed prior to the creation 
of the cosmic clock. Again, Mohr's position does not match the text: for Mohr to 
hold both that Newtonian time existed before the creation of the universe, and 
that time supervenes on motion, he must hold that time supervenes on motions 
that existed before the creation of the universe. It follows that time does not de-
pend on orderly motions, but only on any motion at all, even the disorderly state 
of the pre-universe. But this is just what Timaeus denies when he says that time 
came into being with the heavens. 
Finally, Timaeus does not say that the clock merely measures the temporal 
succession; he says that it is time, and that almost no one is aware of this (Timaeus 
39c7-dl: WCrTE w<; £no<; EinEiv OUK 1oacnv xp6vov ovra ra<; TOUTWV nA.ava<; ... ). The 
claim that people fail to notice what time is squares more easily with the reduc-
tionist reading; it is hard to see why Timaeus would claim that people have failed 
to notice that we use the sun and moon to mark off days, months and years. 
80Mohr (2005, p. 70) 
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Mohr points out that "the Demiurge ... does not produce events simpliciter or 
produce them as having transitive, asymmetrical, irreflexive relations."81 It is not 
clear what Mohr intends by the first half of this disjunction, but it is worth point-
ing out that the existence of events may be necessary, but is not sufficient for the 
existence of time.82 Time, or temporal succession, is (or is manifested as) a certain 
kind of ordering among events. Mohr identifies three properties as making up the 
temporal succession: transitivity, asymmetricity, and irreflexivity.83 
Mohr thinks it would be self-contradictory to claim that there were events in 
the pre-cosmos but no temporal succession; therefore, since Timaeus describes 
events in the pre-cosmos, there must have been temporal succession as well. As 
evidence for events in the pre-cosmos, Mohr cites 30a, 50b6 (there were bodies in 
the pre-cosmos), 52d-53c, and 52el-2. "The emphasis of the description is on di-
versity of appearance and plurality of motions ... "84 Timaeus 52d-53c, for example, 
describes the shaking of the receptacle and the resultant separation of the four 
kinds into separate regions. 
But the presence of events does not entail temporal succession. Remove any 
or all of the three properties of temporal succession, and the result will not be 
describable as "time" in the same sense in which we now use the word. So, for 
example, bodies and events might be ordered in a succession that is asymmetric 
81 Mohr (2005, p. 58). This triad of properties is also mentioned by Vlastos (1964, p. 414). 
82Newton-Smith expresses much the same idea: "For there is no ground for accepting Leibniz's 
implicit claim that time must be measurable. There might well be world in which periods of time 
filled with events could not be measured at all, either directly or indirectly. Things might be so 
chaotic that no self-congruent sequence of events could be identified to serve as the basis of a 
measurement system, in which case ... time would be unmeasurable." (1980, p. 17) 
83Mohr (2005, p. 59) 
84Mohr (2005, p. 58) 
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and irreflexive, but also intransitive.85 There is nothing self-contradictory- or 
even paradoxical - about such an arrangement; it merely seems strange because 
that is not how we experience time. So granting that Timaeus refers to identifiable 
events, and posits some order amongst them, it does not follow that he presup-
poses time in our sense. This fact might do a better job of accounting for Timaeus' 
statement at the beginning of his speech (30a) that the god found "all that was 
visible- not at rest but in discordant and disorderly motion ... " This description 
might refer to a non-standard temporal succession as well as to a lack of purpose 
or order in the arrangements of bodies. But the best reading is that the disorder 
consists of the fact that there were no repetitive, orderly motions by which the 
others could be kept track of.86 Regular periods of some sort, which make it pos-
sible to keep track of how many such periods have passed between one event and 
another is, in Timaeus' view, what time is. If there is no way of doing this, there is 
no time. 
Zeyl 
Zeyl also raises problems about the idea of times having a beginning in his com-
mentary: 
Things that come to be, come to be "in" time. If time itself came to be, 
85Vlastos makes a similar distinction (1964, pp. 410-412). Similarly, Newton-Smith gives seven 
axia that define the "standard topology," that is, the structure time has if it resembles a straight 
line going to infinity in both directions. Remove one or more of these axia, and the result will no 
longer be what we ordinarily mean by "time" (1980, p. 52). This claim could also be put in terms of 
recent scientific theories as the claim that any solution of the field equations for General Relativity 
represents a possible situation, and (again) there are many such solutions for which "time" in our 
sense does not obtain. 
86Vlastos suggests roughly the same thing (1939, p. 390). 
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what did it come to be "in"? A higher-order time?87 
The issue Zeyl indicates is a deep philosophical challenge. But the fact that it is a 
deep point gives it less weight if used to challenge my reading of the Timaeus. For 
it is plausible that there are deep philosophical issues that Timaeus (and Plato) did 
not notice, or else, if he did notice them, did not succeed in resolving. It would be 
less plausible to claim that Timaeus (and Plato) either failed to notice or failed to 
resolve some issue that is neither deep nor difficult. Since this is a deep issue, it 
cannot be used to show that Timaeus (or Plato) was not a reductionist. 
Timaeus has a theory on which both all qualitative changes occurring in the 
visible world, and also all temporal changes, are really nothing but spatial motions. 
This is a bold and striking attempt to give a unified explanation for a very diverse 
set of phenomena. I now turn to the receptacle, which provides some explanation 
of the space in which spatial change occurs. 
2.5 The Receptacle 
We have now seen that Timaeus advances a general theory of change, claiming 
that all change is spatial motion. Its most interesting aspects deal with time and 
the receptacle, but these are precisely its most tantalizingly brief and obscure 
parts. The existence of this theory of change may also contribute to the debate 
over the nature of the "receptacle" that Timaeus introduces and briefly discusses 
(47e-53c). 
My goals in this section are very limited, as the debate over the receptacle is 
87Zeyl (2000, p. xliii) 
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too involved to enter here. I will introduce an argument that bears on the recep-
tacle's nature, and which so far as I know has not previously been recognized as 
relevant. Introducing this new argument will not decide the question, of course. 
In particular, I will not attempt here to decide how much weight to give the new 
argument compared with others already extant; I will do little more than explain 
the argument and how, taken by itself, it bears on the nature of the receptacle. 
Since Timaeus advances a position according to which all change consists of 
spatial motion, it follows that to explain change one has to explain spatial motion. 
It seems likely that the receptacle is introduced to answer some problem(s) about 
change. What problem this is, is far from clear. But by reducing all forms of change 
to spatial motion, the theory has reduced the problem of change to the problem of 
spatial motion. It seems likely that Timaeus considers this an advantage, since as 
he introduces the receptacle, he refers to economy as one of the main advantages 
in his account of the universe (49a).88 
Four types of theory have been advanced about the nature of the receptacle. 89 
Roughly, the receptacle has been thought to be (1) matter,90 (2) space,91 (3) both,92 
or (4) neither.93 If the receptacle has the connections I have alleged with the the-
88Brisson also notes the extreme economy ofTimaeus' account: "We are thus faced with a bru-
tal and radical compression or reduction of reality's extreme complexity. On every scale, from the 
domain of microscopic realities invisible to the naked eye to the gigantic objects considered by as-
tronomy, the only explanation of observable phenomena lies within the elementary components, 
which all obey the same mathematical laws:· (2003, p. 190). 
89For detailed descriptions of these types, see Miller (2003, Chapter I, pp. 19-36). The basic 
dichotomy of the dispute is also discussed by Algra (1995, p. 72 ff.). 
90This view has had few recent advocates, but was common in antiquity beginning with Aristo-
tle. For references see Miller (2003, pp. 20-24), Brisson (2003, pp. 113, 117, 122). 
91 Advocates include Mohr (2005, p. 84),Johansen (2004, Chapter 6, pp. 117-136), Robinson (2004, 
p. 12), Brisson (1994, p. 263), Comford (1937, p. 159), Taylor (1928, pp. 312-313). 
92 Advocates include Algra (1995, pp. 89-92), although he also claims the account is incoherent 
(p.78). 
93We might classify here those who claim the account is incoherent: Sayre (2003), Algra (1995, 
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ories of physical, chemical, biological and temporal change in the Timaeus, and 
these theories have the common goal of reducing their respective types of change 
to spatial motion, then this makes it more likely that the receptacle is meant to 
account for spatial motion. This consideration obviously tells in favor of theories 
identifying the receptacle with space. It is silent, however, about the concept of 
matter, so that we cannot judge at this stage whether this argument ultimately 
tells in favor of type 2 theories or type 3 theories.94 But the argument suggests 
that the main purpose of the receptacle is to account for space. 
Thomas Johansen has made a similar argument about the receptacle; the main 
difference in our positions is that I have claimed that the theory of change applies 
to a wider range of phenomena than he recognizes. But he too draws the lesson 
from the intertransformations of triangles, that the receptacle must be primarily 
space: 
.. .I have argued that the receptacle is presented as chOra primarily be-
cause of a spatial notion of coming-into-being. Coming-into-being is 
understood in terms of bodies, phenomenal or real, moving in and 
out of places. ChOra plays a double role in these transformations. Un-
derstood as a count noun, it is the particular places or spaces which 
bodies move to and from. Understood as a mass noun, chOra is generic 
place or space which bodies move to and from.95 
Now if change has been reduced to spatial motion, then Timaeus may wish to use 
the receptacle to explain something relevant to both space and motion. The ar-
gument should say, then, that the receptacle seems to be space, since space is the 
pp. 93-106). 
94Johansen adopts the same approach on this logical point (2004, p. 118). 
95Johansen (2004, p. 118) 
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first element of "spatial motion." It is less clear whether it should also say that 
the receptacle has any additional properties that would help account for motion, 
or whether it should hold that space on its own already (somehow) accounts for 
motion. 
Arriving at a clear view of what the receptacle is quickly raises deep and ex-
tremely difficult problems. Many of these arise from trying to clarify the concepts 
"matter" and "space." For Plato seems to use these concepts, and expressions 
implying them, in a non-technical way in the Timaeus.96 But the non-technical 
or common concepts are vague, so claims in which they occur are also rendered 
vague. Attempts to render them precise are slippery: while common-sense often 
takes "matter" and "space" to be mutually exclusive notions, more precise ver-
sions may well be compatible.97 So there are some versions of the concept "mat-
ter" which function the way "space" is thought to function (i.e., thought to func-
tion either by common sense, or by more precise concepts of "space"), and vice 
versa. Given these interpretations, one cannot claim- without considerable exe-
gesis - that the receptacle "is space," "is matter;' "is space and not matter," and 
so on, because by themselves such claims might mean almost anything. 
Although I will not try to give any general solution to these problems here, 
I will respond to two charges recently laid against the spatial interpretation by 
Algra. If either claim stands, then the view I advocate is ruled out from the start. 
So I will adopt the limited goal of refuting these two attacks. 
The first claim is that the "space-only" view of the receptacle is unable to pro-
duce any strong reason for not reading certain statements in the receptacle pas-
96Noted by Algra (1995, p. 118). 
97 Noted by Algra (1995, p. 83). 
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sage which make it sound (more) like matter (than it does like space). 
Now the spatial reading of the receptacle can point to the fact that Timaeus 
calls it space (xwpa) explicitly (52a8, b4, 52d3, and possibly 53a6), while there is no 
similar use of any term that can be translated as "matter."98 The most important 
passages that suggest the receptacle is, or is also, matter are the following: 
Suppose you were molding gold into every shape there is, going on 
nonstop remolding one shape into the next. If someone then were to 
point at one of them and ask you, "What is it? ;• your safest answer by 
far, with respect to truth, would be to say, "gold;' but never "triangle" 
or any of the other shapes that come to be in the gold, as though it is 
these, because they change even while you're making the statement. 
(50a5-b4) 
Its nature is to be available for anything to make its impression 
upon (EKllayEiov yap cpuoEtnavti KEi-rat), and it is modified (KtVOUl.lE-
vov), shaped, and reshaped by the things that enter it. These are the 
things that make it appear different at different times. (50c2-4) 
... the most correct way to speak of it may well be this: the part of it 
that gets ignited appears on each occasion as fire, the dampened part 
as water, and parts as earth or air insofar as they receive the imitations 
of these. (Slb3-6) 
Each of these passages is most easily read as saying that the receptacle is some-
thing like prime matter, a stuff with no properties of its own that serves as a sub-
strate for properties. The picture that emerges is like one common conception of 
Aristotle's account of ordinary things as combinations of form and matter. The 
receptacle, on this view, would be something analogous to modeling clay or wax 
that can be molded into anything if the right properties are added to it. 
Algra rightly points out that this kind of reading is easily applied to these pas-
sages. But he overstates the difficulty that this creates for the spatial view of the 
98Noted by Johansen (2004, p. 117). 
receptacle: 
... it would certainly need some arguing to prove that this is not what 
he [sc. Plato] tried to convey by metaphorical descriptions like ek-
mageion ('moulding stuff' or 'wax-tablet'), or meter ('mother'), or the 
periphrastic ex hou occurring in the gold analogy. Especially the lat-
ter expression can hardly be taken otherwise than as referring to a 
material constituent.99 
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Algra overstates the case for the material reading here. For the passage says plainly 
and repeatedly that the receptacle is space (xwpcx), while the sections that make 
it sound like matter are metaphorical, or are images meant to serve as analogies. 
But Algra gives both kinds of statement equal weight. 
The passages that seem to point to a concept of matter are all metaphorical, 
so it requires argument to show that Timaeus' point in each (or in any) of them 
is that the receptacle is matter. After all, every analogy and metaphor includes 
many features that are not the point of the trope. To take one of these as essential 
is to misunderstand the trope. 
The examples are all chosen to emphasize the fact that the receptacle cannot 
be identified with the properties it receives: in the first, the point is that we should 
call the golden triangle "gold" rather than "a triangle" because "gold" is the con-
stant that underlies each of the shapes it receives. But it does not follow from this 
example that the gold represents matter here.100 If we carry Timaeus' analogy 
farther, and ask of some real object before us what we should say it is, the answer 
99 Algra (1995, p. 85) 
100Mohr also makes this point (2005, p. 93). For further reasons that the gold analogy does not 
support a reading of the receptacle as matter, see johansen (2004, p. 122 n. 8). 
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should be "the receptacle."101 Timaeus has not mentioned matter, and further, 
he has mentioned the receptacle. In order to answer "matter," we would have to 
know in advance that the receptacle is matter; but this is precisely the question at 
issue. 
The two passages cited above after the example of gold may seem harder to 
explain, for in these Timaeus says more directly that it is the receptacle itself that 
is "modified, shaped, and reshaped." But again, it does not follow from these state-
ments that the receptacle is matter. What follows is only the much weaker infer-
ence that, on the assumption that there must be matter somewhere in Timaeus' 
physics, then since the receptacle is the most matter-like thing in his system, the 
receptacle must be playing this role. But whether Timaeus thinks he needs matter 
in his system is not at all clear. For one might also think that when he describes 
the receptacle as being "modified, shaped, and reshaped," he attributes these pro-
cesses to the receptacle precisely in order to avoid acknowledging any matter in 
his physics.102 
In particular, Timaeus' claim that the receptacle lacks any determinate prop-
erties may be sufficient to explain these descriptions. For if he had said that the 
receptacle merely contained the properties that objects have, he would have been 
guilty of attributing the determinate property of emptiness or spatiality to it. 
Timaeus' approach seems analogous to negative theology: he attempts to say some-
101 Mohr makes the same point, i.e. that the answer to the same question outside the gold analogy 
would be 'the receptacle' (2005, p. 102). 
102 Algra, for example, cites as a common presupposition about matter the claim that "matter is 
corporeal," and also denies that this claim is necessarily true (1995, p. 84). But he does not explain 
what this means, and I do not see how to make sense of it. What would the alternatives to this 
claim be? That it is incorporeal? It would be helpful, at the least, to spell out some of the claims 
that are supposed to follow from this. My point is just that without a clear concept of matter, it is 
hard to make progress in deciding whether Timaeus' speech refers to or suggests such a thing. 
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thing about the receptacle, but also to deny any definite property that it begins to 
(seem to) have. His goal is to emphasize its indeterminacy, and thereby its recep-
tivity- yet without claiming simply that it has the property of being receptive. For 
if it had this property, it would not be able to receive the opposite of this. And he 
wants the receptacle to receive all properties equally. 
Algra's other claim about the viability of the spatial reading is that Plato has 
two modes of presentation of the receptacle - one like space, the other like matter 
- and that these are incompatible. The issue is that matter is inseparable from 
the object that is formed from it, while space is separable from an object moving 
through it.103 Thus, even if one thinks the receptacle is both space and matter, one 
cannot think it is both separable and inseparable from objects. 
However, if we accept the spatial reading of the receptacle proposed above, 
there will be no inconsistency on the question of whether the receptacle is sepa-
rable from objects. 
I think Algra is right to point out that two levels of explanation are involved in 
the receptacle passage, a metaphysical one and a physical one.104 At the metaphys-
ical level, it functions as something that instantiates properties from the Forms; at 
the physical level it functions as space through which bodies move. But I suggest 
that in dividing levels, Algra has absolved Timaeus from contradiction, although 
not from obscurity. Of course Timaeus does not succeed in showing how the re-
ceptacle is able to function in both ways relative to both roles it plays. But to see 
that it does play two roles helps to explain the source of the obscurity, as well as 
to show that the inconsistency is not incoherence. 
103For Algra's explanation of the problem see Algra (1995, pp. 93-102). 
104 Algra (1995, p. 102) 
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Timaeus thus wants to maintain his explanation of the world from two points 
of view. First, the theory of Forms continues in force, on which phenomenal things 
are images of the eternal Forms. Second, however, the properties and transforma-
tions of phenomenal things get a much more detailed explanation in the Timaeus 
than they have enjoyed before. Timaeus shows how all forms of phenomenal 
change are forms of spatial change, and he provides the receptacle/space as an 
explanation of what makes spatial change possible. 
Another way of describing Timaeus' inconsistency may also be illuminating. 
The Form-theory describes how it is that objects have properties in a static way. 
This is to be expected, since the Forms do not move or change: no explanation 
using them as the explanans could account for change. At the same time, Timaeus' 
account also tells us that when an object comes to have a property, this is also due 
to spatial movements on the part of its constituent triangles.105 These motions ac-
count for the facts that the object did not earlier have this property, that the object 
keeps the property for as long as it does, and that the object eventually loses the 
property. From this perspective, I suggest that the receptacle's contribution to 
the theory pertains more to explaining change than it does to explaining partic-
ipation in a Form. Participation was always obscure, and it may be relevant that 
reading the receptacle as matter does not render it a bit clearer: this is evidence 
that Timaeus does not intend it to explain participation. Reading the receptacle as 
space, however, makes the rest of the theory of change clearer in that it explains 
why there is space in which movement can take place. 
I will close this section with two suggestions about other facets of the recep-
105The double aspect (i.e. describing phenomena as both static images and in flux) is noted for 
the gold analogy by Mohr (2005, pp. 101-102). 
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tacle theory. 
First, why does Timaeus think he needs to introduce the receptacle at all? One 
answer, of course, is that it allows him to give much more detailed and powerful 
explanations of changes in the phenomenal realm. I suggest that at the metaphys-
ical level, he may also think that if he leaves only the Forms and the images in his 
ontology, this may suggest that the images have being in their own right. For it 
is part of the theory of Forms that participants cannot get enough being from the 
Forms to make them independent or to exist in their own right. But while all (or 
most) individual visible things will eventually perish, the realm of the visible as 
a whole might be left looking permanent. How could it do that when it lacks the 
kind of being that keeps the Forms permanently in existence? This might suggest 
the usefulness of positing the third kind. Timaeus is able to say that it exists per-
manently: thus the visible things that come to be in it clearly do not have the kind 
of independent existence granted to the Forms. Nor even does the entire realm of 
the visible as a whole have existence in its own right. 
Second, some of the strangeness of the receptacle may be accounted for by the 
fact that it cannot be identical with, or possess any property that is represented 
by a Form. As Timaeus points out, if it had any such property it would be unable 
to do a good job of receiving the opposite property. But there is a Form for every 
property; it follows that the receptacle must be {literally) Form-less, having no 
properties at all.106 The one exception to this may be spatiality, if I am right that 
the receptacle is space. Further, the receptacle cannot have any of the properties 
106Even if there is not a Form for every property, it is still true that the receptacle cannot have 
any properties. For example, suppose there is no Form for ice because ice is just a combination of 
water and cold; then the receptacle cannot be watery or cold, and it follows that it cannot be icy 
either. So it cannot have any property, even those for which there is no Form. 
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that the Forms have generically, either: it cannot be changeless, for example. This 
may help account for the fact that Timaeus cannot give any simple description 
of it, and keeps changing the way he describes it as if he is dissatisfied with what 
he has said so far in his account. These constraints may make Timaeus guilty of 
giving an incoherent or contradictory account. But my concern at the moment 
is not to defend his account as consistent, but only to point out some constraints 
that may explain why the account turns out to have (roughly) the features it has. 
2.6 An Objection 
The Unified Theory 
I next discuss an objection to my reading of the Kinetic Theory, an objection deny-
ing that the theory succeeds in simplifying the ontology of the visible world down 
to the single property of spatial motion. The elemental theory shows that all 
properties except spatial motion are unreal, leaving spatial motion the only phe-
nomenon in its ontology of the visible world. So, for example, the property being 
wine does not involve any essence of wine, if"essence" means something over and 
above having the right arrangement of ultimate constituent triangles. This the-
ory allows Plato to claim that what it is to be wine is just to be a certain mixture 
of water and fire. Water, in turn, is just icosahedra, and an icosahedron is just a 
certain arrangement of a certain number of a certain kind of triangle. On this the-
ory, then, complex properties in the visible world consist of nothing more than 
simpler spatial properties, freeing the theory of all entities, relations, and prop-
erties that cannot be reduced in this way. It is reductionist in the strong sense of 
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excising all putative properties from its ontology of the visible world except the 
one it treats as basic. 
Consider now the conjunction of the Kinetic Theory and the claim found in the 
Phaedrus and Laws, that souls are the source of motion for everything else. That is, 
souls are both sources of their own spatial motions, and also sources of the spatial 
motions of visible items. I will call this the Unified Theory, since it combines the 
Kinetic Theory with the Self-Mover Theory. 
On the Unified Theory, souls, by serving as sources of spatial motion for other 
items, also become sources of all the properties of visible items. Let us say, for 
the sake of terminological convenience, that souls are directly the source of spatial 
motions, and indirectly the source of other properties. So for example, whenever 
some liquid becomes wine, this is due to some water and some fire moving spa-
tially so that the right mixture comes into being. The Unified Theory says that a 
soul (or souls) was the source of these spatial motions, having spatial motions of 
its own and transmitting them to the water and fire.107 That soul, however, does 
not have the property of being wine within itself, and so cannot transmit this prop-
erty to the water and fire. 108 It suffices that it transmits spatial motions, and those 
st5atial motions result in the right mixture's coming into being.109 
1071 assume that it makes no difference whether the soul transmitted the motions directly to the 
water and fire, or only distally, via a chain of transmission that travelled among several entities 
before the motions were transferred to the water and fire. I see nothing in Timaeus' account that 
rules out either case. 
108 A further reason that souls cannot have properties like being wine within themselves: being 
wine means being a certain mixture of water and fire, and therefore being a certain mixture of 
triangles arranged in certain ways. But souls do not consist of triangles at all, and so are incapable 
of satisfying the conditions for being wine. 
109Note that it makes no difference whether the souls intended to create wine or to do something 
completely different. The theory does not claim that souls always know the results that their 
transmission of spatial motions will bring about. Second, the case in which two or more souls each 
provide a source of spatial motions, and the combination of all these motions causes water and 
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Objection: Of How Many Properties are Souls the Sources? 
The objection says that the unified theory makes souls the source not just of spatial 
motions, but of every other property as well. If wine is just a certain mixture of 
water and fire, and these in turn are nothing but certain spatial arrangements, 
then souls are sources of everything required for something to be wine. That is, 
there is no property, entity, or relation that a thing needs in order to be wine, and 
of which souls are not the source. So souls should count as the source of being wine 
just as much as they are the source of spatial motion. 
Insofar as the objection turns on a difficult metaphysical issue, namely what 
properties a reductionist theory is committed to recognizing, there is no need to 
argue here that Timaeus (or Plato) has the right analysis of the problem. If the 
objection succeeds, showing that the elemental theory is committed to making 
souls sources of every property, it is still the case that souls are only sources of all 
those properties in the sense that the elemental theory recognizes those proper-
ties at all. That is, since the theory holds that being wine is just having a certain 
spatial arrangement of ultimate constituent parts, then if souls are the source of 
the property being wine, this only means that they are the source of something's 
coming to have a certain spatial arrangement of ultimate constituent parts. Noth-
fire to become wine, shows perhaps more clearly that the theory can dispense with essences or 
properties that reside within souls or within visible items. For if there were a property-instance 
like being wine, which could exist inside a soul and be transmitted to a visible thing, making it into 
wine, then if a group of souls each provided some of the motions necessary for bringing water and 
fire together to produce wine, presumably it would suffice for any one of those souls to transmit 
the property being wine to the mixture to make it wine. If the other souls transmitted the same 
property, it would be superfluous. Worse, it would seem that the spatial motions themselves might 
be superfluous too - if something has the property being wine, then it is wine, regardless of what 
arrangement its parts are in. So not only does Timaeus' elemental theory not need additional 
properties such as being wine, it would cause trouble to introduce them. Properties such as these 
reside among the Forms, and do all the work they need do from that location. 
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ing has been added to the description of what souls are or contain by adding the 
claim that they are, for example, sources of the property being wine. The objec-
tion therefore accomplishes less than it promised, showing only that if souls are 
sources of properties other than spatial motions, these properties have no inde-
pendent status that the Unified Theory is forced to recognize. The Unified Theory 
is thus free to maintain that souls are the source of spatial motions, and that the 
visible world consists of spatial motions and nothing more.U0 
2. 7 Conclusion 
A plausible motivation for the Kinetic Theory is the Self-Mover Theory, that is, 
the claim that all changes are traceable back to a soul or souls. In the Phaedo, for 
example, Socrates claims that "the soul resembles the divine" (Phaedo 80a8) and 
"the nature of the divine is to rule and to lead ... " (Phaedo 80a4). A version of the 
same claim survives to be repeated in the Laws: 
Athenian: It's the soul, my good friend, that nearly everybody seems 
to have misunderstood, not realizing its nature and power .. .It is one of 
the first creations, born long before all physical things, and is the chief 
cause of all their alterations and transformations. (892a2-7, emphasis 
in Saunders' translation) 
110Perhaps the elemental theory also renders the relations between visible items and Forms 
somewhat more clear, by showing that visible items have no properties or entities within them-
selves that explain their relations to the Forms. Whatever explains those relations, then, must 
come from elsewhere. This is what we should have expected, since locating some stable property 
or entity within a visible item, on whose strength the visible thing's participation in a Form would 
be explained, would give visible items a source of stability inconsistent with claims familiar from 
the theory of Forms about the instability of the visible world. 
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Timaeus' program of reducing all forms of change to spatial motion may be 
an attempt to reduce the general problem of understanding change to the better-
defined, smaller problem of understanding motion through space. Since knowl-
edge of geometry was much more advanced than that of chemistry, biology or 
physics in Plato's time, this was a promising proposal. just as one prominent re-
search program in cognitive science today attempts to reduce the hard problem 
of understanding consciousness to the better-understood problem of understand-
ing computational algorithms, the program in the Timaeus is an attempt to reduce 
the hard problem of understanding change in general to the (at the time) better-
understood problem of understanding motion through space. This latter prob-
lem was being addressed by geometry with much success in Plato's time. Anyone 
looking for a research program to understand change in general in Plato's time 
had good reason to settle on this one. Since the Timaeus contains all the elements 
of this program, it is plausible that Plato was aware of it, considered it promising, 
and wanted to further it. 
Chapter 3 
Kinesis as Spatial Motion 
Three of Plato's dialogues contain the claim that souls move- whatever this may 
mean - and, further, the claim that they move themselves, the dialogues in ques-
tion being the Phaedrus, Laws, and Timaeus. Perhaps because these three dialogues 
speak only briefly of these ideas, and apparently differ from one another on cer-
tain other, closely related questions, scholars have rarely given these passages sus-
tained attention. Thus, the most basic contribution I hope to make in this chapter 
is to show that detailed argument based on textual evidence can make progress 
on these questions. The result of this inattention, I shall argue in this chapter, has 
been two mistakes in the received scholarly picture of what Plato's dialogues say 
on this point. First, of those who have commented on the issue at all, many writers 
have endorsed the wrong interpretation of"motion" (K{vf]otc;) in these passages, 
taking it as a metaphor, image, or otherwise shorthand expression for "change" in 
general,! Second, it has been tacitly assumed that the ideas expressed about souls 
1For example, Burnyeat and Levett (1990, p.311 n.36), Urmson (1990, p.90), Ostenfeld (1989, 
p.324), Griswold (1986, p.85), Ritter et al. (1971, Vol. I, column 866). 
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and motions in the Phaedrus, Laws, and Timaeus are found only in those dialogues. 2 
With respect to the first mistake, I shall argue that the best reading of "motion" 
in these passages is "locomotion," "motion through space," rather than "change" 
in general,3 Regarding the second, I shall argue that the Statesman also contains 
a passage whose claims logically imply that the soul of the Demiurge moves spa-
tially. So the claims about souls moving (spatially) are not limited to the three 
obvious cases. 
I begin with the Phaedrus and Laws, since these texts say explicitly that souls 
are self-movers, allowing my argument to focus merely on showing that the sense 
of "motion" involved is spatial rather than generic. The Timaeus never says explic-
itly that souls are self-movers, so my argument here will focus on showing that 
Timaeus' speech implies this view, and also that the sense of"motion" involved is 
spatial, the latter claim relatively easy to demonstrate. Finally, the myth told by 
the Stranger in the Statesman logically implies that at least some souls are in spatial 
motion, so my argument will focus on showing how this claim is implied by the 
text.4 
2The view I shall argue for here, that a single conception of motion is found in more than these 
three dialogues, is new, so far as I am aware: it is neither affirmed nor denied by any author, except 
by implication. Miller, in his recent survey of Platonic psychology, discusses only these three dia-
logues for the idea of self-motion (2006, pp.289-292). Robinson denies that those three dialogues 
even contain the same concept of self-motion: Robinson (1995b, pp.133, 146-148, and 151). He also 
denies that the sense of"motion" is spatial: Robinson (1995b, p.151). Skemp notes that it has been 
commonly thought that the theory of forms is Plato's only significant metaphysical claim. Skemp 
wishes to add the theory of motion to this list, but denies that the sense of "motion" involved is 
spatial: Skemp (1942, pp.ix-xi, 21 and 86). 
3Sedley (1997, pp.329-330) and Barnes (1979, p.118) (writing about the Phaedrus only) have also 
argued that these claims refer to locomotion rather than change in general. 
4For discussion of some general interpretive issues related to this chapter, see the Introduction, 
page 8. 
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The Generic Reading of KtVflcrt<; 
A number of writers say that Plato's use of KlVfJcnc; means "change" in a generic 
sense, and this can seem obviously right when reading certain passages.5 Here 
I provide an example of such a reading, since its author, Miles Burnyeat, spells 
out the reasoning by which he arrives at it. Since most authors who endorse this 
reading elsewhere do not explain their thinking, I will assume that they too follow 
something like this train of thought. Burnyeat is discussing the following passage 
in the Theaetetus: 
Socrates: Here then is one form of motion [i.e. spatial movment]. 
Then supposing a thing remains in the same place, but grows old, or 
becomes black instead of white, or hard instead of soft, or undergoes 
any other alteration; isn't it right to say that here we have motion 
(Ktv~crewc;) in another form? 
Theodorus: Unquestionably. 
Socrates: Then I now have two forms of motion (Ktv~crewc;), alter-
ation and spatial movement. 
Burnyeat comments: 
In the above passage the words kinesis, kineisthai, translated 'motion', 
'be in motion', take on a wider sense than they would normally have. 
5Those expressing the opinion that Plato's use of Jdvr]ot<; is generic include Urmson (1990, p.90), 
Ostenfeld (1989, p.324), Griswold (1986, p.85) and Ritter et al. (1971, Vol. I, column 866). With 
respect to Theaetetus 181c-d, those describing spatial motion and alteration as species of change 
include Chappell (2004, p. 138), Sedley (2004, p. 92), Cooper (1967, p. 90) and Heitsch (1988, p. 45). 
Those describing the two as species of motion in this passage (but without further comment on the 
conception of motion): Polansky (1992, pp. 156-157), Desjardins (1990, pp. 95-97): so it is likely 
that all the authors listed think of l<tVr]ot<; as "change" in a generic sense. Skemp alone relates 
this passage to the Timaeus' claim that "all these alterations are reducible ultimately to forms of 
locomotion ... " (Skemp 1942, p. 12). 
Normally they would signify some kind of movement, especially spa-
tial movement, but the Heraclitean philosophy makes the flowing move-
ment of a river the symbol of change in general and change in general 
is what 'motion' becomes when alteration is subsumed under it ... (Burnyeat 
and Levett 1990, p.311 n.36, emphasis added) 
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Now Burnyeat's reasoning is sensible with regard to this passage in isolation, but I 
shall argue that the same reasoning goes astray if applied to passages in the Phae-
drus, Laws, Timaeus, or Statesman. Notice for the moment that Burnyeat's argument 
assumes that alteration is not a form of spatial movement; should alteration be ex-
plained as spatial movement, as the Kinetic Theory does, Burnyeat's argument will 
be invalid. However, I shall not rely on the existence of the Kinetic Theory when 
I examine the passages at issue in this chapter; I shall instead argue that evidence 
from within each passage entails that K{VT(<n<; means "spatial movement" rather 
than "change" in general. 
3.1 Phaedrus 245c-246a 
A short passage near the center of the Phaedrus, running from 245c5-246a2, con-
tains the claims that souls are in motion and are self-movers. Earlier in the dia-
logue, Socrates has delivered a speech on love, in which he claimed that one should 
prefer suitors not in love to those in love, on the ground that love is a kind of mad-
ness. He now wishes to retract that statement, partly in the belief that he has 
offended the god of love, partly, perhaps, as a way of leading Phaedrus toward 
philosophy.6 So the announced purpose of his second speech is to defend love as 
6Note that, although Socrates' two speeches contradict one another on some points, such as 
whether love is advantageous, the first speech contains no claims about the nature of soul. So while 
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a form of "divine madness:' Socrates begins this second speech by mentioning 
other forms of divine madness: the priestesses at Delphi and Dodona are success-
ful only when mad, as are poets and those who succeed in divining the causes 
of divine anger against certain families. Having introduced his subject, Socrates 
next announces that he must begin by explaining the truth about "the nature of 
soul, both divine and human, by observing experiences and actions belonging to 
it" (245c2-4). 
The Text 
The passage I shall be discussing follows: 
'l'ux~ ncxoa &:eavat:oc;. 't'O yap aEtKlVYJ't'OV &:eavat:ov· 't'O B' cfA.'Ao Kt-
vouv Kai tire' aA'Aou KtvOlJ}lEVOV, rcau'Aav EXOV KlVJlO'EWc;, rcau'Aav EXEt 
~wfjc;.}JOVOV 8~ 't'O aut:o KtvOUV, at:E OUK arco'AEircov Eaut:6, OUTCO't'E 'Ar1-
yEt KtvOU}lEVOV, aA'Aa Kat t:oic; a'A.Aotc; OO'a KtvEit:at 't'OU't'O TCT]~ Kat apx~ 
KlVJlO'EWc;. apx~ BE: ayEVYJ't'OV. €~ apxfjc; yap avayKYJ mxv 't'O ytyvO}lEVOV 
yiyveo9at, au~v BE: llYJB' €~ E:v6c;· Ei yap EK 't'OU ap~ yiyvott:O, OUK av En 
apx~ yiyvott:O. fTCEtB~ BE: ayEvYJ't'OV f:onv, Kai &:Btacp9opov aut:o aV<i:yKYJ 
dvat. apxfjc; yap B~ aTCOAO}lEVYJc; OU't'E aut:Jlrcot:E EK 't'OU OU't'E aA'Ao €~ 
fKElVYJc; YEVJlO'Et:at, EircEp €~ apxfjc; Bei 'tel rcavt:a yiyveo9at. OU't'W B~ Kt-
VJlO'EWc; }lEV apx~ 't'O aut:o aut:o KtVOUV. 't'OU't'O BE: out:' arc6A'Auo9at OU't'E 
yiyveo9at Buvat:6v, ~ rcavt:a 't'E oupavov rcaoav 't'E yfjv Eic; EV O'U}lTCEO'O-
uoav O"t'fjvat Kai }lrlTCO't'E aMtc; ExEtv oaev KtvT]9Evt:a YEVJlO'E't'at. &:eava-
't'OU 8E: TCEcpaO}lEVOU 't'OU ucp' EaUt:OU KtvOU}lEVOU, lJJuxfjc; ouoiav 't'E Kai 
Myov 't'OU't'OV aut:6v nc; AEyWV OUK aioxuvEit:at. rcav yap O'W}la, 4> }lEv 
E~W9EV 't'O KtvEio9at, alJJuxov, 4> 8E: £v8o9Ev aut:cf> €~ aut:ou, E}llVUXOV, 
we; t:aUt:T]c; OVOYJc; cpuoewc; lJJuxfjc;· Ei 8' EO'TIV 't'OU't'O out:wc; EXOV, ll~ aA'Ao 
n dvat 't'O aut:o EaUt:O KtvOUV ~ lJJuxJ1v, €~ avayKYJc; ayEvYJ't'OV 't'E Kai 
a9avat:ov lJJux~ liv ElYJ. (245c5-246a2) All soul is immortal. For that 
which is always in movement is immortal; that which moves some-
there is room to question Socrates' commitment to some of what he says in the second speech, on 
the ground that it contradicts his earlier one, nothing in the proof passage (245c5-246a2) contra-
dicts anything said in the first speech. This, at least, is not a reason for wondering whether Socrates 
means what he says in this section. 
thing else, and is moved by something else, in ceasing from move-
ment ceases from living. So only that which moves itself, because it 
does not abandon itself, never stops moving. But it is also source and 
first principle of movement for the other things which move. Now a 
first principle is something which does not come into being. For all 
that comes into being must come into being from a first principle, but 
a first principle itself cannot come into being from anything at all; for 
if a first principle came into being from anything, it would not do so 
from a first principle. Since it is something that does not come into 
being, it must also be something which does not perish. For if a first 
principle is destroyed, neither will it ever come into being from any-
thing itself nor will anything else come into being from it, given that 
all things must come into being from a first principle. It is in this way, 
then, that that which moves itself is a first principle of movement. It 
is not possible for this either to be destroyed or to come into being, 
or else the whole universe and the whole of that which comes to be 
might collapse together and come to a halt, and never again have a 
source from which things will be moved and come to be. And since 
that which is moved by itself has been shown to be immortal, it will 
incur no shame to say that this is the essence and definition of soul. 
For all body which has its source of motion outside itself is soulless, 
whereas that which has it within itself, from itself, is ensouled, this 
being the nature of soul; and if this is the way it is - that that which 
moves itself is nothing other than soul - then soul will necessarily be 
something that neither comes into being nor dies. (Rowe's transla-
tion) 
The Structure of the Proof 
I analyze the proof's logical structure as follows.7 
1. Soul is that which is its own source of motion. 
2. That which is its own source of motion is immortal. 
160 
7My analysis follows that ofBett (1986) at the general level. I differ from him on certain details, 
some of which I will discuss later. For other analyses, see Blyth (1997, esp. p. 194 nn. 18-19), 
Robinson (1995b, pp. 111-119), Heitsch (1993, pp. 105-109) and Hackforth (1952, pp. 63-68). 
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3. Therefore, soul is immortal.8 
The text presents these steps in reverse order, stating the conclusion first (245c5), 
then arguing for Step (2) from 245c5-e2, finally arguing for Step (1) from 245e3-246al. 
The conclusion of the entire argument is stated at 246a1-2. In addition, the proof 
provides two independent arguments for Step 2, the first claiming that a self-
mover is immortal because to stop moving would be to abandon its own nature, 
the second claiming that a self-mover is immortal because it is a principle of mo-
tion for all else that is moved. 
In Chapter 4 I will argue that the proof does not, as is commonly assumed, 
reach the conclusion that individual souls are immortal, but rather claims that 
"soul-stuff," the material from which individual souls are constructed, is immor-
tal. 
KtVYJ<n<; as Spatial Motion 
Phaedrus 245c5-246a2 is inconsistent if KlVTJotc; is read as generic change. As I ar-
gue for this claim, I shall assume that KtvEiv ("to move") and related words have 
a single sense throughout this passage, so that Socrates does not make the ele-
mentary mistake of equivocation. My argument does not depend on the ques-
tions most often raised about this passage, such as the meaning of \jJvxit niioa 
("all soul") at c5,9 whether to read aEtKlVTJt'OV ("always-moving") or aut'oKiVTJt'OV 
8Bett (1986, p. 3) 
9For discussion of this point, see Nicholson (1999, pp. 156-157), Blyth (1997, pp. 186-187), Rowe 
(1986, p. 174), Bett (1986, pp. 12-15), Robinson (1995b, p. 111), Griswold (1986, p. 84), De Vries 
(1969, p. 121), Hackforth (1952, pp. 64-65). Hackforth and Bett argue that if this phrase is meant 
as a "mass term" or as a kind of"soul-stuff" it will follow that whatever is true of soul-stuff will be 
true of individual souls. However, I will argue in Chapter 4 that this inference is invalid. 
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("self-moving") at cs, 10 or exactly how the details of the proof work. 
At various points, the proof claims that "soul" falls into the category of TO auTo 
Ktvouv ("what moves itself;' 245c7), To auTo auTo Ktvouv ("what itself moves it-
self;' 245d7), Tou ucp' E:a:uTou Ktvou~£vou ("what is moved by itself;' 245e3), and 
TO auTo E:a:uTo Ktvouv ("what itself moves itself;' 245e7-246al): four instances of 
nearly the same formula. Since Socrates calls this "the essence and the definition 
of soul" (\jJuxfj<; oucria:v n: Ka:i "A6yov, 245e3),11 it is important to understand KtVE-
iv, whose most basic meaning indicates movement through spaceY For there is a 
large difference between classifying souls as "self-locomotors" and "self-changers," 
and no author has so far asked what happens when these readings are applied 
specifically to each claim using "KtVfJcrt<; (and related terms). This experiment will 
force us to reject the more general reading, "change:' 
100n this point see Blyth (1997, p. 195 n. 22), Robinson (1995b, pp. 111-112), Bett (1986, p. 4 n. 
6), De Vries (1969, pp. 121-122), Hackforth (1952, p. 65). Following the arguments of most recent 
scholars, I will read a£lKtvrrrov below, but my arguments would go through with the alternative 
just as well. 
11The word Myov in this phrase may also mean "account:' Adopting this translation would 
mean that "what moves itself" is not a definition of soul but (merely) a description, a somewhat 
weaker claim, but still significant, and still requiring us to decide between the two readings at issue 
here. 
12Liddell et al. (1996, s.v. KlVEW, Alla, B1). Ostenfeld writes, "self-motion is physical motion;' 
implying that he means motion through space. In the same article, however, he takes KtVT]ou; to 
mean change in general, so which position he intends to endorse is not clear. (Ostenfeld 1989, pp. 
324-325, 327). Several writers do not take a position on this question, although their word choice 
suggests one or the other. Hackforth, for example, consistently uses "motion" and "move;' but 
never says definitely that he intends spatial movement rather than change in general. (Hackforth 
1955, pp. 64-68) Rowe writes, "Being moved, as is implicit in the whole argument, is a specific kind 
of' coming into being' or change." I take it Rowe means movement through space when he writes 
"being moved;' but the sentence might also be read as saying that "being moved" is something 
more specific than "change" in the most general sense, but broader than just spatial motion. (Rowe 
1986, p. 176 ad d7-e2) Robinson, contrasting the Phaedrus with the Phaedo, says, "Now [sc. in the 
Phaedrus] soul is seen as the source of motion or activity ... ", suggesting that he favors the more 
general reading. (Robinson 1995b, p. 114, emphasis added). 
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Step 1 
The text presents the claims in reverse order, but I will discuss them in their logical 
order, as parsed above on page 160. Let us begin with Socrates' claim that "all body 
which has its source of motion (to Ktveio8at, eS) from outside is soulless, whereas 
that which has it from within, from itself, is ensouled, this being the nature of 
soul..." (245e4-6, Rowe's translation, modified). 
This claim occurs late in the passage, forming part of the argument for Step 1, 
the claim that soul is identical with that which is its own source of motion. This 
is the part of the proof (245e3-246a1) with the fewest metaphysical and logical 
entanglements, so it is relatively easy to decide which sense to apply here. That is, 
the claim that soul is its own source of motion receives no argument in this passage 
other than the empirical observation just quoted - bodies have a source of motion 
within themselves if and only if they are alive. Socrates treats this observation as 
unproblematic, making it easy to evaluate which sense of KlVTJOt<; to apply here. 
Applying the two competing readings, this statement means one of the following: 
• All body which has its source of spatial motion from outside is soulless, whereas 
that which has its source of spatial motion from within is ensouled. 
• All body which has its source of change from outside is soulless, whereas that 
which has its source of change from within is ensouled. 
Socrates speaks as if it is both possible and easy to distinguish living from non-
living bodies by observing whether they move themselves. The first reading of 
this criterion refers to just one kind of change, making it both clear and easy to 
apply, whereas the second uses the general concept of "change;' encompassing 
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any and all forms of change, and rendering it unclear how it would be applied 
in any particular case.13 Generality renders the second version unclear and thus 
also unusable. Now Socrates does not justify this claim at all - indeed, he does 
not even explain it. He seems to regard it as axiomatic, something Phaedrus will 
accept without argument. This treatment points to reading "motion" as "spatial 
motion." 
To explain further. It is easy to observe whether a body causes its own locomo-
tion, provided we stick to common sense and don't put too fine a point on things. 
Intuitively, my dog lies down for a nap after eating because he feels sleepy and 
wants to, while another dog down the street runs at me when I pass because he 
doesn't like me. Each has a source of spatial motion from within, supporting my 
belief that they are alive. My book, on the other hand, fell off the table because an 
earthquake shook the table; since the source of its spatial motion lay outside itself, 
I do not think the book is alive. These observations suggest that Socrates is talking 
about the difference between having a source of spatial motion within oneself and 
receiving spatial motions from outside oneself. But if he means "change" rather 
than "locomotion," the criterion is unclear and hard to apply: is the source of that 
piece of iron's rusting within itself or outside it? The iron is rusting partly be-
cause of the kind of material composing it, and partly because of its contact with 
the air. The principle yields no answer in this case, nor in many others, because 
13Note that the suggestion that "motion" means something like "spiritual motion" or "psychic 
change;· and nothing more, cannot be applied here, since in this passage Socrates is discussing 
some kind of motion/change that both souls and bodies can have. If "motion" means "psychic 
change" plus some kind of physical change, then the problem we are discussing remains, that is, 
we must still ask which kind of physical change is meant. Finally, note that the generic reading 
includes the spatial reading, so it is not possible to give a reading on which "motion" means both 
spatial motion and generic change; such a reading reduces to the generic one, and will have all the 
problems that rule it out. 
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"change" is too general. Consider again the two dogs, this time using "change" as 
our criterion. As before, the dog runs at me because he has a source of spatial mo-
tion within himself. But since our criterion is now broader, this does not yet tell 
us whether the dog is alive. We also need to look at other changes the dog is un-
dergoing: he is getting hungry, perceiving me, and growing older, 14 to take only a 
few examples. The hunger seems to come from within, the perception of me from 
without, and growing older is (as far as I can see) indeterminate. This case will 
be typical of most: using "change" as a criterion gives contradictory answers, and 
sometimes gives no obvious answer at all. 
The moral is that if we try to figure out which objects cause their own changes, 
we run into theoretical problems more difficult than those this criterion was sup-
posed to solve. To make this test give the expected answers about which things are 
alive, Socrates will have to supply some further criterion for distinguishing which 
things have their source of growing older within themselves, and so on. By now 
the point should be clear: most changes one might pick out are like getting older: 
they will be of no use at all in distinguishing living from non-living things. Spatial 
motion, however, works easily for the purpose to which Socrates puts it here. In 
other words, only on the reading of "motion" as "locomotion" has Socrates said 
something that Phaedrus and the reader can accept as reasonably clear without 
immediately requiring a great deal of additional theory. Socrates treats this as-
sertion as immediately clear, needing no explanation. So the reading consistent 
with the text is that he is asserting the first version above. "Motion" means "lo-
comotion" at Step 1 of the proof. 
14 As we saw above, Plato classifies growing older as a kind of motion/ change (KtVT)Ol<;) at Theaete-
tus lBld. 
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Step 2, Part 1 
Step 2 of the proof also uses Kivrtcnc; to mean "locomotion." The proof begins with 
the claim that anything always in motion is immortal (ro yap aetKivrtrov &:eci:va-
rov, 245c5). This claim is therefore part of Step 2, which says that anything which 
is its own source of motion is immortal. This claim means one of the following, 
depending on how we understand Kivrtcrtc;: 
1. Anything always in spatial motion is immortal. 
2. Anything always changing is immortal. 
Only the first is consistent with the rest of the proof. For on the second version, 
because many entities change at all times in some way or other, it will be the case 
that all such entities are immortal. 
Plato's texts often treat Kivrtcrtc; as including many changes, including even (as 
we saw above) merely growing older. Again, one of Plato's favorite general axia is 
that every part of the visible world is always changing in some respect.15 So if Step 
2 refers to change, as in the second version, the argument proves too much: many 
things that do not conventionally count as alive will be not only alive, but also 
immortal. So the argument would prove not only that soul is immortal, but ev-
erything else in the visible world as well. There is no basis in any Platonic text for 
attributing this claim either to Socrates or to Plato; the reading using "change" is 
thus not plausible. Anyone worried that reading Kivrtcrtc; as "spatial motion" gives 
15For example: " ... when the soul makes use of the body ... it is dragged by the body to the things 
that are never the same ... " (Phaedo 79c2-7, emphasis added), " ... the body is most like that which 
is ... never consistently the same" (Phaedo 80b4-5), "What is that which always is and has no becom-
ing, and what is that which becomes but never is?" (Timaeus 27d6-28al), "The second thing ... can be 
perceived by the senses, and .. .it is constantly borne along (necpopl']JlEvOV ad) ... " (Timaeus 52a4-6). 
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counterintuitive results should compare those that follow from reading KlVrJcrtc; 
as "change." So at Step 2 of the proof as well, Socrates' claim only makes sense if 
"motion" means "locomotion." 
An objection based on O:etKivrJ·rov 
In discussing Step 2, I relied on a particular reading of O:etKlVrJTOV. But this term, 
"always moving," is ambiguous, and the ambiguity can fuel an objection to my 
view. In deciding whether some entity counts as always-moving, one might rely 
on observations of it in the present and records of its past behavior, using this 
information to predict whether or not the thing is immortal. On this approach, 
Phaedrus 245c5-246a2 is an argument whose conclusion is that soul is immortal, 
the analysis usually given by scholars, and with which I am in agreement.16 If we 
understand the passage's structure this way, and try to read KlVrJ<nc; as "change," 
we encounter the problem I have just described, namely that many parts of the 
visible world turn out both alive and immortal, a bizarre claim to attribute to a 
Platonic text. On this reading of the passage, therefore, the best understanding of 
KlVrJcrtc; is "spatial motion." 
The other reading of"always moving;' however, might appear to block my ar-
gument. This reading takes "always moving" as picking out all and only those 
entities that really are immortal, in Plato's view, namely souls. One can read the 
prefix aEt-, "always," as a prerequisite that an entity be in motion at all times (and 
not merely at all times that it happens to exist) to qualify as "always-moving." So 
16It would be more natural to say "souls are immortal," but the argument is about "soul," what-
ever that turns out to mean. So I leave the term as it is here, and consider in Chapter 4 what we 
should make of that feature of the passage. 
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even if some entity has been in motion for as long as one has observed it, it does not 
count as always-moving, if it is ever going to die or perish. But this reading makes 
the argument circular. Since the conclusion of Phaedrus 245c5-246a2 is that soul 
is immortal, if "always-moving" excludes everything except soul on the ground 
that only soul is immortal, the argument is circular in an especially obvious way. 
No one, so far as I am aware, has suggested why Socrates would give an obviously 
circular argument at this point in his speech, nor again, how Socrates could be un-
aware that his argument is bad. Unless there is another way to explain the point of 
245c-246a, then, this reading cannot get off the ground. So this suggestion fails to 
undermine my reading, and should instead increase our confidence that KtVT)<ru; 
means "locomotion." 
Step 2, Part 2 
When we examine the most difficult part of the proof, the claim that soul is a first 
principle of movement (apx~ Ktv~crEw~, 245c9), and therefore indestructible, we 
find again that KtVT)<rt~ must be read as "spatial motion." Again, we can parse this 
statement in two forms: 
1. Soul is a first principle of spatial motion. 
2. Soul is a first principle of change. 
Now one of the argument's other claims is that a first principle cannot come into 
or go out of being: in particular, if the first principle of KtVT)<rt~ perished, noth-
ing else would be able to move or be moved (KtvEiv /KtvEicr9at). This part of the 
argument assumes a "spillover" theory of causality, such that for A to cause B to 
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become x, A must have some x in itself, which "spills over," or is somehow trans-
ferred, into BY The first version is intelligible on this approach to causality. It is, 
in fact, not very different from the way Newton's First Law of Motion describes 
the transmission of motion among billiard balls: an object at rest tends to remain 
at rest, unless it receives some motion (to put it in the rather crude terms of the 
theory in the text).18 If an object receives some motion, this explains the fact that 
it then begins to move. A moving billiard ball striking a stationary one, thereby 
causing the stationary one to begin moving, illustrates this thought aptly. This 
argument in the Phaedrus treats all visible objects as a single class, and claims that 
unless there is a first principle of motion from which this class receives some mo-
tion, members of that class cannot move; this is just the billiard-ball case elevated 
to a more abstract metaphysical level. 
But the idea that a first principle of change is necessary in order for other things 
to change casts its net too broadly, for several reasons. First, if soul is not only the 
first principle of locomotion, but of all changes, then it is, among other things, the 
first principle of perishing, since perishing is a kind of change. But on the Spillover 
Theory of causality, if souls are the source of perishing, they must have perishing 
17Barnes recognizes this feature of the argument as well (Barnes 1979, pp. 118-119). He refers 
to this concept of causation as the "Synonymy Principle" (p. 88), but this suggests that the idea 
behind it is that words somehow cause events. "Spillover" captures, I hope, the thought that the 
causally responsible item must have something within itself that is transferred to the item affected, 
and that this something must be the same kind of thing in both objects. The principle is in fact 
false, but is nevertheless found in the text. 
181 am not, of course, claiming that Plato's text anticipates Newton's First Law of Motion, only 
that the explanation Newton's Law gives for this particular phenomenon, in which a moving object 
strikes a stationary one, the former transmitting some of its inertia/motion to the latter, is roughly 
the same as that implied by this passage of the Phaedrus. Where Newton's Law uses the concept of 
inertia, Plato speaks (less correctly) of motion. But both theories explain the case by saying that 
the moving ball transmits some x that it has to the stationary ball, and the transferred quantity 
explains why the stationary ball begins moving. 
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within themselves.19 This result generalizes to every property ever possessed by 
any visible object: these must all be located in soul; otherwise soul will not be able 
to cause that property in other things. 
The requirement that soul possess every property of visible items creates fur-
ther unacceptable results. Each soul will have to possess many properties opposite 
to one another, and so (following one of Plato's favorite tropes) it will be the case 
that souls are "no more X than Y," where X and Y are any of these opposites. So 
no soul will be more courageous than cowardly, or more good than bad. Since 
Plato's characters frequently interest themselves in how souls can be courageous 
or good, this cannot be the right reading. Again, souls will have many properties 
within themselves that do not apply to souls at all: they will be green, steep, and 
high-pitched, for example. On the other hand, if no soul has these properties, no 
visible object can have them either. This is implausible, both in its own right and 
as a theory attributed to Socrates in the Phaedrus. Finally, the property of perish-
ing in particular contradicts the conclusion of the proof: for if soul does not have 
perishing within itself, then no visible object will be capable of perishing either. 
But if soul does have perishing in itself, it must also perish. For on the theory of 
Forms, participating in a Form is equivalent to having that Form's property within 
oneself, and this is equivalent to instantiating that property.20 Since the proof is 
supposed to show that soul does not perish, this is not the right way to read its 
underlying metaphysics. For the third time, we see that Ktv11ou; must be read as 
"spatial motion" in this passage. 
191 see no evidence of any other approach to causality at Phaedrus 245c-246a. 
20
" ... when you then say that Simmias is taller than Socrates but shorter than Phaedo, do you not 
mean that there is in Simmias both tallness and shortness?" (Phaedo 102b4-6) 
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Phaedrus 245c-246a and the Kinetic Theory of the Timaeus 
The claims of Phaedrus 245c-246a can be combined with the Kinetic Theory from 
the Timaeus to create a version of the Unified Theory. This will help to answer cer-
tain questions about other features of the Phaedrus proof. In the same part of Step 
2 we have just been discussing, in which Socrates claims that soul is a first prin-
ciple of motion, he draws conclusions broader than one would expect if KtVfJolc; 
means "spatial motion" and nothing more. 
It is not possible for this either to be destroyed or to come into being, 
or else the whole universe and the whole of that which comes to be 
might collapse together and come to a halt, and never again have a 
source from which things will be moved and come to be (08ev KlVfJ8E-
vra ye:v~crETal, 245e2). 
If KtVf)crtc; meant only "spatial motion"- that is, without the extension to "change" 
provided by the Kinetic Theory - we would expect the conclusion of this sentence 
to read, "and never again have a source from which things will be moved;' without 
mentioning coming-to-be in addition to motion. Instead, Socrates says that all 
coming-to-be would cease. This suggests that spatial motion, the direct referent 
of"KtVf)crtc;," is also connected to change in general. The Kinetic Theory provides 
just such a connection, for on this theory spatial motion is the only real form of 
change, but different varieties of spatial motion are identical with what are con-
ventionally identified as other forms of change. This theory explains why, if soul 
is the principle of spatial motion, the perishing of soul would lead to the absence 
of all forms of change. Since all forms of change are forms of spatial motion, the 
removal of the principle of spatial motion would be equivalent to the removal of 
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the principle of all forms of change. 
As a more particular example of how these two theories work together, con-
sider perishing. An object perishes, on the Kinetic Theory, not because it partakes 
of the Form Perishing (though this may also be true of it), nor because there is a 
special first principle (apx~) of perishing, but because the spatial arrangements 
of its parts change so that they no longer constitute the same object (or the same 
kind of object). Soul, on this theory, is a principle (apx~) of spatial motion only. 
Spatial motions, when transmitted to visible objects, may instantiate properties 
that the source of the spatial motions did not have within itself. Thus there can 
be imperishable soul that is indirectly the apx~ of perishing, although directly it 
is the principle of nothing but spatial motion. 
Objection: Which Properties is Soul the Principle Of? 
One might worry that whereas I have just claimed that, according to the Unified 
Theory, soul is not a source of perishing, in fact the Unified Theory guarantees 
that soul is the source of perishing;21 For perishing is just a certain kind of spatial 
motion, on the Kinetic Theory, and as the sole source of spatial motions, soul must 
be the source of all kinds of spatial motion. So soul must be the source of perishing 
-just the result I claimed this theory avoids. But in fact this is a toothless worry, 
one that Plato can happily concede. 
To see why this worry is misplaced, review the problems raised above for the 
generic reading of KlVTJ<n<; as "change:' First, if soul is the source of perishing, it 
has perishing within itself (by the theory of Forms), and therefore must perish. 
211 have already discussed a similar objection in Chapter 2; see page 152. 
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But the Kinetic Theory leaves conceptual space to differentiate between having a 
source of perishing within oneself, and having a quality, perishing, within oneself. 
The Kinetic Theory, conjoined with Phaedrus 245c-246a, need concede only that 
soul is the source of perishing, not that soul has the quality perishing within itself. 
The Spillover Theory of causality says that if soul has a source of perishing within 
itself, it transmits this source both to visible items and to itself. But this source 
is just spatial motion, not the property perishing; transmitting spatial motion to 
oneself and to visible items is necessary, but not sufficient, to cause perishing. So 
it does not follow that soul has the property perishing within itself, or that it itself 
perishes. 
Second, soul would have to possess every property whatsoever within itself, 
an implausible claim, first because soul would possess many opposite properties, 
and second because it would possess many properties that logically cannot pertain 
to it. The same distinction - between possessing the source of these properties 
and possessing the properties themselves - solves this problem as well. First, the 
Kinetic Theory shows how two opposite properties can have a single source. For 
example, growing taller and growing shorter are opposite properties, but on the 
Kinetic Theory both are the result of spatial motions (of different types). So for 
soul to be the source of both, it suffices for it to be the source of spatial motions. 
Second, properties that do not pertain to soul at all, such as being steep, are also 
the result of spatial motions or arrangements, so that soul can be the source of 
these properties without having them. 
Taking Kivnmc; as "spatial motion" is therefore consistent with the argument 
at 245c-246a; the alternative produces absurdity. Further, if conjoined with the 
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Kinetic Theory, the resulting Unified Theory yields a powerful account of how soul 
is related to all kinds of change in the visible world. 
Aristotle's Evidence 
Aristotle supports reading KiVTJOl<; as "spatial motion," for he takes locomotion as 
the "primary motion," observing that "all who have ever made mention of mo-
tion ... assign their principles of motion to things that impart motion of this kind" 
(Physics VIII.9 265b17-19). In his enumeration of examples, he mentions "those 
who make soul the cause of motion," and points to the observation that "when 
animals and all living things move themselves, the motion is motion in respect of 
place" (265b33-34, 266al-2). Since this is precisely the observation that Socrates 
uses in his proof (245e5-6), this parallel also suggests that his use ofK{vfJOl<; through-
out the proof refers to locomotion. 
Three Contrary Views 
Richard Bett denies that KiVTJOl<; means "spatial motion" in this passage. He writes: 
... the argument requires that we think of yevecrt<; as a species of KiVTJ-
crt<;. For Plato introduces the notion of an apx~ Ktv~O'EW<;, and then im-
mediately goes on to say ... that "everything that comes to be comes to 
be" out of an apx~. For the argument to work, it must obviously be the 
same kind of apx~ under discussion throughout; and it follows that K{-
VfJGt<; cannot simply mean "(loco)motion", but must refer to any kind 
of change whatever. However, there is nothing very startling in this. 
We find just such a broad notion of KiVTJcrt<; explicit in the Laws (again 
in the context of a discussion of soul as self-mover) ... 22 
22Bett (1986, p. 9) 
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Having mentioned the Laws, Bett goes on to cite Aristotle (Physics III.1) and Par-
menides as parallels for the use of KlVYJOl~ to mean change in general. I will com-
ment on the Laws below, beginning on page 178. 
The passage of the Physics that Bett refers to contains Aristotle's exposition 
of his own views about motion and change, so there is no reason to take it as a 
guide to Plato's views. We have already seen, however, that Aristotle refers to the 
locomotion of animals as equivalent to their being alive at Physics VIII.9. In this 
latter passage he is also discussing his understanding of the opinions of others, 
including "those who make soul the cause of motion." This is likely to be a better 
clue to what Plato thought, because it is a better clue to what Aristotle thought 
Plato thought. Finally, Parmenides' use of KlVYJOl~ cannot decide how we should 
read Plato here. The disagreement rests, then, on which sense can be read con-
sistently throughout the argument. I have already argued that three claims only 
make sense if KlVYJCH~ means spatial motion. Bett thinks the passage must refer 
to only one kind of apx~. and then argues that the single kind of apx~ cannot be 
KlVYJOl~. But he never considers the problems resulting from the generic reading 
of KlVYJOl<;, nor the fact that the Kinetic Theory provides an account of how spatial 
motion accounts for all changes. 
Blyth makes a similar point, writing, " ... an unwary reader will assume the iden-
tity of motion and becoming ... Yet this cannot be the case, as a self-mover would 
not then be ungenerated (but, by substitution, self-generating):'23 As before, the 
solution lies in the fact that on the Kinetic Theory, spatial motion covers all the 
territory ofbecoming, but particular kinds of becoming occupy only limited parts 
23Blyth (1997, p. 202) 
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of the category of spatial motion. The generation of a visible thing typically con-
sists of its constituent elements moving through space into the same location, as 
well as forming the right configuration within that location. Given these claims it 
does not follow, from the assumption that soul causes itself to move spatially, that 
it also causes itself to come into being. For in the case of visible items, not every 
spatial motion is also an instance of coming-into-being, and presumably the same 
is true of soul. Blyth's objection is invalid.24 
Finally, Griswold also denies that self-motion can mean locomotion, on the 
grounds that "self-motion is incorporeal."25 But this misses the point: the ques-
tion is not whether self-motion can occur without a body, but whether self-motion 
can occur without a change of spatial location. Griswold seems to assume that lo-
comotion implies corporeality. But if this is his reasoning, it is invalid. Geome-
ters, for example, imagine paths through space without claiming that any body is 
24This also provides an answer to a question Bett raises on the following page: "But it is not 
clear why any one self-mover should have to be responsible for every one of the different species 
of Kivrtotc:; ... Plato's argument requires that anything which is a self-mover is a first principle specif-
ically of y€vs:otc:;; but it is not obvious to me why this should be taken for granted. Needless to say, 
Plato does not respond to this query ... " Bett (1986, p. 10). Bett also asks why Socrates talks as if 
there is just one apx~. while there are many souls. If one or a few souls were to perish, surely the 
others could go on serving as apxai Ktv~o£wc:;. So the proof seems to assume that there is just one 
soul, or just one soul that is the apx~ Ktv~o£wc:;. In Chapter 4 I will argue that this is one of many 
clues that individual souls are not being discussed in the proof. 
25 Griswold (1986, p. 85). Plato uses OWJ.Ia for "body" in the Phaedrus, but never uses the word 
aowJ.Ia-roc:; in this dialogue. OW ].Ia usually refers to any visible body, not only to human and animal 
bodies, as it must, for example, at 245e4-5, where bodies are contrasted according to whether 
they have their sources of motion from within or from outside. Since the passage in the Phaedrus 
claims that soul is alive and a self-mover, and I am arguing that the correct reading of "motion" is 
"spatial motion," I also think that if soul ever exists without being attached to a particular body, it 
will nevertheless be alive, spatially located, and causing its own spatial motions. I say if soul ever 
exists without being attached to a particular body, for if soul is spatially located, and all the space 
there is is occupied by bodies (as Timaeus argues it is), then it follows that no matter where soul 
goes, it must occupy the same space as some body. So while the relation between an individual soul 
and a (merely) co-located body may be different than that between a soul and a human body it 
occupies, it may be misleading to speak of soul as dis-embodied. 
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present or travels along those paths. Plato was aware of this practice, and himself 
points out that no bodies are involved in geometric reasoning.26 
Context within the Phaedrus 
I have so far focused exclusively on the short proof passage, since this is one of the 
best candidates in the dialogue for an argument functioning logically, allowing us 
to draw inferences supported by the logic of the passage. I close this section by 
noting that several narrative and rhetorical features elsewhere in the dialogue are 
consistent with the supposition that soul moves itself through space; some may 
even be said to suggest this idea. At the dialogue's opening, Socrates and Phaedrus 
leave Athens, walking along the river Ilissus, eventually stopping in the shade of a 
tree. Other Platonic dialogues begin by describing the characters changing loca-
tions (e.g., the Republic and Gorgias), but the Phaedrus lays more stress than do the 
others on the characters' consciousness of place, and how their choice of where 
to move and where to stop come from within their personalities and motivations. 
Second, the passage I have just discussed in detail is closely followed, still within 
Socrates' second speech, by an extended myth telling how individual souls travel 
through the heavens when not in human or animal bodies. The central feature of 
this myth is the conceit that souls in the heavens, both human and divine, peri-
odically travel up to and around the rim of the heavens in order to glimpse the 
Forms lying outside, either receiving nourishment from the sight or losing their 
wings and falling into mortal bodies if they fail to see the Forms. The myth's cen-
tral explanatory device is the image of souls moving through space. I offer these 
26 At Republic 510c-511a, for example. 
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two points only as starting points; a full treatment of the context would have to 
be much longer. But these examples show that the rest of the dialogue also be-
trays a heightened concern with places and locations. This concern corroborates 
my claim that the central concepts of the proof at 245c-246a are soul and spatial 
motion. 
3.2 The Laws 
In Laws X 891c-899d, the Athenian argues that soul is older than matter. Within 
this passage he defines soul as "motion capable of moving itself" (t'ftV 15vva]JEVl'JV 
aUt'ftV aut'ftV Ktveiv KlVl'JOW, 896al-2), a formula not very different from the one 
used in the Phaedrus ('to aut'o Ktvouv, 245c7). 27 Here in the Laws, too, this defini-
tion should be taken to mean that soul moves itself through space.28 
This stretch of text is much too long to quote in full, so I will summarize the 
points important for my discussion. At 891c-892c the Stranger explains the chief 
27The differences between the two definitions are intriguing. The Phaedrus version designates 
soul with the indefinite neuter article t:o, while the Laws version says that soul is a motion (KtVT)OW). 
Looking at the logic of each version, the Phaedrus says that something is soul if and only if it moves 
itself, while the Laws says that soul is a kind of motion, and then further specifies that it is the kind 
of motion capable of moving itself. While both definitions are built on the same central concept, 
namely self-motion, the Laws version is considerably more complex and precise. The Laws version 
may also strike us as the more puzzling of the two insofar as it defines soul as a kind of motion, 
whereas the Phaedrus version's indefinite article leaves us free to think of soul as a kind of thing, 
a more familiar way of conceptualizing soul. But if we are tempted to think that the Laws puts 
soul into a new category of "motion;· contrasting it mysteriously with the more familiar category 
of"object," it is possible we are looking in the wrong direction. I suggest, instead, that the Laws' 
designation of soul as motion may reflect an assumption by the Athenian that everything (except 
the Forms, if they are part of his ontology) is a motion. If this is right, for example, then he might 
define matter as motion not capable of moving itself. The Laws definition, then, may be intended 
to emphasize precisely what soul and visible items have in common. 
280ther writers claiming that the metaphysics of Laws 10 reproduces that of either the Timaeus 
or the Phaedrus include Carone (1994, pp. 279-280), Lee (1976, p. 102 n. 42) and Skemp (1942, p. 
80). 
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conclusion he will reach in the ensuing argument, namely that "soul...is one of 
the first creations, born long before all physical things, and is the chief cause of all 
their alterations and transformations" (892a2-7). He explains that this claim can 
be established by showing that soul is older than body (892c5-7), following this 
with a taxonomy classifying all motions into ten kinds (893c-894c). The details of 
the classification are far from clear, but for our purposes we need only note the 
following. The motions are arranged in pairs, with the first pair being motion in 
one location, i.e. rotation about a fixed center, and motion in many locations. As 
he begins his list, the Stranger lingers over the description of rotation, apparently 
fascinated by the fact that points at different distances from the center trace out 
circles of different circumference, but all in the same period of time. The third 
through the eighth motions may be: combination and separation, increase and 
diminution, coming-into-being and perishing; this part of the taxonomy is un-
clear, but we need not sort it out here.29 It is plausible that motions one through 
eight are all ways of moving through space; not so the ninth and tenth, which are 
described as "the kind which always imparts motion to something else and is it-
self changed by another thing," and "the motion that moves both itself and other 
things ... the source of change and motion in all things that exist" (894c3-8). 
The Stranger next gives some short arguments to the effect that changes can 
only begin with the tenth kind (894e-895b), and after that invokes self-motion as 
the criterion of whether a visible thing is alive (895c).30 He then defines soul as 
"motion capable of moving itself" ('t'~V 8uva}.lEvflV aU~V aU~V KtvEiV KlVflOW, 
29For more discussion of this list, see Chapter 2, page 109. 
30Since the Stranger uses this criterion, just as Socrates does in the Phaedrus, the arguments 
made above (page 163}, showing that this criterion can only be used if "motion" means "spatial 
motion;' apply here as well. 
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896al-2). At this point he announces that the main goal of this section has been 
accomplished, and his interlocutors agree that soul has been shown older than 
matter. 
Finally, the Stranger explains the nature of rational motion, and argues that 
rotational motion is the best image of reason (897d-898b). This short argument is 
contained within a discussion of whether the heavenly bodies visible from earth 
are rational or irrational, good or bad (896d-899d). The gist of this argument is 
that since the heavenly bodies are observed to follow regular, circular orbits about 
the earth, and this kind of motion is most associated with reason, they are rational 
and good. Since they are considered gods by mankind, it follows that the universe 
is controlled and organized by good and rational gods. I begin my discussion of 
these arguments with the Stranger's identification of rotation as the kind of mo-
tion most associated with rationality. 
The Nature of Rational Motion 
At one point in his exposition the Stranger asks, "So what is the nature of rational 
motion?" (T{va o~v ()~ vou KlVYJcru; cpuow £xet; 897d3). This is the best place to be-
gin, since the Stranger's question and my own are nearly the same. The Stranger is 
asking about rational motion, which must always belong to soul; not all motions of 
soul must be rational, but all rational motions must belong to soul. So the answer 
to the Stranger's question will tell us about some of the motions soul can perform; 
this may give us clues about the rest as well. The Stranger immediately singles out 
rotation about a single point as the motion from his earlier list of ten that most 
closely resembles reason (898a). He then lists several properties which this kind 
of motion and reason share: 
Take reason (vouv) on the one hand, and motion in a single location on 
the other. If we were to point out that in both cases (a}lcpw .... Myonec;) 
(a) the motion was determined by a single plan and procedure and that 
it was (b) regular, (c) uniform, (d) always at the same point in space (ev 
rG} aurG}), (e) around a fixed center (7tEpl ra aura), (f) in the same position 
relative to other objects (npoc; ra aura), and were to illustrate both by 
the example of a sphere being turned on a lathe, then no one could 
ever show us up for incompetent makers of verbal images. (898a8-b3, 
emphasis added and Saunders' labeling revised)31 
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Points (d), (e), and (t) attribute spatial location and spatial motion to reason, and 
this shows that the sense of "motion" involved in reason must be spatial.32 For 
this is a list of properties which reason and rotational motion share (or "saying 
about both ... ", CX}l<pw ... Aiyovrec;). If some of the properties belonged to reason in 
one sense, but to rotational motion in a different sense, there would be no sharing 
- no more than the moon and the number 100 share the property of being round. 
So the Stranger is claiming that reason is always at the same point in space, moves 
around a fixed center, and remains in the same position relative to other objects. 
To deny that this description attributes spatial movement to reason, one would 
have to think the Stranger's speech equivocates, attributing spatial properties to 
rotational motion, and homonymous but different properties to reason.33 There 
31The phrases have been translated in various ways, not all equivalent. But the claims I am 
about to make will hold on any plausible translation. For example, Lee takes rrpo<; ra alira as "in the 
same direction or sense:' But this ascribes spatial location to the turning just as much as Saunders' 
version above. 
32For a point-by-point examination of the comparisons in the passages, see Lee (1976, pp. 74-76). 
I discuss Lee's views further below. 
33Lee's view, to be discussed shortly, is an example of this position. In commenting on the phrase 
Jt£pi. ra alira ("about the same things"), he writes: "This ... must be made explicit so as to have us feel 
the pun connecting the spatial use of the preposition rrEpi. (turning about or around the same point) 
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are three problems with this line of thinking. The first is the equivocation itself: 
if he is merely equivocating, the Stranger's claim that reason and rotation share 
the properties he mentions is strictly false. 
Second, on this reading, either all three characters fail to notice the equivoca-
tion, or the Stranger is deliberately misleading the other two, and neither alter-
native is consistent with the context. The Stranger is serious, earnest, and even 
wise; his partners follow his leads and accept his suggestions eagerly, nor is there 
any sign of conflict or disharmony. The Stranger is the most philosophically able 
of the three, but it would be hard to reconcile his seriousness with his deliberately 
employing such an outrageously bad argument at this key moment, in order to win 
the assent of two interlocutors who in any event are only too happy to agree with 
him. Nothing prepares the idea that the speaker misses a simple equivocation at 
one of the weightiest points in the discussion, nor that he chooses to equivocate 
in order to persuade the other two more easily. 
The third, subtlest, and (yet) most logically forceful objection, is that the Stranger's 
choice of rotation as the motion most resembling reason is inexplicable unless he 
is thinking of reason as a kind of spatial motion. For there are not just one, but 
two motions on the Stranger's list of ten that bear "the closest possible affinity 
and likeness to the cyclical movement of reason." The Stranger's actual choice of 
rotation is the most like reason only if he is thinking of reason as spatial motion. 
The two candidates are the categories of "motion in a single location" (i.e. the 
first motion, 898bl), i.e. rotation, and "motion which can generate itself" (i.e. the 
with the intentional or cognitive use of the preposition (thinking about the same topic) ... " Lee 
(1976, p. 76). Lee's view, of course, demonstrates that it is possible to read the passage as depending 
on equivocation, but such a reading does not do justice to the strenuous and unambiguous interest 
of the Stranger in showing the priority of soul to everything else. 
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tenth motion, 894d3-4). 
The Stranger gives six reasons that rotation resembles reason, three invoking 
specifically spatial properties. But self-generating motion must also resemble rea-
son in certain ways, since it turns out to define soul. Since reason is an activity 
of soul, reason is a species of self-generating motion, and a species must resemble 
its genus, since it instantiates the properties of the genus. So reason resembles 
both self-generating motion and rotational motion, and prima facie, the Stranger 
has two candidates to consider for the kind of motion most resembling reason. His 
choice is explicable on the assumption that reason is a kind of spatial motion, but 
puzzling if reason is not spatial motion. 
If the Stranger thinks of both reason and self-generating motion as non-spatial 
changes, he should think these resemble each other more closely than either re-
sembles rotational motion. For reason is a species of self-generating motion, so 
they share the property of being self-generating. And by hypothesis, neither type 
involves a change of spatial location, so they also share this property (i.e., being 
non-spatial, or being spiritual motion, or whatever property one wants to supply in 
place of spatiality). By contrast, rotational motion cannot be self-generating, since 
again by hypothesis self-generating motion is non-spatial. So on the assumption 
that the motions of soul are not changes in spatial location, the Stranger should 
not claim that reason resembles rotational motion more closely than any other 
motion: rotation lacks two properties which reason has, while self-moving mo-
tion has both. Nor do the other points of comparison that he mentions help with 
this puzzle, since points (a), (b) and (c) fit either self-generating motion or rotation 
equally well. 
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However, the puzzle dissolves if all ten motions listed by the Stranger (and 
not merely one through eight) are spatial motions.34 Now his choice of rotational 
motion can be justified. As before, reason is a species of self-moving motion, since 
it is an activity of soul. But since both self-moving motion and reason are spatial 
motions, this property does not make reason more like self-generating motion 
than it is like rotation. Again, since self-moving motion is also spatial motion, it 
follows that some instances of rotational motion can also be self-moving. If this 
suggestion is correct, the Stranger would probably accept "self-moving rotational 
motion" as a definition of reason. 
The Stranger immediately puts his comparison of reason and rotation to work 
to argue that the rotations we observe in the heavens imply that the souls direct-
ing the heavenly bodies are supremely rational (898c-899a).35 Taking the sun as 
illustration, the Stranger assumes that it moves in a circle because there is a soul 
driving it in a circle. He considers three ways that this soul might operate in order 
to produce the observed effect of the sun's circular motion: 
Either (a) the soul resides within this visible spherical body and carries 
it wherever it goes, just as our soul takes us around from one place to 
another, or (b) it acquires its own body of fire or air of some kind (as 
certain people maintain), and impels the sun by the external contact 
34Furthermore, this hypothesis also explains why the Stranger uses the same term for them all, 
KlVT]Ol<;. 
35Lee argues that Plato could not have reasoned from the observed motions in the heavens to 
the conclusion that reason is circular motion, on the grounds that this would be no more than 
a contingent connection between circularity and reason. Had the heavens appeared to move in 
square-shaped motions, the argument would have shown that reason is a square-shaped motion. 
(Lee 1976, pp. 71-72) But I fail to see why Plato could not have reasoned this way. Only on the 
assumption that Plato was engaged in a priori reasoning, or looking for necessary and intimate 
connections between reason and circularity, does Lee's argument go through. Since much of the 
material in the Timaeus and Laws includes empirical observations, this assumption is unconvincing. 
ofbody with body, or (c) it is entirely immaterial (\jn.A~ <Hh}laro~ ol5oa), 
but guides the sun along its path by virtue of possessing some other 
prodigious and wonderful powers. (898e8-899a4) 
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Each of these three hypotheses would require that the sun's soul to move in a 
circle, following the same path through space as the sun's body. This shows that 
the Stranger believes that some souls engage in spatial motion. His comparison of 
reason to rotational motion makes it likely that he thinks all souls are by definition 
in spatial motion, and that souls become more rational as their motions become 
more like circular rotation. 
It remains to address an obvious worry: as the Stranger asks what is the na-
ture of rational motion, he also announces that he will not answer directly, but will 
instead present an image (EiK6va) of rational motion (897d-e). Does this qualifica-
tion, calling rotation an "image," invalidate the argument that, since he compares 
reason to rotation, he must think reason is a kind of spatial motion? The qualifi-
cation implies that his image is not like reason in every respect. This makes it easy 
to think that one way in which reason is not like rotation must be that it is non-
spatial. But the Stranger never says this, and as we have seen, in the comparison of 
reason to rotation, he singles out three aspects that can only be spatial as impor-
tant ways the two resemble one another. He then uses the likeness to argue that 
the sun's apparent circular motion shows that the soul controlling it is supremely 
rational. There is no evidence in this presentation that reason is conceived as non-
spatial. Moreover, we can explain why the Stranger will not endorse rotation as 
more than an image of reason. For not all instances of rotation are instances of 
reason: the motion of the sun's body, for instance, is a kind of rotation, but this 
does not show that the sun's body is rational. Equally, not all self-generating mo-
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tion is rational, since souls can behave irrationally. So the fact that the Stranger 
calls his account of reason an image does not settle the question which aspects of 
that account can be taken literally, and which only loosely. And the spatial as-
pects of the comparison are so central to it that the Stranger must be understood 
as attributing spatial motion to reason and to soul. 
Lee's View 
Edward Lee gives an alternative to my view that deserves mention here, for his 
interpretation is specific and clear. Beginning from the Stranger's comparison of 
reason and rotation, Lee takes two interpretive steps. First, he insists that the 
Stranger is comparing reason not to a circle, a sphere, or any physical object, but 
to circular motion. Second, he distinguishes two ways of thinking about rotational 
motion. In the "accomplishment sense," we focus, for example, on a point located 
on a rotating disk. The point moves around in a circle a determinate number of 
times; if it does not go all the way around, we can measure how many degrees 
it has rotated. This kind of motion can be repeated, and in this sense it makes 
sense to talk about "going around again." Contrast this with the "activity sense," 
in which we focus on the disk or sphere as a whole. In this sense the entire disk 
is rotating, and its action of rotating is complete at every moment. Since there 
are no parts to consider, we cannot count how many rotations it has performed, 
and it makes no sense to talk about the disk undergoing another rotation.36 Lee 
points out that the former, accomplishment sense, is like a count noun, while the 
36This distinction reproduces Aristotle's distinction between K{VT]OU; ("motion") and evepyEt<X 
("activity"), on which see, for example, Mourelatos (1993). Mourelatos, however, is mostly con-
cerned to point out ways in which the recent distinction fails to reproduce Aristotle's. 
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latter, activity sense is like a mass noun. 37 He then points out that Plato apparently 
regards the axis of rotation as motionless, while the disk or sphere rotates around 
it. The relation between the rotating disk/sphere and its own motionless axis is 
thus analogous to the relation between the activity of reason and the object it 
reasons about. Lee sees this as an image of impersonality. That is, the rotation of 
the disk represents for him the multiplication of perspectives one would achieve 
by physically walking around a visible object in order to see how it looks from 
every angle. This, he suggests, is the point of the Stranger's comparison.38 
There are several reasons that Lee's view is untenable. The arguments I have 
already given (on the Laws) apply equally to Lee's position, so I will only add some 
objections specific to his view. First, Lee arrives at his position via two interpre-
tive steps, of which the first is plausible: the Stranger does make his comparison 
between reason and motion (Kivnmv), rather than with objects that could engage in 
this kind of motion; his mention of disks and spheres is clearly only meant to illus-
trate his point, not to encourage a comparison with the disks or spheres as static 
objects. But Lee's second step has no support in the text, so far as I can see.39 
And while Lee is admirably clear in explaining his thoughts, he offers no textual 
support for the second move, the distinction between the accomplishment and 
activity senses. Nor, in discussing his position's merits, does he give reasons that 
would motivate taking this approach. In discussing Aristotle's criticisms of Plato, 
for example, he says only that Aristotle is using the wrong sense of rotation, never 
why this is the wrong sense. 
37Lee (1976, pp. 74-78) 
38Lee (1976, pp. 80-81) 
39See note 36: Lee is drawing on an Aristotelian distinction. But this tells us nothing about its 
applicability to Plato. 
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Further, the Stranger's interest in rotation is not what we would expect if 
he were working with the distinction between the accomplishment and activity 
senses. When he mentions rotation in a single place as his first kind of motion, 
the Stranger pauses to observe: 
And we appreciate that when a disk revolves like that, points near 
and far from the center describe circles of different radii in the same 
time; their motion varies according to these radii and is proportion-
ately quick or slow. This motion gives rise to all sorts of wonderful 
phenomena, because these points simultaneously traverse circles of 
large and small circumference at proportionately high or low speeds 
-an effect one might have expected to be impossible. (893c7-d5) 
The Stranger's interest in high and low speeds shows that the activity sense is the 
wrong way to read these comments. Rather than regarding the disk as a unified 
whole whose rotation is at every moment complete, the Stranger separates the 
various points and radii on his disk, measuring and comparing their movements. 
If there is any separation of Lee's two senses here, it can only favor the accom-
plishment sense. And since the quoted passage introduces the Stranger's concern 
with rotation, and he says nothing later to indicate that he is thinking of rotation 
in another way, it follows that he is not thinking of the activity sense, since that 
would allow no measurements or comparisons. 
Further, in the comparison between reason and rotation at 898, Lee's proposal 
makes it hard to see why the Stranger mentions rotation "in the same direction" 
(Lee's translation of npoc; -ra a\rta). If the point were to see what is at the center 
from every possible perspective, one would rather wish to rotate in both directions, 
for the same sequence of objects can look notoriously different when taken in a 
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different order.40 And this point too, favors the accomplishment, not the activity, 
sense. For the activity sense refuses to regard the disk or sphere as containing 
parts; it is all one unified whole. But if the point of the image is to see an object (in 
this case the disk or sphere) from all perspectives, one will need to pay attention 
to the differences between all those points or parts, and to the different ways the 
center appears from each position on the disk or sphere. 
As Lee acknowledges, Aristotle takes Plato's view to be that the soul's motion 
is a motion in space. I do not wish to take any more detailed position here on 
Aristotle's arguments at de Anima I.3.407a2-bll, but whether or not his arguments 
hit their targets when examined in detail, his broad assumption that Plato's view 
commits him to the soul's movement through space is clear. 
The Stranger's comments on soul are in many ways hard to pin down. But 
when he compares reason to rotation, and enumerates the six ways in which the 
two phenomena resemble each other, he shows that he is thinking of reason as 
a specifically spatial motion. It follows that soul or souls move spatially if and 
when they reason, and this makes it likely that the other activities of souls are also 
spatial motions. As we saw in Chapter 2, Plato thinks of motion as either round, 
straight, or a combination of the two. So if reason is rotational motion, irrational 
thinking must add a component of straightness to a soul's motions. This is just 
what Timaeus claims about irrational humans and other animals in his speech. 
40Think, for example, of driving a road one knows from traveling it in one direction, but now 
proceeding in the opposite direction. 
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3.3 Timaeus 
Introduction 
The spatial movements of souls are woven so tightly into Timaeus' account that 
they must be read literally. The alternative, supposing that Timaeus' many de-
scriptions of souls moving in space actually mean something else, denatures too 
large a portion of the text. Second, Timaeus' comments imply that souls are self-
movers. The Timaeus therefore contains the same claims that we found in the Phae-
drus and the Laws. 
A number of writers have denied that the motions of souls referred to by Timaeus 
are literally spatial, while recently there has been a trend in the opposite direc-
tion. 41 On both sides, however, there has been a tendency to affirm and deny with-
out assembling evidence or making one's reasoning explicit. The significance of 
my argument, therefore, comes less from the novelty of the conclusion than from 
spelling out the reasons by which I arrive there.42 
41Those reading the motions of souls figuratively: Brisson (1994, p. 94), Lee (1976, p. 85 and n. 
28), Cherniss (1944, pp. 405-406), Skemp (1942, pp. 79 and 86), Cornford (1937, p. 93), Taylor (1928, 
p. 175) and Archer-Hind (1888, p. 116). Those reading them as motions in space: Johansen (2004, 
pp. 139-140), Sorabji (2003, p. 152), O'Brien (2003), Burnyeat (2000, pp. 58-59), Gould (1963, p. 128). 
O'Brien does not affirm this explicitly, but his argument seems to require it, since he claims that 
the placement of the World Soul outside the body of the world is Plato's response to Empedocles' 
metaphysics, in which the principle of Strife is located outside the world when Love is in control of 
the universe. Since O'Brien thinks the World Soul is located in space, it is likely that he also thinks 
the World Soul's motions are spatial. 
42Sedley (1997, pp. 329-330) gives detailed reasons that souls move spatially, but my argun1ents 
go beyond those given there in both detail and variety. 
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How to Approach the Problem 
I assume there is no dispute that according to Timaeus' account, souls (including 
the World Soul and human souls) rotate in space: disagreement arises when we 
ask whether this account is itself to be taken literally or figuratively.43 Some find 
the claim that souls move in space bizarre, perhaps thinking it an advantage if we 
can absolve Plato from this idea.44 
I will not try to decide what status to assign Timaeus' account as a whole. This 
would involve many issues we can pass by here, such as whether the account of the 
universe's creation is to be taken literally, whether the universe has always existed 
(according to Timaeus' account), and what Timaeus means by calling his account 
a "likely story" (EiKw<; }lii8o<;). Instead, I propose to take the many references to 
spatial motion by souls as a group, and ask whether this set of claims is better 
taken literally or figuratively, taking into account only considerations related to 
this group itself. Now of course some of the things Timaeus says are figurative: 
no one thinks that the Demiurge reaches for a real mixing-bowl (Kpa-rt;pa, 41d4) 
in which to whip up his recipe for the World Soul, for example. But myths are 
not arguments, so we cannot infer that because one element of a myth is not to 
430ne might also think Timaeus can be read as saying that souls are in spatial rotation while 
they reside within bodies, but only figuratively in motion when disembodied. I doubt whether 
Timaeus' account leaves any room for souls that are disembodied in every sense, for there are no 
empty spaces in Timaeus' universe. So every soul will be, at the least, co-located with some body. 
Beyond this, I see no evidence for treating disembodied souls differently from embodied ones. 
Since the only evidence available claims that souls are in spatial rotation, we should adopt this 
reading for all cases. 
44Granted, Plato's texts contain much that is bizarre. But the scholars I have in mind suppose, I 
suppose, that the myths need not be given the same interpretive weight as the more argumentative 
passages. I take no position on this approach here; my point is just that some have found the claim 
that souls move through space - a claim found outside as well as within the mythical passages -
too bizarre to attribute to a great philosopher. 
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be taken literally, some other element, even one depending on it, should not be 
taken literally either, since the dependence involved is not the logical kind. So 
the figurative status of some parts of Timaeus' account cannot decide what we 
should think about his claims that souls rotate. To decide how to take this group 
of claims, we must look for other arguments. 
Evidence for Spatial Motion 
I begin by surveying passages in which Timaeus either says or takes for granted 
that souls move spatially.45 For there are simply too many such passages in the 
Timaeus for them to be taken plausibly as symbolic of something non-spatial, es-
pecially since, as we will see in the following section, there are no proposals on 
the table specifying what this something could be. If Timaeus referred only oc-
casionally to souls moving spatially, and if these passages were peripheral to the 
main concerns of the dialogue, then one might think that spatial motion, like the 
single mention of the Demiurge's mixing bowl, is not a feature of the account we 
are meant to take seriously. But since Timaeus refers to souls moving spatially 
many times, and these passages include many important parts of his speech, it is 
not plausible to suppose that all these references really mean something else -
especially since we have nothing to fill in the "something else" with. Moreover, 
the suggestion that spatial motion symbolizes "change" in general will not work 
in this dialogue either. 
When Timaeus begins to describe the creation of the World Soul, he says that 
the god "extended [the soul] throughout the whole body" (34b3-4).46 Shortly af-
45The survey will not be exhaustive, but includes the most significant passages from the Timaeus. 
460n a related issue, Archer-Hind points out that the soul is supposed to be interfused through-
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terward, he repeats that the World Soul is located throughout the body of the uni-
verse "from the center on out in every direction to the outermost limit of the 
heavens;' and adds that the soul rotates within itself (36e2-4).47 Bumyeat writes 
of this passage, "The spatial language is unmistakable. Soul, both human and di-
vine, has extension in three dimensions."48 johansen takes the same view: 
For Timaeus, then, thinking is a form of circular motion. This position 
is likely to strike us as odd, to say the least ... At this point it is tempt-
ing to say, with many scholars, that the language of cyclical motion is 
merely an image. Thinking is not literally a circular motion, it is only 
like it in certain respects. However, unless we take the circular mo-
tions of the soul literally we have no way of understanding how the 
soul moves round with the planets. The circular motions of the plan-
ets are also the motions of the thinking world soul...Here there seems 
no alternative to taking the notion of thinking as circular motion lit-
erally.49 
johansen's argument can be repeated for most of the passages I will mention: it is 
hard to make sense of any of them unless the motions of souls are literally spatial. 
out the universe's body, so it is puzzling that the soul is also described as forming two intersecting 
circles. His solution is to "regard the two circles simply as a framework ... denoting the directions 
of the two movements. (Archer-Hind 1888, p. 112 ad 2). Cornford's interpretation is based on 
the axiom that the motions of the World Soul and those of the body of the universe must be the 
same, but he nevertheless denies that the motions of the World Soul are spatial. I believe this is an 
inconsistent position. (Cornford 1937, pp. 78-93) 
47 Carone notes that the rotation of the World Soul implies space. But she goes on to argue that 
space implies body because there is no void in Plato's universe. Fronterotta rightly rejects the 
latter claim: Carone (2005, p. 44), Fronterotta (2007, p. 232). The mistake in Carone's reasoning 
is that while any space must have some body filling it, it does not follow that if a soul and a body 
occupy the same space, the soul must occupy that body. It is at least possible to hold that souls 
and bodies can be (merely) co-located, where this is a less intimate relation than that of a soul's 
occupying a body. Aristotle takes the motions of the World Soul as spatial: de Anima 407a1, as does 
Karfik (2005, p. 198) and Karffk (2004, p. 177). 
48He adds, "This does not make it corporeal ... Soul ... as a non-corporeal thing, must be invisible 
and intangible, without secondary qualities. But this is compatible with its having extension in 
three dimensions and primary qualities such as size or shape -just like the abstract, non-sensible 
objects of solid geometry:' (Burnyeat 2000, pp. 58-59) 
49Johansen (2004, pp. 139-140) 
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Some writers also note that the composition of the World Soul is guided by an 
axiom, taken over from Pre-Socratic philosophers, that "like is known by like."50 
Timaeus invokes this principle in his explanation of eyesight (OJ.lOlOV n:poc; OJ.lOlOV, 
45c4). IfTimaeus uses this principle, it is also likely that souls have spatial proper-
ties, since otherwise they will not be like visible things: they will not share loca-
tion, or size, or shape, or direction, or any secondary quality. One goal we can rea-
sonably attribute to Timaeus is to explain how souls are capable of knowing things 
in the visible world, and this goal requires him to find some common ground be-
tween visible things and souls. Spatial properties are a reasonable solution to this 
problem. 51 Spatial location and motion are two of a limited number of candidates 
for the common properties, then, and the only two for which there is good textual 
evidence that Timaeus attributes them to souls. 
At 41d4-42e4 Timaeus shifts his focus from divine souls to the creation of indi-
vidual human souls. 52 The Demiurge tells the lesser souls they will be responsible 
for dragging "that massive accretion of fire-water-air-earth into conformity with 
the revolution of the Same and uniform within him, and so [of subduing] that tur-
bulent, irrational mass by means of reason" (42c-d). The spatial reading is easier 
for this passage: the instruction to humans (and other creatures) to put their bod-
ies in "conformity" with the revolutions of the Same within themselves is clearer 
5°Cornford (1937, p. 94). Guthrie refers to the Pythagoreans and Empedocles for the view that 
like is known by like: Guthrie (1962, Volume I, pp. 206 and 209). 
51 It is, of course, unclear to what extent Timaeus thinks souls can know anything about the 
visible world. Surely he thinks there are serious limits on this kind of knowledge, but he must also 
think that souls can make true claims about the visible world. For my argument here, I only need 
to claim that Timaeus thinks souls capable of have some level of true belief about the visible world. 
52Taylor suggests that the point of having the Demiurge start fresh, with new ingredients of the 
same composition as the World Soul, is to make clear that human souls are neither emanations nor 
parts of the World Soul. (Taylor 1928, p. 255) 
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if the revolution in question is spatial. The Demiurge's instruction does not be-
come completely clear if we assume that the revolutions of the Same are spatial; 
nevertheless, it is much more clear than the alternative. What is clear in this pas-
sage is that the Demiurge is urging the lesser creatures to master their emotions, 
rather than being mastered by them. 53 The murky part of the passage, then, lies 
in just how the spatial movement of the Same and uniform on the one hand, and 
the spatial movements of the creature's body, on the other, are related when the 
creature masters its emotions, or when the opposite happens. But it seems clear 
enough that the creatures are being instructed to make some aspect of their bodies 
similar to, or the same as, some aspect of the revolution of the Same. The crude 
version of the thought here is: when the body moves like the revolution of the 
Same, one masters the emotions; when the body moves differently from it, one is 
mastered by them. 
Now if the revolution of the Same is spatial, it is at least clear what the body 
is being compared to, even though it remains unclear what respect the compari-
son focuses on. If, on the other hand, the revolutions of the Same are not spatial 
motions, but generic changes, the instruction becomes so vague that it is hard to 
imagine an interpretation on which it makes a substantive point. For on this view, 
we do not even know what kind of changes the "Same and uniform" undergoes, 
or can undergo, and without this basic parameter, we cannot know even vaguely 
what the creatures are supposed to do with their own bodies in order to overcome 
emotion. The non-spatial reading leaves us completely in the dark about what the 
53"And if they could master these emotions, their lives would be just, whereas if they were mas-
tered by them, they would be unjust." <!>v Ei }lEV Kpa't~O'OlEV, StKn ~l(~O'OlV'tO, Kpaujeevw; Se aSt-
Kt~. 42b2. 
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Demiurge means, whereas the text suggests that the Demiurge is trying to simplify 
his instructions, to make them easier to follow rather than more mysterious. 
Finally, on the assumption that the revolutions of the Same are not spatial, 
but generic changes, "revolutions of the Same" turns out to mean something like 
"changes of the Same." This is not necessarily self-contradictory, but will require 
careful explanation to avoid contradiction. And as we will see below, while anum-
ber of authors have proposed that the soul's motions are not spatial, but generic 
changes, no one has offered to explain what kind of changes these could be, or 
what these passages mean when read in that way. We need some proposal to give 
this formula content. I leave it to advocates of reading KtVf'(olc; as "change" to pro-
pose a reading on which this passage asserts something meaningful. 
Again at 43c-44c, Timaeus describes the souls of mortal creatures as over-
whelmed by the things flowing in from outside their bodies. These external streams 
"strike against" (npoon{motEV, 43c5) the soul, knocking its circles out of their 
proper paths. 54 Timaeus then (44d) explains that the human head was made spher-
ical in order to imitate the shape of the universe, and locates the divine part of the 
soul within the head. The soul thus has a location in space, and since the universe 
is described as "revolving" (nt:pt<pt:p£c;, 44d4), it is hard to resist the conclusion that 
the soul also revolves in space. 55 It is not much of a step from admitting that souls 
54 Also reading the passage this way are Karfik (2005, pp. 201 and 204-207), johansen (2004, p. 
139 n. 5). 
55 Sedley notes this passage in support of the claim that human souls move in space: Sedley (1997, 
p. 330). Although Cornford does not agree that souls have spatial motion, he does note at this point 
that Plato takes the design of the human body seriously, and that the main idea of this section is the 
comparison between the motions of the human body and those of the universe. (Comford 1937, 
p. 151) Karffk seems to read the motions of souls as literally spatial: Karfik (2005, p. 200). Thein, 
discussing a distinct question, denies that this passage shows that the Intelligible Living Thing is 
spherical, but says nothing directly about whether human souls are spherical: Thein (2006, pp. 
257-258). 
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have location in space to allowing them to move in space (if they could not, each 
soul would have to be permanently fixed in a single location - which is hardly 
plausible). Finally, Timaeus makes the same point again at 47b-c when he speaks 
about sight: the gods gave us the power to see so that we might "observe the or-
bits of intelligence in the heavens and apply them to the revolutions (m;:ptcpopac;) 
of our own understanding." This seems to mean that we are to observe the circu-
lar motions in the heavens and try to make the motions in our heads as similar as 
possible. If our souls do not literally revolve in our heads, then Timaeus is guilty 
of leaving out a crucial part of the explanation he is offering. 56 
Timaeus describes plants at 77a-c. Plants are alive, of course, and in virtue 
of this they must have some kind of soul. But their souls are of the same type as 
the lowest of the types given to humans, "the type that our account has situated 
between the midriff and the navel." This accounts for the facts that plants cannot 
reason or reflect, and cannot move themselves. Here Timaeus seems to say that 
it is because their souls do not rotate that plants are incapable of moving their 
bodies: 
... its formation has not entrusted it with a natural ability to discern 
and reflect upon any of its own characteristics, by revolving within 
and about itself...Hence (Bu)) it is alive ... but it stays put, standing fixed 
and rooted, since (Bta) it lacks self-motion. (77b7-c5)57 
56Sedley (1997, pp. 329-330) 
57Scholars have taken several views of what this passage says: Archer-Hind supposes that al-
though plants cannot locomote, they can move within themselves. Taylor thinks plants have a 
very limited kind of self-motion, consisting of responses to external stimuli. Comford takes the 
passage to mean that plants cannot move themselves, but says they must nevertheless have some 
kind of self-motion, since this is the definition of soul. Broadie writes that "for [Plato] the power of 
autonomous locomotion entails possession of reason." Archer-Hind (1888, p. 288), Taylor (1928, p. 
543), Comford (1937, p. 303), Broadie (2003, p. 29). The final sentence may shift its subject from the 
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Timaeus says here that the power of self-locomotion in a body depends on having 
a soul that moves itself. This statement does not entail that he is thinking of souls 
as moving spatially, but this is the most natural and straightforward way of taking 
his claims. 
This is the best place to notice a puzzle raised by this passage as well: Timaeus 
refers to the souls of plants, and apparently thinks of soul as self-moving, but 
also denies that plant souls have self-motion ("since [the plant's soul] lacks self-
motion;' l)ux TO tii<; ucp' EaUTOU KlV~O'E:W<; EO"'t'e:pfjcr9at, 77c4-5). To preserve consis-
tency, it must be the case either that what plants have (and by extension the low-
est part of human "souls" as well) is not, strictly speaking, a soul, or that Timaeus 
does not subscribe to the definition of souls as self-movers. If I am right, then, 
the lowest part of the human soul is not really a soul at all, but may be given that 
name here either causa honoris, or because no better name is available. Perhaps 
the reason is that what plants have is, strictly, the lowest component of a full soul. 
In general a part of a thing X need not itself be an X, so it is plausible that plant 
"souls" are not real souls, but only soul-parts. They may be enough to confer life, 
but insufficient to confer the other properties of things with complete souls. 
Near the end of the dialogue Timaeus says, "the best of the motions is one that 
occurs within oneself and is caused by oneself," adding that this kind of motion 
"bears the greatest kinship to understanding and to the motion of the universe" 
(89al-3).58 The fact that Timaeus compares self-motion both to understanding 
entire plant to the plant's soul: the plant as a whole is alive, but stays rooted in one place, since 
its soul lacks self-motion. Although Timaeus does not signal the shift of subject explicitly, this 
reading saves his sentence from redundancy, since the alternative reading would be: "the plant as 
a whole is alive, but stays rooted in one place since the plant as a whole cannot move itself." 
58Taylor draws the natural conclusion that what makes this kind of motion best is that moving 
oneself physically is an imitation of the soul's self-movement. Taylor (1928, p. 626) 
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and to the motion of the universe suggests that he is thinking of all three instances 
as belonging to the same kind. Since the motion of the universe is spatial, the other 
two types are also spatial. 
Timaeus recommends that the only way to care for anything is to provide it 
with the "nourishment and the motions that are proper to it. And the motions 
that have an affinity to the divine part within us are the thoughts and revolu-
tions of the universe (ai -roO nav-ro<; Otavo~crEl.C; Kai neptq>opai)" (90c6-dl). The 
way Timaeus joins "thoughts and revolutions" here shows again that he thinks of 
them as members of the same type, namely spatial motions. 
I have cited many examples here, perhaps past the reader's patience. But the 
multiplication of cases is part of my argument: although it is true that none of 
these passages provides an absolutely sure argument that soul-motions are spa-
tial, it is important to take stock of how often these claims occur in Timaeus' 
speech. His treatment of soul-motions as spatial is constant and pervasive. We can 
now ask whether these statements are best read literally, or if this is all part of the 
imagistic, non-literal part ofTimaeus' account, like the Demiurge's mixing-bowl. 
The difference between these passages and the mixing-bowl should now be clear: 
the Kpa-rfjpa is mentioned once only, and Timaeus makes no significant claim that 
cannot be formulated without mentioning it. The spatial motions of souls, how-
ever, are mentioned many times, and form part of many significant claims in the 
dialogue. Anyone proposing that these are not literally spatial motions should 
explain what equally specific idea they express; without such a proposal, such a 
reading reduces a relatively more clear and specific set of claims to pretty imagery 
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standing for nothing. 59 
Evidence for Self-Motion 
Finally, it is not difficult to show that Timaeus thinks of souls as self -locomotors, 
not just as locomotors. At 3 7b5 Timaeus, speaking about the circles of the Same 
and Different within the World Soul, refers to what is happening "within the self-
moved thing" (E:v ni;> KlVOUllEV(f> ucp' auroO). He is clearly referring to the World 
Soul as moving itself.60 It is therefore likely that he thinks of all souls this way. 
For while Timaeus never defines soul, it is a fair assumption that if he thinks self-
movement is an important property of one soul, he attributes the same property 
to all souls. His comments on plants, too, when they explain lack of bodily loco-
motion by the fact that plants' souls lack the power of self-motion, imply that all 
other souls have this power. So these two texts each reveal that Timaeus attributes 
self-motion to souls. 
Non-Spatial Readings 
A number of scholars have thought that the motion of souls cannot be spatial. 
Thus, for example, Archer-Hind: 
59Johansen writes, " .. .for Timaeus the motions of body and mind both fall under a general me-
chanics explaining the motions of extended figures (whether two- or three-dimensional) in space." 
Oohansen 2004, p. 142) 
60Most scholars have agreed that this is a reference to the World Soul, meaning that Timaeus 
thinks of the World Soul as a self-mover. Those reading the reference as to the World Soul: Karfik 
(2005, p. 215 n. 90), Carone (2005, pp. 47 and 214 n. 93). Only Cornford has suggested that the 
reference is to the universe's body, but agrees that if this is right, the body's movement is due to 
the World Soul: Cornford (1937, p. 94 n. 2). Taylor notes that there is no mention of the definition 
of souls as self-movers when the Demiurge makes the World Soul (35a-b), but nevertheless thinks 
that, according to Timaeus, self-movement is a proprium of souls: Taylor (1928, p. 178). 
Plato does not of course mean that the immaterial and indivisible essence 
of soul is composed of circles and distributed in mathematical pro-
portions. The circle is with him a common symbol of the activity of 
thought: and by assigning the harmonic numbers to soul he declares 
that whatever relations or harmonies, mathematical or otherwise, are 
found in the world of space and time, these are the natural expression 
in material terms of some eternal law of soul. 61 
AndSkemp: 
Plato regards the activity of thought as a KtV110tc;, not in space and so 
not bodily, whose EiKwv is the rotation of a sphere.62 
201 
While the predominant reading of the soul's KlV11otc; in the first three quarters of 
the twentieth century was figurative, interpretations in this tradition said noth-
ing specific about what Timaeus or Plato was trying to express with the image 
of circular motion in souls.63 We thus have Archer-Hind suggesting that spatial 
motion represents "some eternal law of soul;' and Skemp who is wholly silent on 
what kind of KlV11otc; is meant if not bodily or spatial movement. This is the first 
problem with this reading: as we have seen, Timaeus draws on the claim that souls 
move spatially at many points in his speech. If these are all reduced to the bland 
and uninformative claim that there is "some eternal law" of souls, the text suffers 
61 Archer-Hind (1888, p. 114). Since he denies that souls are literally composed of circles, his 
denial presumably extends to the claim that those circles rotate. It is puzzling, then, that Archer-
Hind writes in the same commentary, "In the Timaeus ... there is a necessity for assigning to the 
KOO'J.lO~ the unchanging motion of the Same." (Archer-Hind 1888, p. 103) This is puzzling because 
it assumes that the motions of the cosmos (KOO'J.lO~) and the Same belong to the same type. And 
since the motion of the KOO'J.lO~ is locomotive revolution, it should follow that the Same experiences 
the same kind of motion. But this is just what Archer-Hind denies in the quotation above. 
62 Skemp (1942, p. 86). For similar views, see Ross (1961, p. 189), Lee (1976, pp. 84-86), Cherniss 
(1944, pp. 405-406). 
63 0ne might think, for example, that the circular imagery is meant to symbolize perfection. But 
this will not account for the large number of varied and specific claims Timaeus chooses to cast in 
circular terms. 
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the equivalent of reducing a color photograph to black and white. It is hard to be-
lieve that this claim, on which Plato has Timaeus place so much weight and return 
to so often, carries no substantive information about Timaeus' thought.64 
In the same vein, Brisson and Cornford agree that the reason the World Soul's 
center is put at the world's center is so that it can communicate its movement to 
the world as efficiently as possible.65 But, Brisson concludes, " ... on ne doit pas en 
inferer ... que l'ame a quelque chose a voir avec l'extension."66 But other things be-
ing equal, the co-location of the soul and body only helps explain the transmission 
of motion from one to the other if what is transmitted is spatial motion.67 Oth-
erwise the theory would also need to explain how "soul-motions" are also trans-
formed into spatial motions as they are transmitted, and why it is the case that hav-
ing co-located centers makes this transformation more efficacious. We can add a 
narrower argument against Brisson's suggestion as well: if Brisson's thought is 
that soul-motions (which, on his view, are non-spatial) are somehow transformed 
into spatial motions as they are transmitted to the body of the universe, it is hard 
to see why the World Soul's center should be placed at the center of the universe's 
body, unless the World Soul is itself extended. 
The motivation of these scholars (I speculate) is, perhaps, to avoid what they 
see as the unacceptably bizarre claim that souls literally move in space. But while 
64Cf. remarks by Lee, referring to Aristotle's criticisms of Plato's image of rotation: "He [Aristo-
tle] was even in some ways doing Plato more credit than do many of Plato's defenders, for whom 
the white flag of'mythicallanguage' seems to place the validity or defensibility of Plato's notions 
hors du combat:• Lee (1976, p. 99 n. 29). 
65Brisson (1994, p. 94), Cornford (1937, p. 93) 
66Brisson (1994, p. 339) 
67This point is also made by Archer-Hind, who says that since in the Timaeus the distinction 
between spirit and matter is obliterated, it is necessary to give both the same motions. But he 
then (inconsistently) denies that soul is extended: Archer-Hind (1888, pp. 102 and 104). 
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this claim is difficult to explain, it fits Timaeus' and Plato's other statements better 
than the non-spatial reading. Let us follow the same strategy as earlier sections 
of this chapter, comparing what the two approaches say about Timaeus' view that 
souls are self-movers. 
Grant for the moment that souls are referred to as self-movers by Timaeus. 
The claim means one of the following: 
1. Souls cause themselves to move through space. 
2. Souls cause themselves to change. 
Much remains obscure on either version, but the implications of the two differ by 
enough to prefer the former over the latter. To see the difference, consider this 
passage: 
And he [the Demiurge] bestowed two movements upon each of 
them [the fixed stars]. The first was rotation, an unvarying move-
ment in the same place, by which the god would always think the same 
thoughts about the same things. The other was revolution, a forward 
motion under the dominance of the circular carrying movement of 
the Same and uniform. With respect to the other five motions the gods 
are immobile and stationary, in order that each of them may come as 
close as possible to attaining perfection. Ktvt1cre:u; 8£ Mo npocrfj\jJe:v 
fKacr-r~, n')v }lEV EV -ra\m~ Ka-ra -rau-ra, ne:pt -rwv au-rwv ad -reX: au-ra 
€au-r~ 8taVOOU}lEV~, n')v 8£ e:ic; -ro np6cr9e:v, uno -rfjc; -rau-rou Kai O}lOl-
ou ne:ptcpopac; Kpa-rou}.!Ev~· -rae; 8£ nine: Ktvt1cre:tc; aK{vfJ-rov Kai €cr-r6c;, 
iva on }laAlCJ"t'a au-rwv EKacr-rov YEVOl"t'O we; aptcr-rov. (40a7-b4) 
Timaeus assigns two motions to each star, both circular, but only the first, rotation, 
constitutes the thinking of these gods. The second, revolution, somehow puts the 
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gods "under the dominance of ... the Same and uniform," but apparently does not 
itself constitute thinking. The final sentence, specifying that the other five kinds 
of motion are not given to these gods, shows that all these are all spatial motions. 
Now Timaeus says that the reason these gods have none of the other five mo-
tions is to bring them as close to perfection as possible. There is reason, albeit a 
somewhat speculative one, to think that it is the second motion that limits the 
gods' perfection here, rather than the first. For in the myth of the Statesman we 
will see that rotation in a single direction is treated as a perfect imitation of the Demi-
urge. So if the gods discussed here are less than perfect, this may be in virtue of 
their revolutions, not their rotation. 
We have, tentatively, isolated the motion identified with thinking in this pas-
sage as rotation.68 Now Timaeus says that rotation guarantees that these gods will 
"always think the same thoughts about the same things:' I do not pretend to un-
derstand what connection Plato saw between rotation and thinking: the passage 
treats them as identical, but how or why is not explained at all.69 But we can ask 
which interpretation this claim fits better, the view that souls cause themselves 
to rotate in space, or that they cause themselves to change. 
There is a simple, direct, and obvious sense in which spatial rotation resem-
bles "always think[ing] the same thoughts about the same things," namely that 
rotation is an unvarying and uniform motion.70 As an object rotates, it repeats the 
68The following argument goes through in much the same way even if one thinks that thinking 
consists ofboth motions, rather than just the first. The assumption that thinking is identical with 
rotation simplifies the argument, so I will proceed as if this point is established. 
69Cf. Lee: "He is not 'explaining' his analogy here, but merely expressing it, as he had done 
before, and presupposing its validity." (Lee 1976, pp. 72-73) 
70It seems clear that Timaeus in this passage and the Stranger at Laws 893c-d are speaking of 
rotation in a single direction and at constant speed, although they do not state this explicitly. 
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same motion indefinitely. If we grant Timaeus his assumption that spatial motion 
is identical to thinking, then it is easy to see how he can arrive at the thought that 
to repeat the same spatial motions is to think the same thoughts.71 And since rota-
tion is apparently special for Timaeus because it repeats itself indefinitely, while 
straight-line motions must either stop or bend at some point, there is a natural 
fit between the claim that these gods always think the same thoughts about the 
same things and the view that their thinking consists of rotation in space. 72 
But on the second, non-spatial version of the view, souls are self-changers. This 
produces an immediate tension, or perhaps even a contradiction, between souls 
as self-changers and Timaeus' assertion that the motion (read "change") of these 
gods is identical to their thinking. For the following set of claims is inconsistent: 
1. The fixed gods always think the same thoughts about the same things. 
2. The fixed gods always move, that is, cause themselves to change. 
The explanation of motion in the second point is supposed to be equivalent to the 
gods' thinking. 
71 We might compare the identification of motion and thought in the Platonic texts to contem-
porary physicalist claims that mental events (or properties) are identical to physical events (or 
properties). At a sufficiently general level, this position too claims that thinking is identical with 
certain motions. This does not, of course, render Plato's texts any less opaque to us, but it argues 
for more patience if we find Timaeus' position bizarre. It is, after all, possible both to believe that 
(some version of) contemporary physicalism is the best theory of mind, and also to find it bizarre; I 
take it that something like this combination of thoughts lies behind the common appellation "the 
hard problem." 
72Chemiss takes the view that "axial rotation ... is the physical result of self-consistent thought 
about unchanging objects:· (Cherniss 1944, p. 404 n. 331) He thus seems to say that there is a 
natural fit between the two phenomena, but also to maintain that thought is something other than 
spatial motion, not identical to it, since on his view thought produces, and is therefore distinct from, 
spatial motion. 
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I see two ways of parsing this non-spatial reading, neither leading to a work-
able result. First, the changes involved might be limited in number, and the gods, 
perhaps, change the states they occupy among the available options. For exam-
ple, the gods might change themselves constantly by continuously alternating be-
tween red and blue. So the gods could cause themselves to change constantly, and 
these motions could be equivalent to their thinking. On a reading like this it will 
be clear how Timaeus can say that these gods "always think the same thoughts 
about the same things." The faults of this approach, however, are obvious: there 
is no textual support for this approach, it introduces arbitrary lists of changes and 
limitations on them, and it can provide no account of why these changes should be 
equivalent to thinking. If one is worried that making spatial motion equivalent to 
thinking is bizarre, this is clearly worse. 
Second, one might opt for the completely general sense of "change;' so that 
the gods' motions consist of any and all changes of state. This reading has some 
of the problems just listed, but its main fault is other: there is a tension, possibly 
a contradiction, between the claims that the gods think the same thoughts about 
the same things, the claim that they continually change themselves, and the claim 
that their movements (changes) are equivalent to their thinking. For it is hard to 
see how items in the set of the gods' thoughts can stay the same while the gods' 
movements, and therefore their mental states, constantly change. 
Since the non-spatial alternative has these problems, while the spatial read-
ing lacks them, we should read KlVTJOlc; as spatial motion in the Timaeus as well. 
Since this result applies to the souls of the fixed stars, which are gods, this is likely 
Timaeus' view about all souls: there is no reason to think he treats mortal souls 
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differently from divine ones when discussing basic characteristics such as these. 
Contrary to what some have thought, then, the most embarrassing reading to at-
tribute to Plato is the one that denies the literalness of the claim that souls move 
through space. 
3.4 Statesman 269a-274e 
The myth at Statesman 269a-274e does not say directly that mental activities are 
motions, but one of the myth's claims entails this. This passage also treats uniform 
rotation in the same direction as satisfying the predicate remaining in the same state. 
This is a surprising move, given that Platonic texts such as the Phaedo and Republic 
seem committed to treating any spatial motion as a change in state. I will not 
attempt any larger-scale diagnosis of what this shift means. That it is a different 
treatment of rotation seems clear; whether it signifies a promotion of rotation to a 
higher rank or a loosening of the concept of changelessness would require a more 
wide-ranging investigation than space permits here. 
At 268c the Eleatic Visitor tells Theaetetus that they have not yet defined the 
Statesman fully, because they have described him without ruling out a number 
of other experts who might be confused with him. He proposes to tell a story, 
promising that it will prove useful in carrying out this next step. The myth he 
tells says that the universe turns sometimes in one direction and sometimes in 
the other. During some of these periods (such as the one we are now living in), 
the sun and stars turn from east to west, and people grow older with time, while 
during the other periods, the heavens rotate in the opposite direction and people 
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spring out of the earth and grow younger with time.73 The important feature of 
the story for my argument is the reason given by the Visitor that the universe 
could not go on turning in the same direction all the time: if it were to do so, it 
would be too similar to "the most divine things of all." 
VISITOR: Remaining permanently in the same state and condition, 
and being permanently the same, belongs only to the most divine 
things of all, and by its nature body is not of this order .. .In conse-
quence it is impossible for it [sc. the cosmos] to be altogether exempt 
from change, although as far as possible, given its capacities, it moves 
in the same place, in the same way, with a single motion; and this is 
why it has reverse-rotation74 as its lot, which is the smallest possible 
variation of its movement. To turn itself by itself forever is, I dare say, 
impossible for anything except the one who guides all things that are 
in movement...(269d5-e6, Rowe's translation slightly modified) :::E. To 
K<X'ra raura Kal wcraurw<; EXEW ad Kal raurov dval TOi<; mxvrwv 8ElO-
raTOl<; npOcnlKEl }lOVOl<;, O"W}laTo<; 8£ cpucrt<; OU TaUTTJ<; Til<; ra~EW<; ... o8EV 
aur0 }lETa~o.A.fj<; a}lotp<.p yiyvEcr8at Ota navro<; aMvarov, Kara Mva-
}llV YE }lfJV on }laAtcrra EV •0 aur0 KaTa raura }ltav cpopav KlVElT<Xl' 
010 TfJV avaKUKATJO"lV ElATJXEV, on cr}llKporaTTJV rfj<; auroif5 KlV~O"EW<; 
napa.A.Aa~lV. aUTO 8£ £auro crrpE<:pElV ad crxEOOV OU0Evl8uvarov n.A.iJv 
r0 TWV KlVOU}lEVWV au naVTWV iJyoU}lEVtp· 
This passage is surprising for the claim that rotation in the same direction would 
73 Skemp and Taylor discuss the features this myth shares with the Timaeus and Phaedrus; they 
find important differences as well as many basic similarities in the astronomy and cosmology, es-
pecially when comparing the Statesman and Timaeus. what matters for my argument is that all 
three dialogues claim that souls are in motion insofar as they think. Skemp (1962, pp. 89-90), 
Taylor (1961, pp. 206-210). 
74The word translated as "reverse-rotation" (or variants with the same meaning) by most trans-
lators, ava:KUKAT]crtv, is taken by Delcomminette instead as "le mouvement circulaire recurrent". 
That is, he explains the prefix ava:- by the fact that circular movement keeps returning to spaces 
already traversed. I follow the more usual understanding of this passage, on which "ava:xul<AT]-
crtv" means the universe periodically reverses its direction of rotation. Note that Delcomminette's 
reading violates the Stranger's explanation in the text, since it leaves both the universe and "the 
one who guides all things" both turning in a single direction forever. (Delcomminette 2000, p. 176 
n. 46) 
751 follow the manuscript reading a:irr:oO rather than Robinson's emendation n:po roO. 
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amount to "remaining permanently in the same state and condition." One would 
have expected that rotation, being a kind of motion/6 would suffice to put the 
rotating thing in a different state than "the most divine things of all." But instead 
we learn that the universe must change the direction in which it rotates in order 
to be in a different state from those divine things. 
The first question in understanding the claim is what the divine things are 
that the universe is not allowed to resemble too closely. Whatever these things 
are, the passage asserts that they are in permanent rotation in a single direction. 
There are two candidates: "the god" of this myth (perhaps along with the other 
gods mentioned), and the Forms. There are two reasons that the Visitor must be 
referring to the god(s).77 First, the Forms are never mentioned explicitly, either in 
the myth or in the whole dialogue.78 Further, it would be hard to believe that the 
Forms are being said to rotate here without some corroborating evidence, prefer-
ably another text that said or implied this about the Forms. 
Those who argue that the comparison is to the Forms usually base this view 
on the similarity of language used at 269d5 to that used to describe Forms in the 
Phaedo or Timaeus.79 But if the comparison is between the body of the universe and 
the Forms, the Visitor has failed to give any reason that the universe must change 
the direction of its rotation. For there is no reason to think that the cosmos is in the 
"same state and condition" as the Forms in the first place, so reversing its direc-
tion of rotation does not lessen the (already non-existent) resemblance between 
76 See Chapter 2, page 106, for Plato's taxonomy of motions. 
77Miller assumes this is the case as well: Miller (1980, p. 38). 
78 As Rosen recognizes at (1995, p. 45). 
79It is often thought that the comparison is with Forms: Rieken (2008, p. 113), White (2007, p. 
40), Plato (2003a, p. 227 n. 103), Delcomminette (2000, p. 181 n. 60), Robinson (1995a, p. 93), Rosen 
(1995, p. 45), Kahn (1992, p. 56). 
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them.80 Since the Forms do not rotate, the universe could not come to resemble 
them too much by rotating in only one direction. So the comparison must be ei-
ther to the god, or jointly to the god and the Forms, and either is sufficient to carry 
my point. Finally, while most scholars rely on similarity of language to conclude 
that the Visitor is referring to the Forms, the most natural thing to receive the 
epithet 9et6-raro<; ("god-like") would be 6 9e6<; or oi 9Eo{ ("the god(s)"). 
So the "most divine things" must be the god or gods mentioned throughout the 
myth. Since these gods are souls, the Visitor must think that these souls rotate just 
the way the body of the cosmos does. Otherwise, the cosmos would not need to 
change directions in order to differ in condition from the god(s). So the passage 
only makes sense if the souls of the gods rotate. Now it is possible to distinguish 
this claim logically from the claim that the mental activities of the gods are a kind 
of rotation, but it is hard to see any reason for doing so. If the Visitor holds that 
the souls of the gods are in rotation, then the gods' mental activities must be a 
kind of motion as welP1 For in the case of the gods, mental activity is identical 
with activity tout court. 
There is, however, a way of reading the passage quoted above so that it con-
tradicts my argument. The final sentence says that turning oneself forever is im-
80Rowe also notes that this is what the Visitor promises to explain: Rowe (1995, p. 188 ad d2). 
Rosen writes, "The implication is evident: the gods are not the most divine of beings; not even the 
divine demiurge is of this order (taksis)." Rosen (1995, p. 45). Far from evident, this conclusion 
seems entirely unwarranted, since the word taksis is used to separate the universe from what is 
most divine on the grounds that the former has a body. So nothing follows about whether or not 
the Demiurge is part of what is most divine. White tries an explanation of the reverse rotation 
according to which the reversal is necessary because "such motion displays the 'least deviation' 
from the cosmic motion instilled by the demiurge." White (2007, p. 41) (emphasis added). But the 
text does not say the universe has to vary the motion the Demiurge has given it; it says the universe 
cannot remain in the "same state and condition" as the Demiurge. 
81Those agreeing that the god in the myth is in rotational motion: Miller (1980, p. 37), Taylor 
(1961, p. 275). 
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possible, "nA~V rcA;> "t'WV KlVOUpfvWV a3 mXV"t'WV ~YOU}lEV!f>." Rowe translates this 
phrase, "except the one who guides all the things that, unlike him (a3), are in 
movement." He thus takes a3 to mark a contrast between the god and the things in 
movement which the god guides.82 But this translation is not forced by the Greek, 
and produces nonsense when its implications are spelled out. For the whole sen-
tence of which this phrase is a part says that this god is capable of turning himself 
by himself forever. On Rowe's translation, then, the Visitor says that this god both 
is able to turn himself forever and is not in motion.83 The statement would thus 
amount to a re-definition of motion, on which turning oneself forever does not 
count as a form of motion. Rowe's approach thus arrives at a destination very 
close to my own by another path. Nevertheless, while I shall argue that my read-
ing enacts a re-classification of rotation as "remaining permanently in the same 
state and condition, and being permanently the same;' Rowe's translation simply 
contradicts itself, claiming at once that the god is and is not in motion. 
One might try two arguments that this does not amount to a contradiction. 
First, the Visitor says merely that the god is capable (Buvarov) of turning himself 
forever, not that he actually does so. Being capable of some action, but not actu-
ally doing it, does not a contradiction make. But the Visitor is discussing his basic 
metaphysical assumptions here, and at this level it is much harder to draw a line 
between possibility and actuality. For example, at Republic 380c-381c Socrates ar-
gues that it is impossible for the gods to change themselves. His argument is not 
that the gods lack the power to change themselves, but that they are incapable of 
wanting to do so, since any change would have to be a change to a worse state, and 
82His brief explanation of this interpretation is at (1995, p. 188 ad e6) 
83The same point is made by Delcomminette at (2000, p. 177 n. 48) 
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they know this. Likewise here, if the god is capable of turning himself forever, but 
fails to do so, there would have to be some reason that this would be bad for him. 
And if it were bad for the god to turn himself forever in this way, then it would 
not be true that he could do it - in fact, he could not. So to say the god is able to 
do this is equivalent to saying that he does do it. 
The other way of arguing that this is not a contradiction is to invoke the con-
cept of "spiritual motion."84 This allows us to say that the motion of the body of 
the cosmos and the motion of the god are of two different kinds. So the Visitor 
says here that the god is not in physical motion as the body of the universe is; he 
does not deny (nor does he affirm) that the god is in spiritual motion. I objected 
to this distinction above, but there is a further reason that it will not work here: 
the Visitor's stated reason that the body of the universe must change directions 
is that otherwise it would be in the same state as the god. If there are two senses 
of motion, the universe and the god would not be in the same state except analo-
gously. And while the Visitor has announced that he is telling a story such as one 
tells children, he is arguing here, and thus needs the similarity between universe 
and god to be stronger than a mere analogy - he needs a real similarity. So this 
way of defending Rowe's translation undermines the Visitor's argument. 
Delcomminette defends a strong version of this approach: he cordons off the 
movements of the soul as "d'ordre psychique;' and also denies that there is any 
reversal of the direction of the universe's rotation. In his view, the argument of 
the passage runs: 
84For opposing views on this point see Rieken (2008, pp. 113-114), Delcomminette (2000, p. 177 
n. 48), Skemp (1962, pp. 105-106). 
... contrairement aux Idees, le monde ne reste pas toujours identique 
a lui-meme; il n'est done pas eternel au sens strict du terme; sa tem-
poralite propre est bien plutot la duree, ce qui signifie qu'il est en de-
venir. L'opposition entre le monde et les Idees ne recouvre pas deux 
types de mouvements, mais bien plutot le changement et !'absence de 
changement, c'est-a-dire le devenir et leternite.85 
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I have two reasons for rejecting this reading. First, it has no explanation of why 
the Visitor says that avaKUKArJOW is the "smallest possible variation of its move-
ment" (o]ltKporarrJv rfi<; aurou Ktv~o£w<; rrapa.A.Aa~w). This phrase must refer to 
something that admits of degrees. Delcomminette's proposal that he is referring 
only to the difference between absence of change and change fails this test, for 
any change at all differs by an equal amount from the state of not-changing-at-all. 
Second, nothing in the text supports the distinction between psychic and physi-
cal movement. And this proposal also makes it impossible to say why the universe 
must undergo any particular change rather than anything else as the "smallest 
possible variation of its movement." For if the two types of motion share only the 
name "motion" but not its definition, there is again no way of determining what 
constitutes a greater or smaller difference between them: this would be like ask-
ing which differs more from a pumpkin, the color purple or the square root of 
three. To compare differences, they need to belong to some category in common, 
so that we can ask how much or to what extent the things share some property. 
Fortunately, we need not translate the sentence to say that the god himself 
is not in motion. In the first place, the word au need not indicate contrast: it 
may also signify merely that the speaker is adding something to his thought.86 
85 Delcomminette (2000, p. 183) 
86Liddell et al. (1996, s.v. aiS II) 
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Alternatively, the force of a() in this sentence may simply be the contrast between 
the god, who can turn himself forever, and the things he guides, which cannot. 
Finally, if one insists that a(J mark a contrast between the state of the god and the 
things he guides, we might take the contrast to be active versus passive, ~YOUJlEV<.p 
(active) versus KtvOUJlEVWV (passive). That is, the contrast is that the body of the 
universe is moved, while the god moves himself. The placement of a() between the 
two participles and immediately after KtvOUJlEVWV may favor this suggestion.87 
Finally, the claim that the god's mind is in motion when it guides the universe 
in a circle is consistent with the imagery of the myth.88 The Visitor says that 
the god sometimes accompanies [the universe], guiding it on its way and help-
ing it move in a circle (269c4-5). On my proposal, the reason that the god only 
accompanies the universe at some times is that the god rotates unidirectionally. 
So when the universe's rotation is reversed, necessarily the universe and the god 
are moving in different directions. Later the Visitor describes the change of direc-
tion in the cosmos' rotation by saying that "the steersman of the universe let go 
-as it were -of the bar of the steering-oars and retired to his observation post" 
(272e3-5). This image is resumed a page later, with "the god ... takes his position 
again at its steering-oars" (273d4-e2).89 
The myth therefore contains a surprising new claim, namely that something 
87Campbell has a somewhat different reading: "ai5 implies a contrast between the divinest of 
all things and the leader of all that is in motion. As the former alone can remain always the same, 
so the latter alone can revolve spontaneously for ever." (Campbell1867, pp. 47-48). This reading 
does not, as far as I can see, fit the sentence in which ai5 occurs; even if it is accepted, however, my 
argument would still go through. 
88Skemp also discusses the imagery of the god at the tiller, with conclusions similar to mine: 
Skemp (1962, p. 97). 
890ne could add the many elements of the Statesman myth that are identical with corresponding 
parts of the Timaeus. A thorough review of these is given by Brisson (1992, pp. 354-355). 
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causing itself to rotate forever can be said to be Kara raura Kai. wcraurwc; EX£1V ad 
Kat TaUTOV £ivat, "remaining permanently in the same state and condition, and 
being permanently the same." This formula largely reproduces Plato's favorite 
ways of describing the Forms, e.g. Phaedo 78c6, where they are said to be "a£1 Ka-
ra raura Kai wcraurwc; EX£t".90 So Plato has changed the criteria something must 
meet in order to "always remain the same and in the same state." In the Phaedo, 
while souls were able to do this, presumably they had to rid themselves of all forms 
of change to achieve it. Now the Statesman myth suggests that a soul rotating for-
ever qualifies fully as "remaining permanently in the same state and condition, 
and being permanently the same." Yet such a soul is also in continuous K{vfJcrtc;. 
This shift in standards suggests that in the Statesman, the Forms are not the only 
measure against which other entities are compared to determine their perfection; 
here the highest god enjoys a different kind of perfection which other souls can 
imitate more directly. 
3.5 Conclusion 
The Phaedrus, Laws, Timaeus, and Statesman all contain the view that the motions 
of souls are spatial, and that souls cause their own motions. The Self-Mover The-
ory makes these specific claims, rather than the generic claims that souls change, 
or cause their own changes. In addition, the Self-Mover Theory and the Kinetic 
Theory fit easily together to produce the Unified Theory, claiming that souls are 
the sources of all spatial motions whatsoever, and because all changes are spatial 
9°Kahn writes: "This is precisely the formula for invariance used to describe the forms in the 
middle dialogues." (Kahn 1992, p. 56) 
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motions, souls also become the sources of all changes whatsoever. 
Chapter 4 
The Unified Theory 
The results of Chapters 2 and 3 can also contribute to certain related debates about 
the psychology in Plato's dialogues. In this chapter I will apply the perspective of 
the earlier chapters to one of these debates, the reading of the argument about 
immortality at Phaedrus 245c-246a. Chapter 3 has already argued that this pas-
sage uses K{VY]crtc; and related words to mean "spatial motion"; here I will argue 
that the word l!Jux~. "soul," refers not to individual souls but to a collective sort 
of material, out of which individual souls are constructed. The Phaedrus and the 
Timaeus share a number of claims and assumptions about souls, their properties, 
and their "construction," and this common perspective suggests that the Unified 
Theory is more than a theoretical construct. There is a basis in Plato's texts for 
conjoining the claims making up the Unified Theory. 
The Phaedrus seems to assert that souls are uncreated, but the Timaeus de-
scribes the creation of the World Soul in great detail, and then refers to the subse-
quent creation of many other souls.1 In this chapter I show that what this passage 
1 Although there has been a recent movement among scholars, questioning the practice of com-
paring theories from different dialogues (see, for example, Gill (2002, p. 155)), discussion of this 
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shows to be immortal is the "material" from which individual souls are made, not 
souls qua individuals, both because of the earlier result from Chapter 3 and for fur-
ther reasons I introduce here.2 This result both reverses the judgment that these 
dialogues entail different perspectives, and may provide a new starting-point for 
further attempts to understand the psychology of these works.3 
4.1 TheText 
As in Chapter 3, I will be focusing on Phaedrus 245c5-246a2. This passage occurs at 
roughly the midpoint of the Phaedrus, just after Socrates begins a long speech in 
which he argues that love is a form of divine madness and a gift from the gods to 
mortals. A short distance into this speech, he announces that, "first, we must com-
prehend the truth about the nature of soul, both divine and human ... " (245c2-4). 
In the very condensed proof that follows, Socrates is usually thought to argue that 
sort is alive and well, both on the particular question I address in this chapter, and on related 
psychological questions involving the dialogues I discuss. Miller, for example, calls the conflict 
between the Phaedrus and the Timaeus on the createdness of individual souls "especially problem-
atic:' (2006, p. 291) Vlastos wrote, "The creation of soul in the Timaeus is in flat contradiction with 
the doctrine of the Phaedrus (though not of the Laws) that the soul is uncreated ... " (Vlastos 1964, p. 
414) McPherran compares the Republic and Phaedrus on a set of ideas about souls and gods (2006, 
pp. 93-95). Lorenz finds the Phaedrus and Timaeus taking contrary approaches to the question 
whether souls are tripartite (2008, p. 254). Gerson pursues comparative questions of psychology 
throughout much of Gerson (2003); see especially Chapter 6, on the Timaeus, Philebus, and Laws. 
21 use "material" for lack of a better term, to indicate that there is something out of which indi-
vidual souls are constructed, but without intending to claim that this stuff is any sort of matter or 
visible stuff. Whether it is any kind of matter or something completely different is a question for 
another project. 
3For another way of reconciling the Phaedrus and Timaeus, see Hackforth (1936, p. 442). As 
should be clear from the preceding chapters, it is no part of my project to show that Plato's di-
alogues are consistent on every point, or even on many points. But the issue discussed in this 
chapter is a common observation, so much taken for granted that its assertion is usually free of 
evidence or argument. So it is worth pointing out that this received opinion is not substantiated 
by the texts. 
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individual souls are neither created nor destroyed. In Chapter 3 I argued that 
in this passage, KlVYJ<n<; should be read as "spatial motion" rather than "generic 
change"; I will now argue that the word \jJux~ should be read collectively rather 
than individually, that is, that the word refers not to individual souls but to the 
kind of "material" or "stuff" out of which individual souls are constituted. 
Here we can focus on less than the full text of the argument; the relevant sec-
tion of the argument is concerned with a first principle. This part reads:4 
So only that which moves itself, because it does not abandon itself, 
never stops moving. But it is also source and first principle of move-
ment for the other things which move. Now the first principle is some-
thing which does not come into being .. .for if the first principle is de-
stroyed, neither will it ever come into being from anything itself nor 
will anything else come into being from it, given that all things must 
come into being from a first principle .. .It is not possible for this ei-
ther to be destroyed or to come into being, or else the whole universe 
and the whole of that which comes to be might collapse together and 
come to a halt, and never again have a source from which things will 
be moved and come to be. (Rowe's translation, slightly modified.) 
}!OVOV s~ t'O aUt'O KlVOUV, CXrE OUK arroi..Eirrov eaut'6, OUltOt'E .MyEt Kt-
VOU}!EVOV, &:Ua Kai t'Oi<; aUot<; ooa KtvEi'rat t'OUt'O ltYJ~ Kai apx~ Kt-
V~O'EW<;. ap~ Sf: ayEVYJt'OV ... apxfj<; yap s~ arrOAOJlEvYJ<; OUt'E aut'~ ltOt'E 
E:K t'OU OUt'E llio e~ EKElVYJ<; YEV~O'Et'at, ElltEp e~ apxfj<; SEi t'cX mivt'a y{-
yvEo8at ... t'OUt'O Sf: OUt'' arr6Uuo8at OUt'E yiyvEo8at Suvat'OV, ~ ltaVt'a 
t'E oupavov ltiXO'aV t'E yfjv Ei<; Ev O'UjlltEO'OUO'aV O't'fjVal Kat Jl~ltOt'E a0St<; 
EXElV o8EV KlVYJ8EVt'a YEV~O'Et'al. (245c7-dl, d4-6, d7-e2) 
4For the complete text of the proof, see page 159. 
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4.2 Interpretations of \fJux~ at Phaedrus 245c5-246a2 
The word t!Jux~ ("soul") appears five times in the proof passage, always without 
an article, and can thus be translated literally either as "soul" or "a soul."5 Prima 
facie, three interpretations are possible. 
1. t!Jux~ refers to soul as a collective or mass term, similar to "snow" or "water;' 
indicating an undifferentiated material or stuff that individual instances are 
composed of. 
2. t!Jux~ refers to individual souls (I shall call this the naive individual reading). 
3. t!Jux~ refers to the species "soul," implying that whatever is asserted of the 
species is also true of each individual member of the species (I shall call this 
the sophisticated individual reading). 
I will argue for the first interpretation. 
Scholars have differed on this question, with a recent trend toward the collec-
tive reading, which I shall also favor.6 Ferrari states the collective interpretation 
5The omission of articles is a general feature of this passage, and imitates archaic style. In this 
style, the use of a noun without an article can sometimes function as the equivalent of a proper 
name, as when ~aowuc; without an article refers to the Persian king. Unfortunately, this feature 
does not help in the interpretation of \jlux~ in this passage. For it is not plausible that \jlux~ refers 
to some particular soul only, and after eliminating this possibility, we are left with the question 
whether it refers to souls as individual entities, or to 'soul' as a kind of material. Cf. Gorgias 451c9, 
where ~A.{ou and OEA~VT]c; are used to mean "the sun" and "the moon," respectively; "soul;' how-
ever, is not a single item but a class. So I am asking what the passage would look like if rewritten 
more literally. To answer this question, we have to consider the content of the claims in the pas-
sage. Notice, further, that the passage cannot use 1jmx~ in both senses, since this would amount 
to equivocation. Claims about one sense of \jlux~ will not necessarily be true of the other sense 
(see further argument in main text for examples). In addition, the reasonable impression that the 
myth following this passage is about individual souls has no bearing here, since I am focusing only 
on how to read lJIUX~ within Phaedrus 245c-246a. Finally, this feature matches a pattern noticed 
in Chapter 1 for the Phaedo's claims about Forms: in both dialogues we fmd a set of claims, argu-
ments, and distinctions developed to reach a fairly specific goal, but the exact range of things the 
argument is supposed to apply to is never specified except vaguely. 
6Endorsers of the individual reading include Nicholson (1999, p. 156), Barnes (1979, p. 115), 
Patterson (1965, p. 114), Frutiger (1930, p. 134). The proof opens with the sentence 'l'ux~ niioa 
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most clearly: "Socrates' argument treats the soul as cosmic 'soul-stuff': the gen-
eral principle and source of change for the universe (245dl-e2).".7 
The argument for the collective reading can be stated simply: although a ca-
sual reading of the passage gives the impression that the proof is about individual 
souls, any careful reading assuming this encounters problems explaining the logic 
of the proof. We thus have to choose between explaining the passage as invalid in 
a basic and obvious way- for its supporting argument about a first principle ob-
viously fails on any individual reading- and explaining it as a valid argument for 
a perhaps surprising conclusion. I am unaware of any contextual or dramatic rea-
son that should lead us to expect this argument to be invalid, much less to contain 
obvious introductory-level errors. The choice, then, seems easy: both the prin-
ciple of charity and the context favor reading the argument as valid, even if this 
means revising the conclusion identified by the casual reading.8 Since the col-
&:9avat'o<; ("all soul is immortal"); this phrase has been scrutinized for a clue to the referent of 
\jlvx~ throughout the passage, but unsuccessfully. Frutiger gives a thorough but inconclusive ex-
amination of the grammar of the phrase (Frutiger 1930, pp. 130-134), taking the view that the pas-
sage is about each soul, but his argument is unconvincing, and he himself admits doubts. Skemp 
takes the same evidence to point in the opposite direction (1942, p. 3 n. 1). In view of the failure 
of Frutiger's approach, Hackforth concludes, "the distinction between collective and distributive 
senses is not here before his mind:' (Hackforth 1952, p. 64) Guthrie, and possibly De Vries, agree: 
De Vries (1969, p. 121), Guthrie (1962, Volume IV p. 419 n. 4). Taking the collective side, Robinson 
suggests the translation "soul in all its forms:' Robinson is following Skemp and Schleiermacher: 
Robinson (1995a, p. 111), Skemp (1942, p. 3), Schleiermacher (1855, p. 255). Others endorsing the 
collective reading are Blyth (1997, p. 186), Bett (1986, pp. 12-13), Griswold (1986, p. 84), Thompson 
(1868, p. 44). 
7Ferrari(1987,p. 124) 
8Here is a brief argument for the choice I favor, treating this passage as a valid argument for a 
surprising conclusion. Context gives us the following reasons to expect a strong argument. First, 
the argument is spoken by Socrates, who is characterized in the Phaedrus as the wiser and more 
sophisticated partner in the conversation. This is not to say that he is presented as infallible, but 
only that he is miles ahead of Phaedrus in his grasp of philosophy and argumentation: even if we 
do not accept the claim that Socrates should give a strong argument, we should certainly avoid 
readings that give him an obviously weak one. Second, Socrates himself approves of this speech as 
he arrives at its end (257a-b), and Phaedrus concurs that it is a much better speech than his first 
(257c). By comparison, Socrates shows little enthusiasm for the first speech he delivered, both 
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lective reading is counterintuitive, its justification depends on the fact that both 
versions of the individual reading produce a contradiction. So let us turn to the 
problem with the second, naive individual reading. 
The Individual Readings 
The naive individual reading will re-state the claims from the passage quoted above 
as follows: 
1. Each individual soul moves itself, and therefore ... 
2. ...each individual soulnever stops moving. 
3. But each individual soul is also a source and first principle of movement for 
the other things which move. 
4. Now an individual soul, being a first principle, is something which does not 
come into being. 
as he prepares to speak (237a) and even while still engaged in giving it (241d-e); after finishing 
this speech he repudiates it entirely (242d). But he never expresses this sort of suspicion toward 
his second speech. Finally, Socrates introduces the passage I am examining (245c5-246a2) by say-
ing," ... we must comprehend the truth (rllAT]9E<;, 245c4) about the nature of soul, both divine and 
human ... and the beginning of our proof (a7to5d~£w<;, 245c4) is this" (245c2-4). Socrates, then, an-
nounces this passage as a statement of the truth about soul. To defeat the expectation that the 
proof will be strong, and valid if possible, we would need a compelling reason. These are prima 
facie reasons for taking the content of Socrates' second speech seriously, and for the expectation 
that a passage presented as an argument will admit of a valid, non-amateurish reading. One may 
also ask: if I am interested in psychological claims, why not focus also on the myth following this 
argument, which narrates extensively about the travels and travails of souls in the heavens? While 
these claims are also fascinating, they are presented as a likeness of the truth, not as the truth itself. 
In assessing them, we thus face the problem of deciding what literal claims, if any, we can draw 
from this material. Since the argument at 245c5-246a2 is presented as the truth, not a likeness, 
we do not have this problem when discussing the proof. Further, since this passage is described as 
an argument or proof , we have a basis for drawing logical inferences from the claims made, and 
expecting that, in addition to the claims found explicitly in the text, the inferential conclusions 
should also hold. 
223 
5. For if an individual soul is destroyed, neither will it ever come into being 
from anything itself nor will anything else come into being from it, given 
that... 
6. ...all things must come into being from an individual soul. 
7. It is not possible for an individual soul either to be destroyed or to come into 
being, or else the whole universe and the whole of that which comes to be 
might collapse together and come to a halt, and never again have a source 
from which things will be moved and come to be. 
This set of claims creates a problem, however, for while claims 5 and 6 are 
supposed to justify claim 7, they fail to do so. If every individual soul is a source of 
movement, then if a single individual soul were to perish, many other sources of 
movement would remain, so that the consequence envisioned in 7 does not follow. 
Far from "never again hav[ing] a source from which things will be moved and come 
to be," there would be as many such sources as there were other individual souls 
that had not perished.9 The argument therefore provides no reason that any - or 
indeed, many - individual souls could not perish. The nai've individual reading 
produces an obvious non sequitur. 
Further, the results of Chapter 2 render it clearer why this reading fails. First, 
the Kinetic Theory provides a rationale for the otherwise surprising connection at 
the end of this argument between "movement" and "coming-to-be;' when Socrates 
says, "the whole universe ... might...come to a halt, and never again have a source 
from which things will be moved and come to be." On the Kinetic Theory, depriving 
the universe of its {unique) source of spatial motion would also deprive it of its 
9Miller and Bett concur that the argument requires that there be no more than one first princi-
ple of motion. Miller points out the viability of the mass reading as a solution to this puzzle, while 
Bettis led by this problem to adopt the mass-term reading: Miller (2006, p. 290), Bett (1986, pp. 
10-11). 
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source of coming-to-be. Conversely, every individual soul is a source of motion, 
and so also a source of coming-to-be. So reading the Phaedrus' immortality ar-
gument in conjunction with the Kinetic Theory both helps explain an otherwise 
anomalous choice of words in the Phaedrus passage, and may help explain why 
Socrates chooses to include his argument about the first principle of motion. Yet 
with or without the Kinetic Theory, the naYve individual reading fails to produce 
a valid argument for individual immortality. 
Other readings of \jmx~ are possible, but will reduce to one of the alternatives 
already set out. For example, one could read ¢ux~ as just referring to all individual 
souls directly, rather than referring to individual souls indirectly, and directly to 
the species. This is a distinct reading from the naYve individual reading, since that 
approach took ¢ux~ to refer to each individual soul. But this reading is not distinct 
from the sophisticated individual reading, in spite of appearing different from it 
at first. For this reading will either parse the argument's claims at the level of 
individual souls, as the naYve individual reading did, and suffer from the problems 
just seen for it, or it will parse the argument as applying to all souls at once, and 
suffer from the problems about to be described for the sophisticated individual 
reading. 
The third reading will parse the same passage somewhat differently, taking the 
claims as follows: 
1. The species 'soul; and therefore each individual soul, move themselves, and 
(therefore) ... 
2. The species 'soul; and therefore each individual soul, never stop moving. 
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3. But the species 'soul; and therefore each individual soul, are also the source 
and first principle of movement for the other things which move. 
4. Now the species 'soul' (and therefore each individual soul) being the first 
principle, does not come into being. 
5. For if the species 'soul' (and therefore each individual soul) is destroyed, 
neither will the species (and therefore any individual soul) ever come into 
being from anything itself nor will anything else come into being from it, 
given that ... 
6. All things must come into being from the species 'soul; and therefore from 
some individual soul. 
7. It is not possible for the species soul, and therefore for each individual soul, 
either to be destroyed or to come into being, or else the whole universe and 
the whole of that which comes to be might collapse together and come to 
a halt, and never again have a source from which things will be moved and 
come to be. 
Given claims 1 through 5, claim 6 presents a problem. I have parsed it as the 
claim that "all things must come into being from ... some individual soul...", since 
the alternative is "all things must come into being from ... all individual souls", 
which is plainly absurd. But "some" creates an invalid inference: if all things that 
come into being must do so from the species soul, what follows is that the species 
cannot perish, i.e. not all individual souls can perish. But the argument goes on, 
according to most readings, to claim that no individual soul can perish. This way 
of reading "soul" will not give Socrates a valid chain of reasoning, implying that 
this is not the claim he is advocating for. 
While more sophisticated than the naYve individual reading, this one fares no 
better logically. 
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The Collective Reading 
The first, collective reading of l!Jux~ solves these problems, yielding this set of 
claims: 
1. Soul-stuff moves itself, and therefore ... 
2. Soul-stuff never stops moving. 
3. But soul-stuff is also the source and first principle of movement for the other 
things which move. 
4. Now soul-stuff, being the first principle, is something which does not come 
into being. 
5. For if soul-stuff is destroyed, neither will it ever come into being from any-
thing itself nor will anything else come into being from it, given that ... 
6. All things must come into being from soul-stuff. 
7. It is not possible for soul-stuff either to be destroyed or to come into being, 
or else the whole universe and the whole of that which comes to be might 
collapse together and come to a halt, and never again have a source from 
which things will be moved and come to be. 
Since this reading of l!Jux~ is the only one to produce a valid argument, the 
text assumes the existence of "soul-stuff," that is, the "material" from which in-
dividual souls are constructed.10 Individual souls are made of soul-stuff, just as 
snowballs are made of snow. If all snow melts, it follows that there are no more 
snowballs, and if all the soul-stuff perishes, it follows that there are no more souls. 
So on the collective reading only, the argument is valid: if soul-stuff is the source 
10This conclusion is not strictly forced by the text. What the text demands is that we find some 
reading on which ljlux~ can be treated collectively, and on which Socrates' argument is valid (or 
at least does not suffer from obvious, elementary mistakes). Perhaps there is some other reading 
satisfying these conditions, but not recognizing "soul-stuff:' But I see no other plausible approach 
than to treat ljlux~ as "soul-stuff." 
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of movement, and if all the soul-stuff is destroyed, it follows that no source of 
movement will be left.11 The collective sense yields a valid and clear argument 
where the other two readings give invalid ones. None of the three readings yields 
a valid argument for individual immortality.12 The collective reading is valid be-
cause it removes the claim that individual souls cannot perish, reading in its place 
the claim that the whole mass of soul-stuff cannot perish. The three readings thus 
parse the structure of the argument in the same way, but only the first, reading 
l/Juxr1 collectively, produces a valid argument.13 
Textual Evidence for the Collective Reading 
I next show that textual evidence also favors the collective reading of l/Juxr1. Begin 
with the observation that apxr1 ("first principle") occurs exclusively in the singular 
in the passage: if each soul individually were supposed to be an apxr1, it would be 
110ne might object that the text does not specify that all the soul-stuff is destroyed - it says 
only that the apxt1 is destroyed. So why do I parse this claim, in the first case, as "an individual soul 
is destroyed," but in the second as "all the soul-stuff is destroyed"? On the assumption that ¢uxt1 
refers to individual SOulS, then the sentence t'OU't'O nTJY~ K<Xl apx~ KWJlOEW<;, "this iS SOUrCe and first 
principle" must mean, "an individual soul is source and first principle." So the subsequent claims 
about an apxJ1 are also about individual souls, and apxfic; yap 0~ arcoAO}l€vT]c;, "for if a first principle 
is destroyed," can be recast as "for if an individual soul is destroyed." But on the assumption that 
¢uxt1 refers to soul-stuff, the sentence rouro TCT]Y~ Ko:i apx~ Ktvt1crewc;, "this is source and first 
principle" must mean, "soul-stuff is source and first principle." Since any claim about soul-stuff as 
a kind applies to the whole of that kind, the subsequent claims about the apxt1 is about the material 
or kind that soul-stuff is. So when we reach apxfic; yap oi] arcoAO}l€vT]c;, "for if a first principle is 
destroyed," we should read this as, "for if soul-stuff is destroyed." The natural meaning of this is 
"if all soul-stuff is destroyed;' not merely some. 
12Griswold also concludes that personal immortality is not the goal of Socrates' proof: Griswold 
(1986, pp. 84-85). 
13"Soul-stuff" is nowhere explicitly described or discussed in the Phaedrus. This is true, but in-
conclusive: showing that something is mentioned explicitly is perhaps the easiest way to show 
that that thing is implicated in a text, but certainly not necessary, and sometimes not even suf-
ficient: commentators sometimes dismiss explicit mentions on the ground of irony, for example. 
"Soul-stuff" is logically implicated by the argument's structure. 
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natural for the argument to refer to them as apxal. This suggests that an individual 
soul does not qualify as an apx~ on its own, and since any number of individual 
souls less than the complete set of them would be arbitrary, it is natural to think 
that all the souls together, or better, all the soul-stuff together, constitutes the 
apx~ of movement, with the singular in the text indicating that it is the stuff out 
of which souls are formed that is the subject of the claims. 
One can make a similar point about the word ¢ux~: throughout the passage, 
the word ¢ux~ appears just five times, always without an article.14 This is not the 
pattern we would expect if the passage were about individual souls directly.15 This 
is hardly conclusive: the Phaedrus passage is elevated and archaic in tone, perhaps 
omitting articles for the sake of style alone. But it is consistent with the collective 
reading. 
Continuing with linguistic data, we can note that in the whole proof only two 
phrases briefly focus on individuals, as opposed to abstractions and categories. 
This is the first: 
So only that which moves itself...never stops moving. But it is also 
source and first principle of movement for the other things which 
move. JlOVOV 0~ TO aUTO KlVOUV ... OUTCOTE .MyEl KlVOUJlEVOV, a.AAa Kai 
Tote; CXAA.otc; ocra KlVElTal TOUTO mw~ Kai apx~ KlV~O'EWc;. (245c8-9) 
Here ocra focuses the attention on the plurality, and therefore the individuality, 
of the objects that receive their motions from TO auTo Ktvouv, "that which moves 
14The whole passage is in this style: throughout the argument, most substantives occur without 
articles. 
15 Cf. Phaedo 91c7-92al, a passage in which Socrates is clearly discussing individual souls. There 
the word ¢ux~ occurs five times also, three times with the article (91c9, ds, 91e7-92al), and twice 
without (91d3, d6). 
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itself." It would at least have been natural to shift to the plural as well for "that 
which moves itself," if the author had wanted to refer to a number of individual 
self-movers. The singular t'O <nho Ktvouv is an abstract, general category, and its 
abstraction is thrown into relief by its proximity to the plural ooa.16 Like the pre-
vious observations, this is not conclusive. One might account for the pattern of 
singular and plural, for example, by supposing that each apx~. of an implied plu-
rality of apxa{, moves a number of other entities. But for this reading to become 
convincing, we should be able to locate some other feature in the passage referring 
to, or hinting at, a plurality of apxa{, evidence lacking in the passage. 
The language throughout the rest of the passage, and in particular all the lan-
guage used to discuss the soul, is strongly general. For example, the proof begins 
by dividing entities into two groups, each viewed as a single class: t'O l)' aiJ...o KlVO-
UV Kai urr' aiJ...ou KlVOUJ.lEVov ("that which moves something else and is moved by 
something else") is opposed to 'to aut'o Ktvouv ("that which moves itself;' 245c5-7). 
In each of these phrases, the neuter article focuses on the characteristic by which 
the group is defined, thus amounting to something like a definition of a set or 
class. The central section of the proof is about an apx~. "first principle;' and this 
word is also deprived of an article throughout. Through the entire proof, in fact, 
there is only one instance of an article other than the indefinite neuter t'O (in 'to 
aut'o KlVOUV), found in the phrase t'a rravt'a, "everything" (245d6). In short, there 
is no significant use of individualized language anywhere in the passage, a feature 
16The other individualized phrase is, ... ljJUXfi~ OUO'tav 'tE Kat A6yov 'tOU'tOV aurov n~ AEyWV 
ouK aiaxuvEirat, "someone who asserts that this is the essence and definition of soul will not be 
ashamed" (245e3-4). Here n~ focuses on an arbitrary individual person, but the individual per-
spective does not include the content of this person's assertion. This phrase, therefore, has no 
bearing on how to read 'ljluxJ1. 
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best explained by the collective reading of l!Jux~ .17 
Further, we can trace Socrates' shift in focus from soul-stuff to individual souls 
through his word choice: he begins his proof with the phrase l!Jux~ mxoa, "all soul" 
(245c5), whose ambiguity we have discussed above. The same phrase is used at 
246b6, as Socrates introduces the myth he is about to tell. But once the myth has 
begun, he soon begins using the definite article with l!Jux~. writing ... ai Be: aAA.at 
l!Juxai, ~ !!EV apt<Yta 9e:<i;> Eltoll€V11 ... (" ... of the other souls, the one that follows god 
best ... ," 248al-2). The articles signal the myth's focus on individual souls. 
Finally, although the context of the Phaedrus proof may easily lead us to think 
that Socrates' claims apply to individual souls, in fact he never promises to prove 
the immortality (or indestructibility) of individual souls, nor does he claim to have 
done so afterward. By contrast, in both the Phaedo and the Republic Socrates ex-
pressly claims to prove the immortality of the individual soul. AtPhaedo 106e8-107al, 
for example, Socrates says, "The soul is immortal and indestructible, and in real-
ity our souls will be in Hades" (l!Jux~ aeavat'OV Kai avwAe:epov, Kai t'<i;> ovn EO'OVt'at 
~llwv ai l!Juxai f.v '1\tBou). And at Republic 608d2-3) Socrates says, "Have you not 
realized, I said, that our souls are immortal and will never be destroyed?" (OuK 
fio9110'at, ~v B' tyw, on aeavat'O<; ~llWV ~ l!Jux~ Kat ouBenot'e: cXltOAAUt'at;). In both 
other contexts, Plato has Socrates indicate beyond any doubt that individual souls 
are supposed to be shown immortal by the proofs given: the absence of this claim 
in the Phaedrus may thus be telling.18 
170ne might object that this feature can also be explained by appealing to the archaic style of 
the whole passage. This objection, however, fails to address the logical points raised above on 
page 224. Reading apx~ in the "sophisticated individualistic" way described above (page 220) will 
produce the same problems as those found for that way of reading ljlux~. 
18Note also that the myth's description of individual souls migrating from one body to others 
gives no support to the claim that individual souls are immortal qua individuals in the Phaedrus, 
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Context 
In this section I argue that there are plausible explanations available for what may 
be the surprising conclusion of the proof at 245c-246a. Since the unexpectedness 
of the conclusion is, so far as I can see, the major objection to its acceptance, it 
may help to show that there are resources in the text for explaining its presence, 
ideas that render it less anomalous than it might at first appear.19 I take some of 
Ferrari's basic observations about Phaedrus as assumptions, and show that they 
can be developed to suggest reasons for which Socrates would offer Phaedrus the 
proof he does, rather than the proofPhaedrus (and most readers) expect.20 
Ferrari's work on the Phaedrus suggests that Phaedrus is an acme of un-self-
conscious contradiction. Ferrari portrays Phaedrus, for example, as an addict 
of conversations, something also true of Socrates, but in a very different way. 21 
Whereas Socrates puts himself into conversation for the improvement of his own 
soul, Phaedrus seeks to arrange conversations among others for his own enter-
tainment.22 Ferrari takes the ambiguity between the collective and individual 
since Socrates never claims that these souls will go on existing qua individuals forever. As Cebes 
worries at Phaedo 87b-88b, individual immortality would only follow from a claim or an argument 
that these individual souls go on existing forever, not merely that they go on existing for a long 
time. Since Plato shows in the Phaedo that he is keenly aware of the difference between a proof that 
souls will last a long time, and a proof that souls are immortal, we should be especially cautious 
in attributing an argument for immortality to one of his texts, when that argument's logic only 
succeeds in showing that souls last a long time. 
19Blyth offers a distinct but similar reading, claiming that the passage contains both a valid proof 
of immortality and a series of deliberately misleading statements meant to provoke the reader into 
searching for the correct version (1997, pp. 201-202). While rich and subtle, his approach strikes 
me as overconfident; I make no claim about what effect the reading I advocate is supposed to have 
on the reader, for example. 
20I take Ferrari's reading as a starting-point, but he is of course not responsible for the way I 
develop it. For his account, see Ferrari (1987). 
21Ferrari (1987, pp. 6-7) 
22"Phaedrus loves to arrange talk. Even when he talks himself, it is as much for the excite-
ment of provoking further talk as for the value of what he has to say ... Phaedrus ... has a tendency 
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meanings of \flux~ as intentional, making the point that the impersonal (i.e. col-
lective) point of view in the proof forces the reader to adopt the personal (i.e. in-
dividual or first-person) point of view as well.23 That is, the characteristic attempt 
of philosophers to look at the world impersonally also forces them to confront the 
personal perspective. 
Now the proof's context, and surely Phaedrus' expectations as well, lead the 
reader to expect a proof of individual immortality. But what we in fact get is some-
thing subtly but significantly different: rather than showing that each individual 
soul is immortal, and thus gratifying the personal interest each person has in con-
tinued survival, this proof shows that the material making up individual souls is 
indestructible, thus telling us something important about individual souls, but 
pointedly not that they are immortal qua individuals. If we start from the reason-
able assumption that Phaedrus, like most readers, takes an interest in the proof 
partly because of the expectation that it will show his own soul immortal, we can 
ask what effect it would have on him should he realize that the proof in fact looks 
past the individual level to a more fundamental and universal aspect of souls, their 
underlying material. Now in fact Phaedrus shows no sign in the dialogue that he 
has noticed the real structure of the proof, so if this is part of Socrates' intention, it 
may be an attempt that misses its aim. But this is beside the point: it is neverthe-
to consider intellectual talk good just because it is intellectual talk, rather than because it is good 
talk ... he devotes himself to promoting the discourse of the mind as an end in itself, rather than 
evaluating it ... But Phaedrus is not after pleasure at all costs ... " (Ferrari 1987, pp. 7-8) I read Fer-
rari as attributing the pleasure-motive to Phaedrus as the principle attraction of intellectual talk. 
Of course, Phaedrus' derivation of pleasure from arranging intellectual talk is far from simple-
minded, and is in fact quite sophisticated. But I take the final sentence quoted as indicating that 
pleasure is Phaedrus' principle reason for loving talk in the way he does; at any rate, my further 
use of this portrait does not depend on this detail of my reading. 
23Ferrari's use of "impersonal" and "personal" lends an air of paradox where I see none; I prefer 
"collective" and "individual." 
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less plausible that the proof is intended to draw Phaedrus away from his habitual 
focus on individuals and their personalities, toward more universal facts, facts 
applicable to all individuals. The proof's emphasis on a collective, or universal, or 
impersonal, rather than a personal, perspective may be an attempt to undermine 
Phaedrus' tendency to see the world through the lens of personalities and their 
surface interactions. 
This suggestion applies Ferrari's view that the proof's impersonal perspective 
forces us into the personal perspective, in the following way. By adopting an im-
personal perspective on the logic of the proof, we have been led to discover that 
the proof's conclusion is not what it first appears to be. This in turn has prompted 
us to ask what motive Socrates could have for giving Phaedrus, not the proof he 
expects, but the one we in fact find in the text. The motive I am suggesting, ap-
peals to features ofPhaedrus himself. Socrates' proof may also be designed to lead 
Phaedrus away from his preoccupation with personality, toward a concern with 
objective content. Ferrari is at least correct that the personal and impersonal are 
intertwined in this part of the dialogue: it is Phaedrus' personality, too focused 
on the individual and merely personal, that leads Socrates to produce a proof fo-
cusing on a deeper, more universal aspect of souls. Perhaps also Socrates' interest 
in arguments and philosophy has left him too little focused on how concrete in-
dividual humans relate to one another, and this lack of familiarity is reflected in 
his being led away from his usual haunts by Phaedrus. Any or all these sugges-
tions may be reflected, and added to, by the proof's somewhat deceptive quality: 
it allows itself to be taken for something it is not, but mistaking its nature is a sign 
that one is in need of what the proof actually does, namely, focus on the universal 
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and eternal aspects of the human soul. 
Phaedrus is too much focused on the personal, evaluating talk and speeches 
not by the quality of their content but by his success at inducing others to give 
speeches or continue conversations. He puts the personal aspects of human inter-
action so much to the fore that he loses sight of that for which conversation ought 
to occur, namely the truth.24 Socrates therefore gives him a proof that shifts the 
perspective away from the personal toward the collective or universal.25 The first 
parts of the myth continue this universal perspective: the charioteer represents 
an undetermined number of individual souls, both human and divine (246a-d). 
That is, the charioteer is not any particular soul, but stands in for the structure of 
all souls, both human and divine. Divine souls have two good horses, while hu-
mans have to make do with one good horse and one bad, but the larger structure 
is identical. The image of the charioteer, therefore, is individual, in that it repre-
sents the structure of any given individual soul. It is, however, generic rather than 
personal: it does not represent any particularperson.26 So after the proof has muted 
24Ferrari remarks on Phaedrus' insistence that Socrates stay and continue the conversation af-
ter he delivers his second speech, and later writes, "[Phaedrus] cannot conceive that the values 
of performance might actually prove a danger to the well-being of intellectual talk; cannot con-
ceive, in other words, that he should aim to be a philosopher first, and an impresario only second." 
(Ferrari 1987, pp. 5-6 and 9) 
25Not necessarily the impersonal, as Ferrari has it. And pace Nicholson, who writes, "Moreover, 
such a 'mass-soul' interpretation could not be united with the following imagery whereby each 
soul is visualized as a distinct entity ... " Nicholson (1999, p. 156). But I have already shown that 
the collective reading of "soul" is compatible with the existence of individual souls, so there is 
no further problem in uniting it with the imagery of the myth. Nicholson's reading may stem 
partly from the assumption that Socrates is arguing for the immortality of each individual's soul: 
Nicholson (1999, p. 157). 
26By "individual" here I mean focusing on a single entity as opposed to a group (and I count an 
instance as individual even if the single entity is clearly intended to represent a group, as it is in 
the myth). By "personal" I mean focusing on characteristics that make one member of a genus 
different from other members. Thus there can be accounts that are consistently both individual 
and impersonal, as this one is. Barnes also uses "personal" in this sense: Barnes (1979, pp. 115-116). 
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the personal and individual perspective to which Phaedrus is too much attached, 
the myth goes on to replace these with a more universal and objective portrait 
of souls, focusing on the structure they have in common. Further, the myth says 
that what souls must do to succeed is just what Phaedrus tends to miss, such as 
keeping the truth and reality in view (i.e. the Forms, at 247c-e), and identifying 
and following worthy models (i.e. the gods, at 246e-247a). These are precisely 
the sorts of things Phaedrus ignores in his exclusive concern with quantity over 
quality, with stimulating more talk rather than good talk. Later in the myth, the 
theme of love comes back into view (249d-257a), but now its purpose is to aid 
lovers in more effectively remembering the truth. Interactions with other souls 
have now come back into view, but their proper character is explained as aiding in 
the task of recalling eternal, objective realities. In this way the proof works along 
with the myth in an attempt to reorient Phaedrus' view. As I noted above, there 
is no evidence in the dialogue that Phaedrus ever realizes the real conclusion of 
the proof Socrates gives. The much longer myth, however, tries to accomplish 
something similar, replacing or re-contextualizing Phaedrus' orientation toward 
the personal and toward outer form with a view of what is universal in souls, and 
toward what is valuable for souls, that is, the Forms, or what we might just char-
acterize as the truth. It is not clear to me how much Socrates has succeeded, by 
the end of the dialogue, in turning Phaedrus away from his focus on personal-
ity, toward a new focus on truth. But it is not unreasonable to take the final ex-
changes, in which Phaedrus expresses agreement with Socrates' views, and most 
of all with his final prayer to Pan, as indicating at least the potential for Phaedrus 
to re-evaluate his habits. The proof at 245c-246a, then, may take the first step 
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in a much longer attempt by Socrates to turn Phaedrus out of the direction he is 
going. The proof's conclusion is much less surprising when viewed in the context 
of this longer project, as a prelude to the following myth, and as introducing the 
somewhat more philosophical discussion in the second half of the dialogue. 
The Categories of the Argument 
So far I have shown that on logical, linguistic, and dramatic grounds, we should 
prefer to read Phaedrus 245c5-246a2 as applying to the stuff out of which individ-
ual souls are constituted, and not directly to individual souls. But some of the 
properties true of the material from which a thing is made are true of the thing 
itself, so if this passage proves that soul-stuff is uncreated, it may also follow that 
individual souls are uncreated. To see whether this is the case, we need to examine 
the other concepts employed in the proof and to examine the structure of their 
entailments. 
In the central parts of the passage (245dl-e3), soul is not mentioned at all; 
instead, the argument makes claims about "that which moves itself," "a first prin-
ciple," and "a first principle of movement:' This soulless section is jarringly intro-
duced by the sentence apx~ 8E: ay£vrrrov ("But a first principle is ungenerated," 
my translation, 245d5), the abruptness of this sentence helping to mark the tran-
sition to a somewhat different topic. For the subject of this sentence is no longer 
soul, but the apx~ that soul has just been said to be. It would therefore be too quick 
to assume that the claims of this central section can be transmitted unchanged to 
the level of individual souls. 
As we have already noted, the central section (245dl-e3) is not about soul, but 
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about an apx~ Ktv~cre:wc;, "a first principle, or beginning, of motion." The claims 
here carry implications for souls, of course, but we must travel back across three 
categories to arrive at individual souls: first, from the apx~ KlV~cre:wc; to ro auro Kl-
VOUV, "that which moves itself." Second, from that which moves itself to soul-stuff. 
Finally, from soul-stuff to individual souls. The first stage in clarifying the rela-
tions among these levels is to see how the items at each level fit into the category 
above, that is, whether each item is the only member of the next-more-general 
category, or merely one among several such members. When we have spelled this 
out, we will be ready to decide whether claims made about an item at one level 
entail the same claims for a different level. 
Starting at the top, or most general level, the apx~ Klv~cre:wc; is introduced 
when Socrates says, ro auro KlVOUV ... Kai roic; aAAotc; ocra Ktve:iral rouro Tif(Y~ KCXl 
apx~ Ktv~cre:wc; ("that which moves itself is also source and first principle of mo-
tion for the other things which move;' 245c7-9). This statement places that which 
moves itself in the category of first principle of movement. Note, however, that it 
does not tell us anything about the opposite entailment; that is, we do not know 
whether self-movers are the only first principle of movement, or whether there 
are other first principles of movement in addition to the self-movers.27 A bit later, 
Socrates repeats the claim, saying ourw 0~ KlV~cre:wc; }lEV apx~ ro auro auro Kl-
VOUV, "It is in this way, then, that that which moves itself is a first principle of 
movement" (245d6-7). These statements, then, leave room for things other than 
self-movers to belong to the category of first principle of motion. We have seen 
above, however, that the argument will not tolerate more than a single member 
27Nicholson makes roughly the same point: Nicholson (1999, pp. 160, 161). Thompson, however, 
claims that Socrates has shown that only soul is an apx~: Thompson (1868, p. 45). 
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of the category "first principle;' so we can strengthen our conclusion to the claim 
that something is a self-mover if and only if it is a first principle of movement. 
The next step down is to relate soul-stuff to the category of self-movers. The 
proof opens with the assertion that "soul" belongs to the class of TO <XUTO KlVOUV, 
which should be read as the claim that soul-stuff is in the category of that which 
moves itself.28 At least initially, there is no claim that soul is the only member of 
the class of TO aUTO KlVOUV, but at the end of the proof Socrates says, ... }J~ aAAO n 
dval TO aUTO E<XUTO KlVOUV ~ ¢ux~v ... , " ... that which moves itself is nothing other 
than soul" (245e7-246al). Rowe concludes, rightly, that soul is therefore the only 
thing that moves itself, since soul is here defined as that which moves itself.29 Since 
a definition is equivalent to a biconditional, anything that satisfies the definiens 
must satisfy the definiendum, and vice versa. So everything that moves itself is 
soul-stuff, and every bit of soul-stuff moves itself. 
Finally, we return to the relation between soul-stuff and individual souls. Here 
we must be more speculative, since we have found that this passage makes no 
claims about individual souls; that is, the passage only arrives at the level of soul-
stuff, so we have to make reasonable inferences about the relations between soul-
stuff and individual souls. ]ust as all snowballs are made of snow, all souls are 
made from soul-stuff. But in the other direction, not all soul-stuff must be found 
in individual souls, just as not all snow is found in some snowball or other. Plato 
could have added the claim that all soul-stuff is portioned out among individual 
souls.30 But he does not say this, either here in the Phaedrus or elsewhere. So the 
28! pass over the reference to Soul as TO aElKlVl']WV (245c5), since this is immediately replaced 
by ro auro KlVOUV. 
29Rowe (1986, p. 177 ad 245e7-246a1) 
30Equivalently, Plato could have added the claim that any lump of soul-stuff automatically con-
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text licenses only the claim that any individual soul is composed of soul-stuff, not 
the stronger claim that all soul-stuff is found within individual souls. 
To summarize: every individual soul is made from soul-stuff, and all soul-stuff 
moves itself. What moves itself, equivalent to the whole mass of soul-stuff to-
gether, is also the first principle of motion. Anything predicated of the first prin-
ciple of motion must also be true of what moves itself and this must in turn be true 
of soul-stuff. But what is true of these categories need not be true of individual 
souls. At the end of the proof passage Socrates concludes, €~ av<lyt<f]<; ayEVfJTOV TE 
Ka:l. &:eava:rov \jJux~ liv ElfJ, "necessarily, soul is uncreated and deathless." This is 
not the claim that individual souls are immortal qua individual souls, but the claim 
that they are immortal only qua stuff or material out of which individual souls are 
constituted.31 
stitutes an individual soul. But there is no evidence for this view in the text, and, if we admit the 
Timaeus as relevant here, there is some evidence against it, when Timaeus describes the Demiurge 
constructing the World-Soul out of some soul-stuff he has previously prepared. If any lump of 
soul-stuff automatically made an individual soul, the Demiurge's work in making the World-Soul 
would have been considerably easier. The Timaeus describes soul-stuff not found in souls on two 
occasions: first when the Demiurge has mixed the initial batch of soul-stuff, but has not yet molded 
it into the form that will be the World Soul (35bl-4), and again when the Demiurge takes "what 
remained of the previous ingredients" and divides them into a number of souls (4ld4-8). 
31Bett endorses the collective reading, but thinks that anything true of soul-material must also 
be true of individual souls. But his analogies, water and electricity, are both non-count nouns. He 
says, rightly, that anything true of water as such will be true of any pool of water, and similarly 
for electric current. But 'soul' is a count noun, and souls are treated as individuals at many points 
in Plato's texts. What individuates them, in Plato's view, is unclear, but the most plausible view 
is that something more is required for a pool of soul-stuff to count as an individual soul. After 
all, if Plato's view were that individual souls are nothing but pools of soul-stuff, it would follow 
immediately that individual souls are not immortal, since nothing would prevent one pool from 
merging with another, or splitting into more than one. So individual souls must have at least one 
essential difference from soul-material, and this difference keeps anything true of soul-material 
from being automatically or necessarily true of individual souls as well, just as not everything true 
of snow is automatically or necessarily true of snowballs. We see this difference as well in the 
myth following the proof, in that individual souls are described as having a structure that could 
not belong to soul-stuff: it makes sense to say that an individual soul is tripartite, but not to say 
that soul-stuff is tripartite. For if the stuff or material were tripartite, we would have not one kind 
of stuff but three. And if soul-stuff happens to be a mixture of three ingredients, this fact does 
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Analogously, if some mass of clay is uncreated and indestructible, it does not 
follow that statues molded from the clay are also uncreated and indestructible. 
Rather, the clay may be formed into a statue at one time, and later pounded back 
into formless clay. In the same way, the text says only that the stuff souls are 
formed from is uncreated and indestructible, stopping short of attributing those 
properties to particular souls. 
Alert readers will have noticed, however, that there is another argument for 
immortality in Phaedrus 245c-246a.32 We have been focused on Socrates' second, 
longer argument to the effect that "That which is its own source of motion is 
immortal," in which he develops his claims about the first principle of motion. 
But before this he also gives a brief argument that supports this conclusion inde-
pendently, saying, "that which is always in movement is immortal..." and " ... only 
that which moves itself, because it does not abandon itself, never stops moving" 
(245c5-8). This argument says that anything that moves itself never stops mov-
ing, and anything that never stops moving is immortal. But this argument does 
not validate the immortality of individual souls either, for "soul" is defined as "that 
which moves itself;' and the "soul" that has been thus defined is soul-stuff, not any 
individual soul. Since the definition has the force of"if an only if;' it positively ex-
cludes individual souls from being self-movers. This argument, too, fails to provide 
any evidence that individual souls are immortal. 
not imply that individual souls are tripartite. It is one thing to describe a non-count material as a 
mixture of three ingredients, but something else to describe a count noun as tripartite, with three 
identifiable structural components. Bett (1986, pp. 12-13). 
32This argument is analyzed as an independent support for Step 2 of the overall argument in 
Chapter 3, page 160. 
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4.3 The Phaedrus and the Timaeus 
In the Timaeus, the Demiurge tells the gods he has created that they can be dis-
solved, but that he will never consent to this (41a-b). This declaration is consis-
tent with reading the Phaedrus and the Timaeus as parts of the Unified Theory, at 
least on the narrow issue of whether souls are uncreated and whether individ-
ual souls are immortal. For if one of the gods were to be undone, the individual 
soul would be dissolved, but presumably the soul-stuff out of which it had been 
composed would remain. 
The often-repeated assertion that the Phaedrus and the Timaeus contradict one 
another on the question of whether souls are created or uncreated has been shown 
to be groundless, for it relies on assumptions unsupported by the text of the Phae-
drus. In fact, neither the Timaeus nor the Phaedrus promise immortality to individ-
ual human souls, in spite of the fact that casual reading of both may leave the im-
pression that this has been asserted. For in the Timaeus, only the gods are promised 
immortality; that promise will not necessarily apply to humans, and almost cer-
tainly not to the worst souls. So it is quite likely that some individual souls are 
mortal and will in fact perish, and this is consistent with what is said in the Phae-
drus. 
The argument here is, to be sure, more speculative than those that have come 
before, insofar as it takes a criterion from the Timaeus and applies it to the Phae-
drus. For those who find this approach overambitious, here is a weaker conclu-
sion: neither dialogue contains a claim of immortality, either for individual hu-
man souls or for any souls worse than those. My argument will reach the slightly 
stronger conclusion (at the cost of employing a technique not all will accept), 
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namely that the Phaedrus not only leaves open the possibility that some individual 
souls will perish, but also describes certain cases where this is likely. In the myth 
following the Phaedrus proof, Socrates says that no soul enters a human body un-
less it has seen at least a glimpse of the Forms, implying that there are some souls 
that never succeed in seeing the Forms even once during their time in the heavens 
(249b5-6). These souls, we are told, enter animal bodies. They are not mentioned 
again, but we do learn about the 10,000 year itinerary of the souls that manage to 
see the Forms, entering a human body, separating from that body, either suffer-
ing punishment beneath the earth or enjoying rewards in the heavens until1,000 
years have elapsed, then choosing another life, and continuing this cycle until 
10,000 years have passed, when they finally return to the heavens. Given the re-
striction on entering human bodies, during all this time the bad souls must inhabit 
the bodies of animals only. In the same part of the Phaedrus, Socrates says that it is 
the sight of the Forms that gives the gods their divinity and feeds the rational part 
of human souls (247d-e, 249c). This prompts the question what happens to souls 
that never achieve this nourishment. Now in the Timaeus the Demiurge promises 
that he will never consent to the dissolution of the gods, for "only one who is 
evil would consent to the undoing of what has been well fitted together and is in 
fine condition" (41b1-2). But this promise would not apply to the bad souls from 
the Phaedrus: in fact, no reason is given that the Demiurge would not consent to 
their dissolution, for they are neither well fitted together nor in fine condition. 
The status of human souls in the Timaeus is also questionable. The Demiurge's 
promise not to destroy the gods comes just before he gives his leftover soul-stuff 
to the other gods, for them to use in constructing human and other souls. The 
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soul-stuff he gives them for this purpose is explicitly called "of a second and third 
grade of purity" (41d4-7). The implication of the juxtaposition must be that there 
is also no promise that individual human souls are immortal, since they are less 
well fitted together, and in less fine condition than the gods to whom the promise 
is given. Both dialogues, then, stop short of claiming that individual human souls 
are immortal, and both hint at the perishability of some individual souls. 
Finally, let us note another way in which the two dialogues do not contradict 
one another: neither claims that more soul-stuff, or more individual souls, will 
not again be created in the future. We saw above that the Phaedrus leaves open 
the possibility that individual souls will perish, and that their material could be 
re-used to create other individual souls. Likewise, nothing in the Timaeus pre-
cludes the creation of more soul-stuff, or of more individual souls.33 Timaeus' de-
scription of the World Soul's creation begins precisely by describing the mixing 
of soul-material, from which the World Soul and all others will be manufactured 
(34b-37c).34 Timaeus does not say that this is the first time that soul-material 
has been mixed up, or that this is the only amount of it in existence. It would be 
consistent with the creation described in the Timaeus, then, to suppose that other 
soul-stuff has been mixed together on other occasions, and other souls created 
from those other batches, or that this will happen again in the future. 
33By comparison, Socrates is made to deny these claims at Republic 61la, saying, " ... the same 
[souls] will always exist. I mean, they surely could not become fewer in number if none is de-
stroyed, or more numerous either." 
34Bett notices this commonality between the two dialogues as well: Bett (1986, p. 24). 
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4.4 Conclusion 
A common and natural understanding of the claims found in the Phaedrus and 
Timaeus is mistaken, namely that these dialogues contain conflicting claims about 
the status of individual souls as created or uncreated, and that each dialogue (but 
especially the Phaedrus) gives individual immortality to souls. In fact, neither di-
alogue claims that individual souls are uncreated, nor that they are immortal, 
nor that the same souls always exist. We saw in earlier chapters that the Phaedo 
and Republic contain the Imitation Theory of individual souls, while the Phaedrus, 
Timaeus, and Laws contain the Self-Mover Theory. The results just argued for add 
some points on which these two sets of dialogues divide in the same way: the Re-
public denying that individual souls can come into being or perish, the Self-Mover 
Theory failing to claim this, and distinctly hinting that certain individual souls 
will perish. These parallels between the Phaedrus and the Timaeus show, in ad-
dition, that the Unified Theory is more than a theoretical construct. It is true, 
but uninteresting, that we could conjoin claims from any pair of Platonic dia-
logues to produce a new set of claims. In this case, however, we have two strong 
grounds for combining claims. First, the Kinetic Theory and the Self-Mover The-
ory fit together elegantly and precisely; the former provides an account reducing 
all changes to spatial motion, while the latter claims that soul is the source of all 
changes, and that soul moves itself in space. Second, on a more particular set of 
claims about souls, the dialogue expounding the Kinetic Theory (Timaeus) turns 
out to match one of the dialogues expounding the Self-Mover Theory (Phaedrus) 
on three claims about individual souls. Neither gives immortality to individual 
souls, neither claims that human souls are uncreated, and neither claims that the 
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same souls must always exist. Negative facts are usually not persuasive, but in this 
case the claims that fail to appear are not chosen at random, but express views 
from the Imitation Theory, or views that are widely believed to lie in these texts. 
Developmentalists, noting that the Laws also refrains from using the article with 
lf!ux~. may conclude that Plato eventually became a skeptic about the immortality 
of individual souls. 
Conclusion 
I have raised at least as many issues as I have solved; here I will indicate what I 
have shown, and the most salient issues I have not been able to pursue. 
Chapter 1 explains some aspects of the Imitation Theory, found in the Phaedo 
and Republic. I would expect to find similar (not necessarily identical) views in 
other dialogues usually classified as "middle": the Gorgias and Symposium, for ex-
ample. 
The major claim in Chapter 1 is that the Imitation Theory assumes a Form of 
Soul without mentioning it. This Form gives individual souls something to imi-
tate that is what they essentially are. We are more familiar with thinking of souls 
imitating the Forms of Justice, Knowledge or Beauty, but these are inessential to 
souls. The Form of Soul, by contrast, is what a soul most basically is; its existence 
explains why, on this theory, it is good for souls to separate from the visible world 
and draw closer to the world of Forms. 
The Form of Soul raises several further questions. Why does Plato refrain from 
mentioning it? What else can we learn about individual souls from the presence of 
this Form? To the former question, I have two answers, one more pedestrian, the 
other more speculative. The pedestrian answer is that Plato was dissatisfied with 
the Imitation Theory at the time he wrote these texts, and so avoided mentioning 
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what he considered its weakest point, what Archer-Hind called a "metaphysical 
monstrosity." The speculative answer is that precisely the absence of this central 
concept is a strategy to provoke readers, to leave them feeling that something is 
missing, and to conduct their own search for what it may be. On the issue of what 
individual souls are like on this theory, I show that they fit consistently into a slot 
between the Forms and the visible world, with the status of"invisible individuals." 
I suspect there is more to discover in this direction. 
I have also been unable to give a fuller description of the Imitation Theory, 
which would include discussion of, for example, the question why souls become 
more like whichever 'world' they imitate. Does this indicate (as I suggested in the 
Introduction) that the visible world and the world of Forms are each a source of 
change for souls, whenever souls are imitating those worlds? We may also ask 
whether the dialogues expounding this theory contain other clues as to what it is 
in souls that forces them to imitate something (why not nothing?), and by what 
mechanism (for lack of a better word) souls resemble what they imitate more and 
more closely. 
Chapter 2 described the Kinetic Theory, claiming that all forms of change are 
nothing but spatial motions. The Kinetic Theory is a parallel to the Form of Soul 
insofar as neither is mentioned directly in the text. Fortunately, this theory re-
quires much less detective work to uncover, as its pieces are laying on the surface 
of the dialogue, ready to be assembled. This theory's main interest is the extension 
and support it provides to the Self-Mover Theory. 
I was unable to pursue in much depth the nature of the "receptacle"; while 
my argument adds weight to the camp taking it as space, a full treatment would 
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involve many more issues. I am skeptical that any new argument will push the 
debate about the receptacle toward consensus, but a new argument is of interest 
nonetheless. 
Chapter 3 argued that in the three texts well-known for containing the Self-
Mover Theory, "motion" means "spatial motion." 
I concentrated on establishing this claim, and so did not give a full description 
of the Self-Mover Theory itself. I also showed that one additional text, a passage 
from the Statesman, assumes the same claims as the other, better-known loci of 
the theory. This passage contains a striking claim, given the better-known as-
sumptions of the Imitation Theory, namely that rotation in a single direction, at 
constant speed, is a way of remaining in the same state. 
The first task for further work would be to give a fuller description of the the-
ory, and then to ask what clues we are given about how soul moves itself, and what 
this means (beyond the fact that the motion is spatial). I suspect that certain other 
dialogues customarily classified as late may also betray assumptions of the Self-
Mover Theory, but have not been able to demonstrate that here. There is also 
more to be said about the innovative claim in the Statesman concerning rotation. 
I am curious whether other Platonic texts can be found assuming this claim. I 
also hope that further reflection will yield a more coherent view of why rotation 
becomes the model of rationality. 
The Self-Mover Theory and the Kinetic Theory look designed to support the 
claim that soul is the source of all change. The Self-Mover Theory guarantees that 
soul is the source of its own changes, the Kinetic Theory showing that soul is the 
source of all other changes. I hold the view, although I have not argued for it 
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carefully here, that the Self-Mover and Imitation Theories are incompatible. The 
best reason for this is that the Imitation Theory has souls imitating Forms, and 
the Form of Soul especially. On the Imitation Theory, then, there is at least a 
theoretical possibility that souls may escape from change altogether, becoming 
completely changeless, as the gods are said to be at Republic 380c-381c. On the 
Self-Mover Theory, however, soul is its own source of change. I see no possibility 
of soul ever failing to change, and no need for the Form of Soul as an object of im-
itation. These claims would need substantial argument to make good on, so here 
I merely record them as impressions I hope to work through more carefully later. 
Chapter 4 examines the use of"soul" in the Phaedrus proof at 245c-246a, argu-
ing that individual souls are never mentioned in this passage, and that the proof 
says nothing about them. Instead, it shows that soul-material is self-moving (while 
nothing else is), is immortal, and is the first principle of motion. Further, the Phae-
drus and Timaeus share a set of claims about souls (or rather the absence of certain 
claims about souls), showing that the assumptions in each dialogue are closer than 
usually thought. This is significant partly because the Phaedrus gives the most con-
cise statement of the Self-Mover Theory, while the Timaeus expounds the Kinetic 
Theory. Marrying these two theories as the Unified Theory is thus not an arbitrary 
proposal. 
The proof focuses not on individual souls, but on soul-stuff or material. I have 
not been able to investigate whether other texts containing the Self-Mover Theory 
share this approach. One would also like a fuller description of the set of claims 
relating to soul-stuff. Where are the claims found, what else do they say about 
souls, and what do we learn from the fuller description about the Kinetic Theory? 
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